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5 1. Introduction 
 
 
What are the threats that face Finland? 
“What are the threats that face Finland?” is a simple enough question 
in itself, and one that is frequently asked both in the context of Finnish 
security policy and in everyday conversation. In academic terms, 
answers may be sought through a wide variety of perspectives and 
approaches, as there are numerous ways of defining and interpreting 
security and the threats posed to it. It is a question that all those in 
positions of political responsibility should be able to answer, as the 
defining and management of threats is a matter of crucial importance 
for the state – it is a matter of its own security. Correspondingly, a 
vast number of widely differing opinions may exist on this topic in 
everyday reality, as each one of us may have his or her own views on 
the subject. We are constantly arriving at our own assumptions 
regarding the world around us and the factors affecting it, which in 
turn serve to construct our understanding of the various threats that we 
face. People perceive reality through a variety of concepts and social 
processes, and at the same time, if some particular thing is felt to 
constitute a sufficiently powerful threat, steps are taken to meet this 
threat in the manner felt to be most appropriate (depending on the 
object of the security risk), in order to gain a sense of security or 
eliminate a source of insecurity.1 One may indeed ask in a critical vein 
                                                 
This study was written when the author was serving as lecturer of strategy at the Finnish 
National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies. Dr.Mil.Sc, 
M.Soc.Sc and Captain (ret.) Jarno Limnéll is currently working as Director of Cyber 
Security in Stonesoft Corporation. 
1 Another essential factor in this is the experienced intensity of the threat. One good 
example of this would be the technological threat scenarios associated with the transition to 
the new millennium, which were perceived beforehand as very serious matters in terms of 
both intensity and impact. In the opinion of Johan Eriksson no threat since the Second 
World War had elicited such a comprehensive response in Sweden as did the interference 
with telecommunications that might have arisen at the turn of the millennium, and this has 
subsequently been used in Swedish threat perception research as a prime example of both 
the relative nature of threats and the relationship between talk and reality in this field. 
Investigations after the event have shown that certain actors made a conscious attempt to 
exaggerate the threats on that occasion in order to obtain greater allocations of government 
funding, but it has also been noted that no mention was made in this research of the 
significance of the preparations made (to control the threat) relative to the intensity at 
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6what things or factors we regard as threats, and what factors interacted 
in the early years of the new millennium to construct the Finns‟ 
understanding of the threats that faced their society. Who dictated the 
conditions under which this took place? 
The present discussion will set out from the understanding of a threat 
as a social construct, a political instrument that is both disputed and 
negotiable. There is no such thing as a threat as a single, defined, 
stable state of affairs, as it is impossible to establish the “true reality” 
of a threat objectively,2 if only because this would entail an objective 
measure of security, which no theory of security has yet been able to 
produce (and is scarcely likely ever to do so). This is in any case also 
tied up with the nature of a threat as a prediction of the future, and the 
fact that the perception of a threat is tied to a certain evaluative 
viewpoint. The disputable nature of security and threats is concerned 
with the reconciliation of different evaluations, world-views and 
political goals, which means that perceived threats can never 
command total unanimity and thresholds for defining a threat can vary 
to a substantial degree. Since actors can look on a security 
environment and the threats entailed in it in different ways, the 
understanding upon which the decisions are eventually based is 
determined by the process by which the perceptions of threats are 
formed.3 A state‟s public threat perceptions are constructed through 
interaction between numerous actors in combination with perceptions 
expressed by external actors. We shall approach the question of 
perceived threats in this work from the viewpoint of social reality 
rather than regarding material factors as being of prime importance. In 
this sense the perception of a threat may in itself promote the concrete 
existence of that threat, i.e. a common belief in its existence may turn 
it into a “reality”. At the central government level the definition of 
threats can be regarded as one of the fundamental processes involved 
in the outlining of security policy. 
                                                                                                         
which it was realized. See, for example, Johan Eriksson, Kampen om Hot-bilden. Rutin och 
Drama i Svensk Säkerhetspolitik, Santérus Förlag, Stockholm 2004, pp. 11–13, 189–190. 
2 Thus the defining of a perceived public domain threat to national security is primarily a 
political issue and not a matter of objective assessment. Cf. Barry Buzan, People, States 
and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, Worcester 1991, p. 115.  
3 According to Harto Hakovirta, it is a question of whose views carry the greatest weight in 
this process. See Harto Hakovirta, Maailmanpolitiikka, teoria ja todellisuus, Gummerus 
Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä 2002, pp. 142–143. 
7Security and threats are what we make of them.4 The constructivist 
theoretical and methodological perspective adopted in this work refers 
in its entirety to the manner in which security and threats are 
understood and interpreted. We shall approach the reality of threats in 
a multi-level, multidisciplinary manner – in as broad a manner, in fact, 
as the various actors set out to present the threats they perceive and to 
justify this reality. The examination will not be limited to the level of 
independent states nor to the perception of political or military threats 
but will aim at a more comprehensive viewpoint in this respect. In 
spite of the attention paid to different levels, however, the main 
emphasis in the empirical interpretation will be upon the state and the 
national security and defence policy reports that have become 
established procedure in Finland during the post-Cold War period. 
Indeed, one of the motives behind this work lay in the observation that 
the process of preparing these security and defence policy reports and 
constructing the associated descriptions of perceived threats had not 
previously been studied. 
A secure life calls for secure truths,5 and these truths regarding 
security and perceived threats were constructed during the post-Cold 
War period to a great extent under conditions dictated by a bipolar 
view of world politics, a mood of realism and a state-centred 
philosophy of military security. There was little open discussion of 
security issues or perceived threats within Finnish society at that time, 
and the threats that the country faced were shrouded in a certain 
indeterminacy and ambivalence in addition to being largely of a 
military nature. The public perception of threats tended to be rather 
different from the reality on which the actual actions taken to control 
and counter perceived threats were based.6 The Soviet Union was 
                                                 
4 To parallel Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1992, p. 391. 
5 James Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard”, in 
Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, Columbia University Press, New York 1995, p. 34. 
6 According to Pertti Salminen, public perceptions of threats in the 1960s showed a 
powerful tendency to avoid anything that would annoy the Soviet Union. The military and 
political leadership based their threat perception philosophy on the possibility of an 
overland Soviet offensive aimed at occupying Finland, but it was impossible to bring this 
prospect out into the open. Pertti Salminen, Puolueettomuuden nimeen, sotilasjohto 
Kekkosen linjalla ja sen sivussa 1961–1966, Helsinki 1995, pp. 44–46. On ambivalence in 
threat perceptions on the part of small nations, see Wilhelm Agrell, Alliansfrihet och 
Atombomber, Kontinuitet och förändring i den svenska försvarsdoktrinen från 1945 till 
1982, Liber, Stockholm 1985, pp. 20-25. 
8looked on as the only real military threat, but official public policies 
were always framed in strict accordance with the provisions of the 
1948 Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. 
This was a form of security policy logic in which different perceived 
threats were manifested at different levels. The Finnish understanding 
of the threat scenario was dominated by the possibilities of the country 
becoming involved in a war above all on account of a worsening of 
tension between the major world powers of the day.7 A public, or 
semi-public, threat perception was employed as a means of protecting 
Finland‟s neutrality, but the covert perception that lay behind it was 
seldom discussed openly. The main emphasis in all the evaluations of 
perceived threats was upon military issues and the balance of power, 
and the official, publically expressed views on the threat scenario 
were in general highly neutral in character, so that all talk of threats in 
the public domain was directed towards reassuring the country‟s 
citizens and strengthening their belief in Finland‟s ability to defend 
itself militarily.8 Thus a publicly declared threat perception should be 
understood in this context as being above all a carefully formulated 
political statement designed to support both the country‟s official 
foreign policy and its internal stability, in which certain factors in the 
definition may be “underweighted” or “overweighted” for particular 
political purposes; in other words it is deliberately constructed and is 
flexible in relation to the political aims of the moment. One interesting 
observation to emerge from earlier research is that threat perceptions 
are frequently formulated and expressed in public only after the 
related decisions have been made, so that they do not in fact serve at 
all as definitions of the pre-existing state of affairs but are in effect the 
products of political power struggles and conflicting interpretations.9 
                                                 
7 See Ari Raunio, ”Suomen sotilaallinen uhkakuva kylmän sodan aikana 1944–1990”, in 
Petteri Jouko, Pasi Kesseli, Jukka Kulomaa, Ari Raunio (eds.), Suursotien vuosisata. Sodan 
ja taistelun kuva 1900-luvulla, Sotahistorian laitos, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Helsinki 
2002, pp. 149–179. 
8 A comprehensive picture of the multidimensional political and evaluative nature of the 
concept of threat in Finland is given by Kari Miekkavaara, Ydinaseiden uhka Suomen 
maanpuolustukselle, Päättäjien käsitykset uhkasta ja toimenpiteet sen torjumiseksi vuosina 
1945–1971, doctoral thesis, Turun yliopisto, Turku 2004, pp. 213–214.   
9 See, for example, Fredrik Bynander, ”Securitizing Submarine Intrusions”, in Johan 
Eriksson, Threat Politics, new perspectives on security, risk and crisis management, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2001, pp. 123–144.  
9As may be seen from earlier threat perception policy research,10 the 
meaning of the word threat can be judged to have altered in two ways 
since the end of the Cold War. Firstly, the conceptual foundation for 
the terms security and threat has been essentially broadened, so that 
the concept of threat can apply nowadays to a wide variety of 
problems, risks and even challenges. This is linked to the 
modernization of society and the projection of security as an everyday 
issue, so that threats have become to an increasing extent part of our 
collective cognitive knowledge. Thanks to the greater communicative 
efficiency of the media, we are more aware than ever before of the 
various factors in our lives that are identified as threats. At the same 
time, it is no longer possible to react to threats exclusively by defence 
policy means. The broadening of the scope of the threats that face 
society is also a consequence of the increased vulnerability brought 
about by its dependence on information technology. Virus attacks or 
other forms of cybercrime would not be possible without the 
technological progress and high degree of networking typical of our 
modern society. Secondly, there has been a distinct increase in the 
openness with which threats are discussed and the use that is made of 
them to advance political interests. Threat perception policy has 
become an aspect of politics alongside many others, and at the same 
time security and threats have become central concepts in the 
language of politics. The scope and diversity of possible threats are 
increasingly often being discussed with political intent, and this is 
reflected in the initiatives taken to renew the legislation regarding 
perceived threats and the creation of functional and organizational 
structures of various kinds. In national and international contexts this 
has meant the institutionalization of many new threats. 
The beginning of the new millennium, especially the time after the 
terrorist attack of 11.9.2001, has often been described in research into 
international relations as “the age of the new security policy mind-
set”,11 while the period of ten years or so that is referred to as the 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Johan Eriksson (ed.), Threat Politics, New perspectives on security, 
risk and crisis management, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2001, Myriam A. Dunn, 
Cyber-Threats and Countermeasures: The Threat Politics Behind Efforts to Secure the 
Information Age, doctoral thesis, Universität Zurich 2006. 
 
11 See, for example, Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, Routledge, 
New York 2007, pp. 235–243. The metanarratives of international relations, in which the 
meanings of the narratives themselves serve as mental images, concepts and names for 
10
“post-Cold War era” is regarded as having come to an end at that 
point.12 Terrorism emerged at the nucleus of western threat per-
ceptions in the early years of the 21st century, even though no com-
mon policy was developed for containing this threat. Alongside this, 
however, the decline in the probability of a major war, the expansion 
of security measures and the increased level of globalization created 
an atmosphere in which states were more committed than ever to the 
logic of securitization, i.e. the treating of various issues and 
phenomena as aspects of national or regional security. The notion of 
securitization alludes to the fact that security and the threats to it are 
not simple, readily observable states of affairs, but rather they are 
questions of definition and viewpoint. In fact the definition of security 
and perceived threats has become a competitive political arena in 
which practically everything conceivable can be “securitized”. One 
may very well ask whether security and threat have lost their meaning 
as concepts. It is certainly true, for instance, that alongside its own 
nationally perceived threat reality, an individual state in the present-
day globalizing world is required to formulate perceptions that serve 
as parts of a more extensive, international threat perception policy. It 
then becomes necessary for us to consider to what extent a state‟s 
threat agendas are determined nationally and to what extent 
internationally. Securitization may be seen as a part of a continuous 
process of political prioritization which is being carried out both 
consciously and unconsciously at the national and the international 
level. The situation becomes rather different, however, at the point 
where the threats come to be seen as military ones, for then they are 
understood as requiring the exercise of military force. 
The logic of securitization will be examined here in the context of the 
government‟s security and defence policy reports, employing the 
methods of agenda-setting theory, framing and process tracing. In 
temporal terms, the work will concentrate on the period from 
                                                                                                         
historical periods, refer to the time following 11.9. as “the war on terror”, “the time of anti-
terrorist activity”, etc. On this point, see Jari Rantapelkonen, The Narrative Leadership of 
War, doctoral thesis, Johtamisen laitos, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Julkaisusarja 1, 
Tutkimuspapereita No. 34, Helsinki 2006.  
12 See, for example, Nicholas Rengger, “Theorizing world politics for a new century”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3, 2006, pp. 427-430; Jyri Raitasalo, ”Läntinen sodan 
kuva kylmän sodan jälkeen”, in Jyri Raitasalo, Joonas Sipilä (eds.), Muuttuva sota, 
Jyväskylä 2005, pp. 106–107. 
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11.9.2001 onwards. The process of constructing threat perceptions 
will be understood as being expressive of continuity and as taking 
place constantly, and interest will be focused in the first instance on 
the threat perceptions of actors external to Finland‟s security policy 
mechanism who may be assumed to exercise influence on and interact 
with the content of the country‟s perceived threats. Perceptions from 
outside Finland‟s security environment contribute to the construction 
of the country‟s perceived threats, i.e. they create a certain inter-
national perspective for its national threat perceptions. Indeed, 
national threat scenarios have been regarded in earlier research as 
emerging to an increasing extent as integrated products of inter-
national cooperation.13 Secondly, the situation at the beginning of the 
new millennium would seem in the light of Finland‟s social and 
security policy discussions to have been full of threats of one kind or 
another, and an attempt will be made here to ascertain how certain 
matters came to be defined officially as part of Finland‟s security 
policy, i.e. as publicly acknowledged threats to the state. This is 
related to the procedure of “going inside the issues” associated with 
the drawing up of government security and defence policy reports, an 
approach which is intended to question the fairly uncritical approval 
commanded by the broad-based concept of security in Finnish society, 
as it is through political decisions that the concept of security has been 
extended.14 Thirdly, the construction of threat scenarios of a particular 
kind is assumed in a democracy to be all the more legitimate if similar 
matters are generally regarded as threats within society at large. 
Therefore, our interest will also be focused on the extent to which the 
Finns‟ ideas of threats to the nation coincide with the perceptions 
expressed at the government level (in its reports). 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Georg Sørensen, Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of 
International Relations, Palgrave, New York 2002, pp. 12–21, 141–144; P.H. Liotta, 
“Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security”, 
Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2005, pp. 65–67. 
14 See Jarno Limnéll, ”Laaja turvallisuus on poliittinen valinta”, Ulkopolitiikka, No. 2, 
2008, pp. 59–60. 
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Political threats 
The way in which the term “threat” is interpreted15 is dependent on the 
actor‟s understanding of security, for like security, the concept of a 
threat can be a high complex and relative one, and may carry 
connotations of a danger posed to one‟s system of values and at least 
partial inability to control the situation.16 One may well regard 
“threat” and “risk” as parallel concepts, to the extent that attempts to 
distinguish between them may be of little practical significance. A risk 
may nevertheless be regarded as less serious than a threat and more of 
an everyday matter, more often involving an element of concrete 
activity (the capacity to do something).17 On the other hand, the 
concepts of threat and vulnerability are also connected, and may best 
be distinguished from one another by considering the object whose 
security is at stake. Where a threat is a factor causing danger, 
discomfort or uncertainty, vulnerability is a property of the actor, the 
propensity for becoming an object of the threat or its consequences.18 
Interaction between threats and vulnerability can generate a form of 
insecurity in which even something that is only perceived as a minor 
threat may prove to be of political significance if the vulnerability of 
the object of that threat is regarded as exceptionally high. It is also 
common when speaking of threats to use various related concepts such 
as “cause for concern”, “uncertainty”, “possibility” or “danger”.19 
                                                 
15 The definition in a widely accepted dictionary of English that comes closest to that given 
by a basic dictionary of Finnish for the equivalent word, uhka, is that of Webster‟s 
Dictionary: “an indication of probable evil, violence or loss to come”. See also Suomen 
kielen perussanakirja, Kotimaisten kielten tutkimuskeskus, Helsinki, 1996, pp. 412–413. 
16 Johnson, Improbable Dangers, p. 12, Thomas W. Milburn, Kenneth M. Watman, On the 
Nature of Threat: A Social Psychological Analysis, Praeger Special Studies, New York 
1981, pp. 8–11. 
17 See, for example, Sjöberg, “Risk Perceptions: Taking on Societal Salience”, pp. 21–22. 
18 See Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 112-113. Buzan maintains that states can 
attempt to attenuate the influence of threats either by reducing or eliminating the formation 
of such threats or by reducing their own vulnerability to them.  
19 The relations between the Finnish equivalents of these concepts and the intensity of the 
threat are discussed in Jari Rantapelkonen, Konfliktin, konfliktinhallinnan ja turvallisuuden 
käsitteet kylmän sodan jälkeen, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitoksen julkaisuja, 
julkaisusarja 1, No. 17, Helsinki 2000, pp. 85–86. Especially in everyday language there is 
not necessarily very much difference between a threat, the perception of a threat and the 
various related expressions. 
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One frequently used basis for defining a threat (especially in military 
defence planning) is the equation Threat = Will x Capability.20 This 
suggests that the threat and its intensity are functions of the combined 
effects of the political will and performance capacity of the opposite 
party (that posing the threat), and it is on the basis of this that attempts 
are made in the context of military planning to calculate as “accurate” 
estimates of the threat as possible in the form of “threat-resource 
analyses”.21 These analyses are usually highly confidential and are 
drawn up and made available only within a limited group of actors, 
and they are generally concerned with estimates of performance 
capacity, which can be regarded as an element that is less open to 
change than will. It is more difficult to define will objectively, as it 
can alter within a very short space of time.22 This traditional con-
ceptual basis for defining a threat is limited in scope and 
problematical in view of the expansion in the concept of security. It is 
difficult, for example, to find a coherent performance capacity or 
political will behind the threats posed by the refugee problem or 
environmental disasters, for instance. 
Perceived threats do not form the content of a policy by themselves 
but through the medium of actors, so that the impact of their material 
basis is consequent upon the interpretations arrived at and measures 
taken by actors, and it should be noted that the same point of departure 
also holds good for the modelling of perceived military threats. 
Publically announced threat perceptions have a powerful political 
dimension. Threat perceptions are constructed with various interests 
in mind and their evolution is always a form of societal activity in 
which politics is involved. A threat can be assumed objectively to be 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Puolustusministeriö, Turvallisesti tulevaisuuteen, puolustusministeriön 
strategia 2025, Helsinki 2006, p. 11; also Robertson, ”Mediated Threats”, pp. 61–83. 
According to Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 265, a military threat may be defined as 
consisting of certain factors: total strength, geographical proximity, offensive capacity and 
aggressive intentions. 
21 See Kenttäohjesääntö, Yleinen osa, Puolustusjärjestelmän toiminnan perusteet, General 
Headquarters, Planning Division, Helsinki 2007; Visuri, Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia, 
pp. 461–471.  
22 According to Walt, “it is difficult to measure the factors that contribute to a threat, 
because no clear-cut method has been developed for this.” Stephen Walt, “Keeping the 
World Off-Balance”, in: John G. Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled – The Future of the 
balance of Power, Ithaca 2002, p. 134. The estimation of military capacity has also become 
more difficult since the end of the Cold War, see Raitasalo, “Läntinen sodan kuva kylmän 
sodan jälkeen”, pp. 102–122. 
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omnipresent, in other words threats in a broad sense are insecurity 
factors that are experienced by all people. Threats are all those things 
that people wish to look on as threats. 
When interpreting publicly perceived threats (as expressed by 
governments, for instance) it is possible to by-pass the construction 
process and that of forming a political consensus. The consensus in 
the case of perceived threats announced by governments may be 
defined as far as the present research is concerned as a consequence of 
the power relations and interactions between the actors involved and 
factors affecting these. Likewise, when studying different actors‟ 
concepts of the same threat or threatening factors, the concept of 
perception will inevitably include within it a relativity associated with 
the actor. The political construction of a perceived threat is a matter of 
the relativity of interpretations of threats. Actors experience threats in 
different ways, and concepts of what is a threat are apt to change. 
Interpretations and evaluations are important parts of the reality of a 
threat, the reality that the actors attempt to construct by means of the 
descriptions that they attach to it. Where the threat concerns 
something that can be predicted, its “truthfulness” is revealed only 
when it is carried out (or fails to be carried out). All perceived threats, 
even those claimed to be real, are in principle guesses and imaginary 
predictions. Since the concept of a perceived threat – a description or 
mental image of a danger – places emphasis on interpretations, ideas 
and interests, perceived threats cannot be assumed to be real, but 
rather they are social and political constructs. As Michael Williams 
points out, a constant, significant struggle then ensues over the correct 
definition of the truth, the perceived threat.23 One has to be constantly 
asking why one particular view of the threat prevails and achieves 
dominance. 
The perceived threats spoken about in publicly accessible documents 
reflect not only the internal and external environments in which a 
government is operating but also various tendencies perceivable in the 
broader political arena. Perceived threats have a dimension of political 
content and use. Actors do not merely observe what is going on 
around them but they also give meanings to their observations in the 
given political context, i.e. they construct an interpretation of each 
                                                 
23 Michael C. Williams, “The Institutions of Security: Elements of a Theory of Security 
Organizations”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1997, pp. 297–302.  
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threat which is designed to be successful in the course of political 
interaction. Perceived threats can always be shown to be based on a 
certain starting point, formations created for some particular purpose, 
and it is the task of politics to choose between these formations.24 In 
the field of threat perception policy, political thinking is taken as the 
cornerstone for the construction and presentation of the reality in 
terms of threats – so that any openly expressed perceived threat will 
inevitably be associated with politics and political thinking.25 
Research into “the politics of threat images” involves attempts at 
interpreting the factors and meanings that affect the social 
construction of such threat images and the interests that are bound up 
with them. Threat images are an integral part of politics and political 
thinking, a starting point for discussing the politics of threat images 
that can well be put forward as a rejoinder to those who believe that 
any study of the political nature of threat images is apt to shift 
attention unjustifiably away from “the threats themselves”. One may 
very well ask why actors can differ so widely in their understanding of 
the same threat factor and the means of coping with it, or equally well 
why certain threat images are permanent within society while others 
are not. It is necessary in these connections to abandon the assumption 
of the complete rationality of politics and political actors and accept 
that it is more a question of rationality from the point of view of the 
actors‟ own ideas and their pursuance of their own goals. 
Since it is a question of the political and social interpretation of 
threats, of the distinction between what is a threat and what is not and 
of the exposure of things that do constitute threats, politics must be 
viewed as a dimension that unites all collective activity. Politics is 
activity, whether official or unofficial, public or private, that takes 
place on the part of all human groups, institutions and communities. 
This concept is grounded in Carl Schmitt‟s definition of politics as 
social activity taking place between individuals.26 Politics always 
                                                 
24 See Roxanna Sjöstedt, “Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of 
HIV/AIDS in Russia”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2008, pp. 7-29; Erik Noreen, 
“Verbal Politics of Estonian Policy-makers: Reframing Security and Identity”, in: Johan 
Eriksson (ed.), Threat Politics, Aldershot 2001, pp. 84–100. 
25 This association is frequently referred to in English as “Threat Politics” or “The Politics 
of Threat Images”. A regularly used equivalent concept in Swedish is “Hotbildernas 
Politik”. 
26 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London 1996, pp. 19–37. See also Pirjo Jukarainen, “Tieteellinen katse ja politiikka”, in: 
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involves more than one person, even though the political actors 
themselves may be individual people. Personal perceptions of threats 
become political only through social intercourse and social practises. 
In this view politics is manifested at all levels of social interaction, 
and threat politics can be associated with practically any phenomenon 
defined by an actor.27 Anything and everything can have a political 
aspect, which implies that nothing is “protected” from the politics of 
threat images.28 It is merely a question of what things one makes 
(wishes to make) into political threat images by means of politics. 
This notion of politics does not prevent us from paying attention to the 
actors who in the final instance decide on a nation‟s perceived threats; 
on the contrary, one should devote due attention to those decision-
makers who are in a position to politicize and securitize threat images 
at the national level. The aspectual nature of threat politics is a 
manifestation of the changing politicization of threats, and also of the 
broad spectrum of meanings attached to their political nature. 
Politics is ever-present in the construction of perceived threats – as it 
is in the nature of threat politics that it should be grounded in 
conflicts over how things should be interpreted in threat contexts and 
as belonging to those contexts. Threat politics refers to the 
problematic relationship between two interconnected perspectives in 
the political construction of threats: 1) What threat images should be 
commonly understood as official perceived threats at the national 
level, i.e. what threats should in general be taken to represent 
perceived threats at that level? and 2) In what form should one 
describe those threats? These perspectives combine to generate a 
competition over the common threats to be recognised by the 
community concerned.29 The fact that politics is grounded in 
                                                                                                         
Jouko Huru & Tarja Väyrynen (eds.), Kadonnutta poliittista etsimässä, Kansainvälinen 
turvallisuus ja politiikka, Helsinki 2004, pp. 18–20. 
27 See Kari Palonen, Tekstistä politiikkaan. Johdatusta tulkintataitoon, Hämeenlinna 1988, 
pp. 18–21 (quote from p. 19), Kari Palonen, ”Politiikka”, in: Matti Hyvärinen, Jussi 
Kurunmäki, Kari Palonen, Tuija Pulkkinen & Henrik Stenius (eds.), Käsitteet liikkeessä. 
Suomen poliittisen kulttuurin käsitehistoria, Tampere 2003, pp. 467–518. According to 
Nokkala, Laajeneva sotilaspolitiikka, pp. 54–56, the concept of aspect is consistent with 
this basic constructivist assumption, because ”aspect politics” lays emphasis on the naming 
of things and the fact that things political are always open to interpretation and are 
dependent on social understanding. 
28 Palonen, Tekstistä politiikkaan. Johdatusta tulkintataitoon, p. 19. 
29 See Heikki Paloheimo & Matti Wiberg, Politiikan perusteet, WSOY, Helsinki 1997, pp. 
42–50; Palonen, Tekstistä politiikkaan. Johdatusta tulkintataitoon, pp. 20–-21. 
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conflicts30 gives expression not only to the relative and actor-centred 
nature of threat images but also to their property of being forms of 
political activity. Politics may be understood as a perspective from 
which to examine the construction of perceived threats and the 
interpretation of those that are to be put forward as such. Political 
activity gains its impetus from the existence of various goals and 
interpretations. 
The political production of threat images raises the question of their 
inevitability: could a situation arise in which a nation was not facing 
any threats? This is to some extent a philosophical question, as it 
implies the possibility of people experiencing a complete absence of 
threats of any kind. Although it is impossible to conceive of a nation 
having a certain “threat quota” which must always be fulfilled, the 
politics of threat images is such that threats of some kind must always 
be assumed to be present. This in turn implies that the existence of 
perceived threats is an inalienable part of the requirement for defining 
the existence of a state and its collective security. States have a need 
to create perceived threats, as this provides a purpose for the state‟s 
existence.31 It is also easier to find threats if one sets out purposefully 
to look for them. On the other hand, perceived threats are constructed 
if and when someone wishes to construct them. Perceived threats and 
their construction are a political practise that is permanent in nature, 
so that, viewed from a conflict perspective, they are always part of the 
reality of political life and collective security. The broadening of 
perceived threats and of the concept of threat is in part a consequence 
of the reduction in the probability of realization in the case of military 
threats, which means that room has been created for the existence of 
other kinds of threat.32 Perceived threats can be looked on as catalysts 
for changes in the concept of security, i.e. by broadening the 
perceived threats one can broaden the concept of security. For threat 
politics, the broadening of security has meant a broadening of the 
                                                 
30 On the conflict-based nature of politics, see Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pp. 
26, 29, 35; Paloheimo & Wiberg, Politiikan perusteet, pp. 43-44, 49; Palonen, ”Politiikka”, 
pp. 499–506. 
31 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 141-142. On the inevitability of perceived threats, 
see, for instance, Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pp 53-58; Moisio, Kriittinen 
geopolitiikka ja alueelliset uskomusjärjestelmät, pp. 43–62. 
32 See, for instance, Eriksson, Kampen om Hotbilden, pp. 113–151; Dunn, Cyber-Threats 
and Countermeasures, p. 10.  
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areas of interests and activities and an increase in the conflict-based 
nature of threats, so that it has also meant the partial disappearance of 
the epithets “high politics” and “low politics” as threat perceptions 
with the re-definition and securitization of perceived threats. 
 
Constructing Finland’s threat reality  
Given that the interpretive framework for a theoretical synthesis forms 
the theoretical context against the background of which empirical 
observations can be examined, a comprehensive interpretation of the 
construction of the perceived threats facing Finland will require 
attention to be paid not only to the central government level but also 
to both its external and internal dimensions. One essential perspective 
(and focus of research) will consist of the factors which govern the 
construction of perceived threats to the state and the manner in which 
the reality of such threats is put forward. The present research is 
therefore concerned with the process of forming threat images, by 
which answers were provided to the question “What constitutes a 
threat to Finland?” for the purposes of the 2004 Government Report 
on Security and Defence Policy.33 
It has become established practise in Finland since the end of the Cold 
War for each government to produce a report on security and defence 
policy in the course of its life, so that such reports have to date been 
placed before parliament in 1995, 1997, 2001, 2004 and 2009. This 
practise has meant a regular “updating” of Finland‟s official threat 
images and the reaching of agreement on these at intervals of 
approximately four years. Parliament has in turn approved various 
statements of opinion on these reports (it has not been required to 
approve the reports themselves), and these statements are appended in 
a conceptual sense to the reports themselves for the purposes of this 
paper. Thus the Security and Defence Policy Reports may be regarded 
as the most significant officially published documents describing and 
defining Finland’s security and the threats to it to be produced in the 
early years of the 21st century. Although the present work 
concentrates as far as threat images are concerned on the process of 
                                                 
33 Finnish title: Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, Valtioneuvoston selon-
teko 6/2004.  
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drawing up the 2004 government report, attention will also be paid to 
two other documents at the level of the Council of State that define the 
concept of broad-based security: the Strategy for Ensuring the Vital 
Functions of Society (SVFS strategy) and the Programme for Internal 
Security. For purposes of the present research, however, it is the 
Government Report on Security and Defence Policy that will be taken 
as Finland‟s security policy agenda in the context of which the 
construction of threat images is to be examined, for it is the opening 
up of the politically constructed description of the reality of the threats 
facing Finland to this agenda that is the principal issue here. If we can 
“penetrate inside” the process by which the report was drawn up we 
should be able to produce previously unstudied information and 
promote an understanding of the wording of these reports and of the 
factors influencing the formulation of this wording. Some attention 
will also be paid to the structure of Finnish security documents as a 
whole. 
Arguing from the theoretical approach adopted in this work and the 
synthesis constructed in it, the empirical examination will be guided 
by the following main question to be asked: How were Finland’s 
threat images constructed in those early years of the 21st century, and 
how did they correspond to the images and concepts harboured by 
external actors and the Finns themselves? 
The theoretical frame of reference to be used for examining the 
construction of public threat images in Finland and the factors 
affecting it is presented in Figure 1. This frame of reference is bound 
to the Security and Defence Policy Report, a concrete political 
document in which actors constructed their images of the threats 
facing the country (in the prevailing circumstances). This framework 
for the interpretation of a theoretical synthesis of Finland‟s perceived 
threat policy represents a combination of the factors contributing to 
the state‟s construction of its threat images as set out in the sections 
above and the theoretical points of departure for this work. It describes 
the complexity of the politics of threat images and the levels upon 
which it exists, for which purpose a theoretical synthesis – one that is 
neither too generalized nor too detailed – is essential in the context of 
this research. It functions as a general interpretive framework for the 
questions to be asked here and as a basis for empirical interpretations 
of the construction of individual threat images, interpretations that can 
then be refined by means of a methodology that involves both framing 
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and process monitoring. The interpretive synthesis can be looked on 
as a framework by means of which attempts may be made to interpret 
the contributory factors forming the background to the construction of 
the perceived threats. But at the same time it is a question of 
combining the various perspectives that are connected with the 
construction of Finland‟s threat images, i.e. the threat reality will be 
examined via three dimensions of analytical levels and actors. In this 
way it is hoped to achieve greater investigatory depth and diversity in 
the analysis. The individual contributory factors that are introduced 
may vary greatly in the influence that they exert, as the power of the 
interpretational framework is based on a synthesis34 and on the paying 
of due attention to the contributory factors operating within it.  
                                                 
34 The removal of the Russian threat from the Estonian security agenda in the 1990s may 
be taken as a good example of the construction of perceived threats as empirical 
manifestations of the combined effects of various contributory factors. The removal of the 
threat was connected with Estonia‟s attempts to associate itself more closely with the 
western culture and a European identity. On the other hand, the considerable reduction in 
Russian military power in the Baltic region in the mid-1990s had the effect of eliminating 
the Russian threat from the Estonians‟ public agenda at least. The threat undoubtedly 
remained on the hidden agenda, however. Noreen et al. interpret this as having arisen from 
cognitive “memories of the past” (of historical events and the period of Russian 
occupation), which still exercise a considerable influence in Estonia. Further factors 
contributing to the removal of the threat can be found in the institutional and political 
context, especially in pressures from the views of the epistemic community. See Noreen & 
Sjöstedt, “Estonian Identity Formations and Threat Framing in the Post-Cold War Era”; 
Erik Noreen, Susanna Björk & Stefan Lundblad, Hot, Identitet och Historiebruk. Analys av 
det säkerhetspolitiska språkets utveckling i Baltikum under 1990-talet, Studentlitteratur, 
Lund 2004.   
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Figure 1. Theoretical frame of reference for interpreting the construction of 
perceived threats to Finland.  
The aim of the theoretical interpretive framework is to combine 
variables existing on several analytical levels, i.e. to take account of 
the dynamics of the interaction relationships between various actors 
with regard to the construction of perceived threats at the national 
level. In spite of the demand for the combining of levels of analysis35 
frequently voiced in the field of international relations, and more 
particularly in that of security research (rather than concentrating on 
just one level),36 there are few studies in security and perceived threats 
that have actually done this.37 Indeed, both strategic and security 
                                                 
35 Interpretability is seen as based on five levels of analysis: those of the international 
system, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals.  
36 See, for example, Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory 
and the Ground of International Relations”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, 
p. 2; Sjöstedt, “Exploring the Construction of Threats: the Securitization of HIV/AIDS in 
Russia”, pp. 11-25. The present research differs in this respect from the view of security 
adopted by Lipschutz, for example, who recognises only one level of analysis. See 
Lipschutz, “On Security”, p. 9. 
37 The exceptions as far as agenda theories are concerned comprise certain studies focused 
on foreign policy and international organizations. See, for example, Christer Jönsson, 
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research has devoted very little theoretical or empirical attention to 
questions of how and why certain matters have been worked up into 
public threat images (and above all, how and why there has been a 
desire to do so). It is hoped by means of the present theoretical 
interpretive frame of reference to respond to these demands within the 
field of academic research concerning the insufficiency of multi-level 
analysis and the need to take account of the factors influencing the 
construction of perceived threats. 
One of the foundations for constructing a government report on 
security and defence policy is inevitably the previous such report, i.e. 
the security policy agenda to be laid down is formulated on the basis 
of the previous agenda. This is reflected in the references to feedback 
received from the previous agenda with regard to a common 
understanding of the threat situation built up on that occasion, 
references that are taken up once more at the beginning of the process. 
This is a matter of the continuity characteristic of such an agenda, in 
that choices made earlier, the prevailing conditions and the cultural 
background together provide the basis on which the next security 
policy agenda is constructed. The nature of the continuity and 
institutionalization of perceived threats alludes to a slow political 
process of change in threat images in the context of security policy 
agendas. It can be assumed that only very dramatic changes will lead 
rapidly to significant alterations in the content of perceived threats at 
the national level. Previous reports also serve as bases for comparison 
when interpreting changes in perceived threats relative to those put 
forward in more recent reports. Thus past threats are tangibly present 
in the process of defining current threats. 
It is impossible to build a threat image into the government‟s public 
security policy agenda unless it is subjected to social interaction with 
actors who have the political and/or administrative powers to handle 
it. These actors who are competent to influence the construction of the 
report may then between them assign the desired political significance 
to each threat image, a consensus understanding of the threat involved. 
This aspect of the exercise of power is essential, as the 2004 report 
was prepared in secret, away from the public eye, within a specially 
created preparation mechanism and amongst only a certain specific 
                                                                                                         
Annica Kronsell & Peter Söderholm, International Organizations and Agenda Setting, 
Department of Political Science, Lund University 1995. 
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body of actors. It was only after the report had been published that 
open discussion of the official threat images put forward in it became 
possible within society at large. In accordance with democratic 
structures, this discussion was concretized in the parliamentary debate 
on the report. 
The theoretical framework proposed here thus implies that the process 
of political construction of the perceived threats facing Finland is 
influenced by both structural and actor-related factors, and that when 
interpreting the construction of perceived threats it is necessary to take 
all the contributing factors into account both together and separately. 
It depends on the situation as to which factors serve best to explain the 
construction of any particular threat scenario, but it must be 
emphasized that, in spite of alterations in the operational environment 
or particularly favourable circumstances, the perceived threats detailed 
in a report will not change without deliberate political action on the 
part of actors. Even changes in the material factors associated with 
perceived threats will only be concretized through social activity. The 
essential thing as far as interaction and the semantic content of 
perceived threats to be built into the security policy agenda are 
concerned is the form given to the threat, its linguistic expression. It is 
by giving it a framework that a perceived threat is assigned the content 
that is desired and agreed upon for it. 
Although theoretical syntheses have been widely criticized as being 
conjunctions of excessively many explanatory factors, the combining 
of the various factors affecting the politics of threat images into a 
synthesis is justified on the grounds of the multidimensionality of the 
problem. In this way it is possible to draw wide attention to the 
principal interpretive factors influencing the construction of perceived 
threats, and it is always possible to extend the interpretive framework 
as required by means of empirical research. 
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2. Towards the Finnish threat reality38 
Finland’s perceived external threats 
Since Finland constructs the content of its own perceived threats 
through interaction with other actors, states and organizations in the 
international system, this implies that the construction process will be 
bound to the concepts of security and threats to security put forward 
by key external actors, principally the United Nations, the United 
States, NATO, the EU and Russia. These form the context for the 
international dimension of Finland‟s process of threat image 
construction, so that the talk of threats at this level – publicly 
expressed international views on the prevailing threat reality – will 
affect the content of Finland‟s perceived threats and the choices made 
with respect to it. Meanwhile, the threat images put forward by the 
various actors will be ideas agreed upon within the states or 
communities that they represent. The actors, through the views on 
security and threats to security that each expresses, construct not only 
their own understanding of the prevailing threat reality but that of 
other actors as well, although they do so each from their own 
perspective and within their own set of institutional and cultural 
structures. Thus, in order to interpret the perceived threats as 
formulated by such actors, it is important to take into account their 
understanding of their own security environment and their ability to 
influence it.39 
From the perspective of the actors considered here, the end of the 
Cold War, and more particularly the terrorist attacks of 11th 
September 2001, brought about major alterations in both national and 
international concepts of security. The world was understood in the 
early years of the 21st century as a far more complex place where 
                                                 
38 The conclusions summarized in this chapter are set out in more detail in Finnish in 
Limnéll. Suomen uhkakuvapolitiikka 2000-luvun alussa, pp. 157–242, 353–368. 
39 On the connection between presentation of the security environment and understanding 
of the prevailing threats, see Susan E. Penska, “Defining the Enemy: EU and US Threat 
Perceptions after 9/11”, in Heinz Gartner & Ian Cuthbertson, European Security and 
Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005, 
pp. 19–20 
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there was more emphasis on interdependence between actors and on 
connections between the various security sectors than ever before. 
This meant the construction of a new way of thinking in security 
matters, with a broadening of the understanding attached to security 
and perceived threats rather than the predominance of a military threat 
as had been the case earlier. The meanings assigned to security and 
threat images varied with the spirit of the times. At the same time the 
distinction between external and internal security became more 
blurred. Thus the framework for the construction of threat perceptions 
can be said to have moved towards more generalized and global 
definitions at the beginning of the 21st century. The need for wider 
security was combined with the development brought about by 
globalization on the one hand and with the borderless, universal nature 
of the threats on the other, and conceptually the same threats came to 
be set in different frameworks by different actors, and in quite 
different ways and with different political purposes in view. 
The perceived threats to Finland at the beginning of the new 
millennium were construed in a security-dominated discursive 
environment within international relations. Security, perceived threats 
and the associated political pressures were well to the fore in both the 
security policy and the political agendas of the various actors. Security 
had by no means lost its significance in international relations; on the 
contrary, the actors considered here pursued both their national 
(organizational) and international interests and goals through the 
medium of arguments based on threats. At the same time, however, 
the threat images quoted betrayed a certain relativity and artificiality, 
as they were being used as political instruments and the form in which 
they were presented by the actors reflected a certain political 
motivation. Perceived threats were used on the one hand to construct a 
threat reality that would influence other actors, and on the other hand 
to promote internal cohesion within the entity represented by the 
actor. In the second sense practically every one of the actors examined 
here can be seen to have had distinct identity-related goals in mind. 
Thus instead of the previous emphasis on military threats, a new 
language of security evolved to some extent in the early years of the 
21st century, a language in which the actors frequently referred to 
their threat perceptions quite emphatically as “new threats” or “threats 
of a new kind”. This applied to virtually all threats except for military 
ones, and although military security was reflected in the background 
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to the thinking on security in general (or in its foundations) there was 
a clear desire on the part of some actors to avoid speaking of such 
perceptions in public. It was social, political and economic threats, 
and to some extent environmental ones, that dominated the 
international discourse in this field, a discourse that also provided the 
justifications for new military means of control. One might say that 
military security was re-framed through the association of new threats 
with it. The threat discourse was nevertheless dominated by the 
replacement of old threats with new ones. 
Finnish security and the perceived threats to the country frequently 
appeared in the definitions provided by the key external actors as 
objects of dispute, the actors themselves often referring to the fact that 
it had become difficult to define security or outline precisely the 
nature of the threats and that it was necessary to consider so many 
approaches, points of view and interests in connection with them. This 
was when talking of the internal construction of threat images (on the 
actor‟s own threat agenda), but it is possible in the international 
context surrounding Finland‟s threat politics to deduce that a power 
struggle took place (and continues to take place) over which actors 
and what understanding of the content of the threat images should 
predominate. Internal and external cultural processes such as these 
create interpretive structures, collective metacognitions of a certain 
type, within the international understanding of threats, so that 
international relations and the understandings of threats are partly a 
question of what threat images and related securitization proposals 
predominate. This relates in part to the moral paradox attached to 
security, whereby an actor is simultaneously seeking security for 
himself and a feeling of insecurity for the “other”.40 Threat images are 
part of a political process in which “others” are divided into current 
and potential allies and enemies. On the other hand, the threat images 
put forward by actors were not only internally disputable but also had 
a desired function of guiding the practising of common policies. The 
framing of threat images reflected an actor‟s need for new concepts 
with which to create identity policy “otherness” - and at the same time 
to legitimize the means for controlling threat images. 
                                                 
40 Another political paradox is that it is impossible to promote security interests in an 
unbiased way, see Robert N. Berki, Security and Society – Reflections on Law, Order and 
Politics, Dent, London 1986, pp. 29-39. 
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Western41 definitions of threats reflected the faded nature of military 
threat perceptions, so that a distinct absence (or at least pronounced 
diminution) of the threat of a large-scale offensive can be seen in the 
security policy agendas of the 1990s in particular, to the extent that 
western thinking turned to the question of what threats the nations‟ 
security efforts should now be directed against. Thus, although the 
nature of the shared threat perceptions occurring in the western 
security discourse of that period does not mean that the actors‟ 
perceptions were identical in content in all respects, the threats 
perceived in EU, NATO and US circles were nevertheless similar: the 
western understanding of the existing threat in the early years of the 
21st century was dominated by terrorism, the uncontrolled spread of 
weapons of mass destruction and the existence of politically unstable 
states (referred to under various names). These threat discourses 
referred to the events of 11th September 2001 as decisive in this 
respect, so that the new security environment, new threats and new 
means of controlling those threats were all directly traceable back to 
those terrorist attacks. In terms of agenda theory, the attacks 
constituted a dramatic event through which the threat posed by 
terrorism became the first priority on the political agenda. As a 
concept and a mental image “9/11” became a part of the western 
culture, i.e. of the culture maintained by the western threat discourse. 
Terrorism can be regarded politically as a useful threat image, as it is 
hard to define precisely and the enemy is difficult to locate, but the 
periodic terrorist strikes have shown it to be a concrete reality.  
 
The predominance of the need for the securitization (and mili-
tarization) of terrorism was to be seen above all in the US politics of 
threat images, and thereby in the framing of the “war on terrorism”. 
Terrorism was the dominant perceived threat in the EU and NATO, 
too, but it did not have the same powerful ideological foundation as in 
the United States. It was nevertheless possible to regard it as the 
                                                 
41 The definition of “the west” and “western” as designations of reference groups is always 
a somewhat dubious matter. “Western” and the “western security community” are socially 
constructed concepts (that are still under construction), so that there are many ways of 
interpreting them.  The point of departure for this work alludes to the two ideologically 
opposed camps that existed in the Cold War era, the “east” and the “west”, with each 
viewing the other as a more serious threat to its own security and the achievement of its 
own aims. On the definition of the “west” and problems related to it, see Stuart Hall, 
Identiteetti, Vastapaino, Tampere 1999, pp. 77–98; Pertti Joenniemi & Marko Lehti, 
“Murtunut, uusiutuva vai muuttumaton länsi?”, Kosmopolis, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2006, pp. 5–
29. 
28
determining factor in western threat politics, a factor with which many 
of the other principal threat images (such as organized crime and 
illegal trafficking in drugs) were seen to be connected. Defence 
against the threat of terrorism and other non-traditional perceived 
threats was also used as a justification for governments setting up 
lines of defence beyond the boundaries of their own nations or 
regions. The war on terrorism/battle against terrorism/anti-terrorist 
activities could be carried to the source of the threat. At the same time 
the western countries developed their military forces for deploying in 
“new” tasks beyond their own territory. Terrorism and other related 
threats were pictured as originating somewhere outside the western 
world, but at the same time, with advances in globalization, their 
impacts were described as near at hand. In accordance with the 
western understanding of threats, the actors ensured their own security 
by functioning over a wider geographical area than previously, the one 
exception to this, however, being the EU, whose threat perceptions 
were usually focused on areas adjacent to Europe. It was also the case 
that the means for controlling the new threat images were understood 
differently by the various western actors, so that there was no direct 
one-to-one correspondence between a threat and the means of 
combating it. 
 
The western understanding of its perceived threats did not deny the 
possibility of a large-scale military threat, but neither did it regard 
such a threat as probable in the near future. Certain reservations were 
expressed regarding developments in Russia, but in no connection was 
that country spoken of as an actual threat or enemy. Russia as a 
military threat had been removed from the western public definition of 
perceived threats. Instead, attention in the field of perceived military 
threats was turned to cases of regional conflicts and internal violence 
affecting unstable nations. Thus the previous Russia-centred 
understanding of perceived threats may be said to have altered 
radically. A broadening of the scope of security in general 
nevertheless took place on a moderate scale, and the threat discourse 
laid emphasis on the priorities to be assigned to the various threats 
relative to the object of the security measures in each case. Admittedly 
the US security discourse did construct an image of terrorism as a 
military threat, and the descriptions of the threats facing the nation 
gave expression to an understanding of its own role as a world power 
and a demand that the other western actors should adopt its definition 
of the threat posed by terrorism as part of their own set of threat 
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images. NATO, on the other hand, may be looked on as an actor for 
which it is essential, in order to justify its own existence, to have a 
perceived threat that is common to all its members. Thus, with the 
passing of the threat posed by Russia, terrorism was adopted to fill the 
gap, in spite of the fact that some of its members were still looking to 
the military alliance for security from the previous threat. Meanwhile 
the EU may be regarded as having other reasons for extensive 
collaboration between its members (such as economic ones) as well as 
the defining of common threats. Security was nevertheless adopted as 
a normative goal within the EU, too, in that a common understanding 
of the threat situation was consistent with the drive towards deeper 
integration. 
 
The UN was inclined to use its threat images as a means of 
constructing a world-view that would promote solidarity and 
humanitarian security. Although terrorism was to be found on its 
security policy agenda, efforts were made to underline a broad-based 
understanding of threats that was linked to environmental factors and 
the responsibility of member states, a central role in which was to be 
played by the characterization of threats as applying to all the people 
and nations of the world. It was thus threats that were framed as global 
and taken to refer to all sectors of security that were emphasized in the 
UN concept of security. The UN was also the only one of the actors 
considered here that clearly emphasized the feminist aspects of 
security. 
 
The concept of security and perceptions of threats that existed in 
Russia at that time reflected the wide-ranging problems associated 
with the post-Cold War reconstruction of the Russian Federation and 
the drive for internal unification. Perceived threats were to be used 
primarily for stabilizing internal development, but also to some extent 
for building a new external image of the country as a major power 
capable of influencing world politics. Russia therefore claimed to have 
a considerable number of perceived threats (according to various 
lists), the characteristics of which from a western perspective were a 
continued emphasis on military security, a powerful connection with 
national interests and the sovereignty of the Russian state, and a 
critical attitude towards the western means of controlling the 
perceived new threats. It should particularly be noted that Russia 
retained its image of a war between nations. 
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It is possible on the basis of the framing of the threat factors put 
forward by the actors considered here to make certain general 
observations regarding the threat reality constructed at the beginning 
of the 21st century, in which there was a desire and notable effort to 
emphasize the change in the security environment (relative to the Cold 
War period). If the perceived threats of the Cold War era were 
relatively permanent, concrete and unambiguous, they now came to be 
more multidimensional, more multisectoral and more bound up in 
each other. On the other hand, anti-terrorist activity had come to form 
a kind of umbrella concept for all threats, a framework within which 
other perceived threats were constructed and evaluated among all the 
actors. The threats were frequently framed as global, or at least 
regional, and as involving elements from all security sectors. 
Symptomatic of this was the fact that all the perceived threats that 
were put forward were interconnected, which in turn heightened their 
individual intensity. It was also maintained that the interconnected and 
global nature of the threats obliged the actors, particularly at the 
national level, to enter into closer collaboration with one another in 
order to guarantee their own internal security. Meanwhile, those 
threats that were described as non-national were nevertheless said to 
be targeted at national values or ones defined by that particular actor. 
Correspondingly, the political goals and interests through which the 
perceived threats were viewed were often left in the background in the 
security and threat discourse. 
 
In addition to increased emphasis on the new threats, the security 
discourse of the early years of the new century was characterized by 
their framing as manifestations of permanence, long-term validity and 
often high intensity. The actors‟ threat perceptions conveyed an 
impression of a world that was in effect more dangerous and more 
unpredictable than ever. At the same time more and more things were 
coming to be framed as threats, creating a parallel impression of the 
security defined by the actor being threatened by a multitude of 
factors over a broad front. The threat perceptions put forward by the 
various actors were all very similar – conceptually the descriptions 
given by all the actors included the notions of terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction and organized crime. When examining the framing 
of the perceived threats, however (e.g. considering how terrorism was 
defined), it was possible to detect differences in the ways in which the 
same threat images were understood. Russia had similar threat images 
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to NATO, for instance, but the aims combined with them (e.g. 
concerning crisis management) were quite different. 
 
The perceived threats put forward by key actors external to Finland 
may be seen as securitization proposals targeted at Finland by its 
international operating environment. The strategies, speeches and 
documents of these actors were aimed at constructing – for Finland, 
too, – an understanding of what are “real” threats and what mental 
images and means of control should be associated with them. Since 
Finland was involved in interaction with these external actors and was 
engaged in monitoring their definitions of threats and security, a 
situation of political choice offered itself as to which externally 
constructed threat images should be adopted as part of the content and 
thinking regarding the threats facing Finland and to what extent. At 
the same time it was a question of the Finns mirroring themselves and 
their own threat perceptions in the frame of reference created by the 
external actors – by evaluating the threats perceived by others and 
assessing their relevance in order to gain support for and new 
perspectives on the ideas that they were obliged to develop for 
themselves. 
 
Monitoring of the international discourse on threats is a continuous 
political and administrative process in Finland which can be expected 
to affect indirectly (not by direct imitation) – but also to some extent 
directly – the construction of the perceived threats that appear on the 
national security policy agenda. At the same time we may be justified 
in stating that it would, especially on political grounds, be impossible 
for Finland to construct its own threat perceptions and threat reality 
without reference to the international threat discourse and without 
taking account of the threats perceived by the principal relevant 
external actors. The external threat image reality will inevitably be 
reflected in Finnish security and defence policy discussions and 
situation reviews. It is a matter of the influence implicitly exercised by 
external actors and the perceived threats manifested in the 
international operating environment, all of which form an important 
context for Finland‟s construction of its own national spectrum of 
threats. 
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Finnish threat concepts 
The threat concepts prevalent among the Finns will be interpreted here 
through the medium of opinion polls and surveys. This will of course 
imply approaching the theoretical object of study, the individual level, 
from the perspective of general public opinion, viewed primarily as a 
conjunct of personal opinions, a citizens‟ opinion.42 Thus it is a 
question not only of examining the assumption of successful 
securitization but also of interpreting the general climate of opinion as 
regards perceived threats that prevailed within Finnish society and 
among Finnish citizens in the years 2004–2006 in relation to the 
threats identified in the government report. 
An individual‟s views on potential threats are indicative of that 
individual‟s way of thinking, his or her interpreted and cognitively 
constructed attitude, which may be referred to as an opinion. The 
background influences brought to bear on this opinion can include 
social and personal values and preferences, the person‟s cultural 
foundation and world-view and numerous other factors that contribute 
to the interpretive reality guiding that individual.43 In the context of 
research into public opinion these individual opinions are combined to 
form a collective opinion, which can then enter into a two-way 
interaction relationship with the political interpretive reality 
constructed by the political elite. Indeed, it is through such studies of 
public opinion that the political elite are able to monitor the ways of 
thinking of ordinary citizens. Thus opinion surveys can serve the 
democratic purpose of drawing the attention of decision-makers to the 
opinions and attitudes of ordinary citizens, factors that are relevant to 
the construction of the content of (threat) policies. Opinion polls can 
also be looked on as part of the game of power politics played out 
between the public administration, the media and citizens‟ 
organizations, in which they serve as instruments for influencing 
opinions and political decisions. On the other hand, if public opinion 
is seriously at odds with the views of the political elite, it is possible 
                                                 
42 Opinion polls and surveys may be regarded as both deriving from and describing general 
public opinion, in which the key concept is that of a common (collective) opinion, as 
opposed to the understanding of public opinion in terms of that represented by the political 
elite and influential pressure groups within society. See Pertti Suhonen, Mielipide-
tutkimukset ja yhteiskunta, Tampere 2006, pp. 210–214. 
43 Ibid, pp. 27–28; see also Erik Allardt, Sosiologia I, WSOY, Helsinki 1983, pp. 51–55. 
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for the authorities to intensify their efforts to disseminate information 
and enlighten the general public. 
The Finns‟ threat perceptions over the period 2004–2006 were 
dominated by the notions of international terrorism, environmental 
issues and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and also fairly 
prominently by internationally organized crime. These factors were 
emphasized as causes of concerns and increased feelings of insecurity 
among Finnish people regardless of the way in which the questions 
were formulated and the selection of optional answers provided. 
Terrorism was felt above all to be not a national threat as far as either 
its source or its target was concerned but rather an international 
phenomenon directed at the western countries at large, and the threat 
of the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction was frequently combined with that of terrorism. The Finns 
were also of the opinion that, alongside environmental issues, it was 
the threat posed by terrorism that was most likely to increase in 
intensity in the near future. Factors likely to undermine environmental 
security formed a second major source of anxiety, even to the extent 
that climate change and environmental disasters were viewed as liable 
to increase the threats posed by other factors, e.g. the refugee problem. 
Environmental problems were looked on as comprehensive threats 
that could affect the security of individuals, states and mankind as a 
whole. Organized crime was felt to pose a threat primarily to the 
international community as a whole, alongside terrorism, the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction and environmental issues, but one that 
could impinge quite specifically on Finland.  
Surveys carried out among the Finns in 2004–2006 tended to approach 
security and perceived threats on the basis of a broad understanding, 
so that issues of various kinds were subsumed under the headings of 
security and threats. It may even be said that these opinion surveys 
(with their questions and answers) served to construct and establish a 
broad-based approach to security, as the approach adopted in them 
was indeed very broad. Correspondingly, the alternative answers 
offered to some of the questions regarding threats made reference only 
to non-military factors. These surveys reflected the general 
understanding with regard to threats, an understanding that was 
confirmed by the emphasis placed on non-military threats in Finnish 
public opinion. At the same time the Finns felt that they were living in 
a relatively insecure world and believed that the feeling of insecurity 
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would be accentuated still further – in all respects other than that of 
military threats. Thus a broad definition of security could be regarded 
as legitimate as far as Finnish society was concerned. 
The sources of anxiety for the Finnish population lay elsewhere and 
not in perceived military threats. They regarded military threats, and 
especially that of military action against Finland, as highly likely to 
materialize. People did not believe in a threat of war or any other 
armed conflict either in Finland or in Europe as a whole. On the other 
hand, one respondent in every five believed that the military situation 
in the areas adjacent to Finland would become more threatening in the 
future. The most probable military threat was seen to be that of an 
armed conflict breaking out somewhere outside Europe and having 
knock-on effects on Finland. The military threat scenarios mentioned 
in the survey questions were frequently associated with Russia in the 
eyes of the respondents, whereas no other states or actors were 
specifically linked with military threats in this way, which serves as 
such to indicate that, in terms of identity policy, the notion of a 
military threat tends in Finnish society to be linked specifically with 
Russia. Correspondingly, since it became evident from the surveys 
that about a third of the Finns regarded Russia as posing a significant 
military threat to Finland, the result may be interpreted as indicating 
that two-thirds of the Finns do not regard Russia as a source of any 
military threat. In fact, although Russia was often mentioned as a 
potential military threat, the respondents were more worried about 
non-military threats associated with that country, e.g. those arising 
from its nuclear power stations. Thus it may be said that Finnish 
public opinion linked military threats with Russia, a country whose 
behaviour was regarded as uncertain and unpredictable, but these 
threats were regarded as being of low intensity and probability. 
The threats, problems and causes for anxiety experienced by the 
Finnish respondents were consistent with the non-military threat 
scenarios presented in the government report. In particular, terrorism, 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and organized terrorism 
occupied a prominent place in the threats perceived by the general 
public, whose concepts of a threat can in general be seen to conform 
closely to the western definitions and international trends. 
Environmental issues were a further aspect of security over which the 
Finns expressed considerable concern, although it is debatable in the 
light of the opinion polls whether they should really be defined as 
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perceived threats. When asked for their opinions on the probability of 
the military threats being realized, the respondents estimated this 
probability to be very low. To a certain extent the Finns’ estimate of 
the legitimacy of the military threat scenarios may be regarded as 
fairly poor, but it should be noted on this score that the information 
provided by the opinion polls concerns only the estimated 
probabilities attached to threat images. It is clear from the perspective 
of Finland‟s security, however, that the possibility of a military threat 
materializing was linked to the uncertainties surrounding the question 
of Russia. In terms of the threat situation in society as a whole, 
military threats formed little more than a background.  
 
Perceived threats in the 2001 Government Report 
The Council of State submitted its 2001 Report on Finnish Security 
and Defence Policy44 to Parliament on 13th June 2001. Although the 
original assignment had been to produce a concise defence policy 
summary in the nature of an interim report, subsequent political 
demands and observations of changes in the security environment had 
led to its being constructed in the manner of a full-scale security and 
defence policy report. The emphasis within its content was on 
analysing the security environment and evaluating the measures taken 
by the Finnish authorities, and these topics were also discussed more 
widely in Parliament than the structural changes in the country‟s 
defence. It was indeed noted in a number of speeches in Parliament 
that it was purely a matter of taste as to whether the document was 
regarded as an updating of the previous report or an entirely new 
statement of policy.45 Extensive and unprecedentedly forceful 
criticism was made in Parliament of the way in which the report had 
been prepared, and it was suggested that the main parliamentary 
committees, citizens‟ organizations and research institutes should in 
                                                 
44 Finnish title: Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, Valtioneuvoston selon-
teko eduskunnalle 2/2001. 
45 See, for example, Johannes Koskinen, Suomen puolustusjärjestelmä integroituvassa 
maailmassa, speech made on 4.12.2001, and Liisa Jaakonsaari‟s speech during the feed-
back discussion. Eduskunnan palautekeskustelu 19.12.2001, PTK 157/2001 vp.  
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future be consulted when drawing up such reports.46 The differences 
of opinion among the parties making up the government that had been 
discussed in public during the winter and spring of 2001 with regard 
to the content of the report had, in the opinion of the opposition, led to 
a “meagre compromise” and caused the Minister of Defence himself 
to note that “the preparatory work could not be awarded many points 
for style”.47 
The description of the security environment contained in the 2001 
Government Report can be regarded as an attempt to shift Finland‟s 
understanding of security and defence policy in a more international 
direction. It is dominated by a general optimism and views that are 
centred firmly on international institutions and rely on cooperation in 
security matters. Far more non-military threats and uncertainty factors 
affecting international and European security were considered in the 
report than ever before, and the sources of these threats were framed 
to an increasing extent in circumstances external to Finland and 
Europe and described as being cross-border factors by nature and apt 
to reduce the significance of geographical distance. There was a great 
deal of talk of global developments in connection with international 
security, which in itself was described as being reflected more 
powerfully than ever in Finland’s security, although the report 
contained no actual analysis of this connection. At the same time it 
was noted that this trend offered Finland opportunities for 
strengthening its overall security and developing the performance 
capacity necessary for this.48 On the other hand, it was also pointed 
out that the international dependence on security and the development 
of a global economy were leaving Finnish society increasingly 
vulnerable, even though globalization also offered opportunities for 
                                                 
46 Puolustusvaliokunnan mietintö 14.12.2001, PuVM 2/2001 vp, Ulkoasiainvaliokunnan 
lausunto 27.11.2001, UaVL 6/2001 vp, Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelu 5.9.2001, PTK 
87/2001 vp. In the opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee, this was justified on account 
of the complexity of the factors affecting the security environment that needed to be 
evaluated.  
47 See comments by Ilkka Kanerva and Jan-Erik Enestam during the feedback discussion. 
Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelu 5.9.2001, PTK 87/2001 vp. 
48 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, Valtioneuvoston selonteko edus-
kunnalle 13.6.2001, VNS 2/2001 vp, Helsinki 2001, pp. 14, 20. 
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tightening the country‟s overall security. No military threat to Finland 
“in the foreseeable future” was envisaged in the report.49 
When defining those “on Finland‟s side” as a broad-based frame of 
reference for the country‟s security, the report put forward an 
institutional coalition that included the UN, the OSCE, the EU, 
association with NATO under the Partnership for Peace scheme and 
Nordic cooperation. All of these were regarded as strengthening 
Finland‟s security. Identification with these was said to be grounded 
in a common system of values and common social and economic 
interests. Strong transatlantic relations were deemed important for the 
security of the Euro-Atlantic region, to which Finland was considered 
to belong. 
Although Finland‟s security was described as being more closely 
connected in an interdependent manner with the perceived threats 
entailed in the development of European and international security, no 
changes were proposed as far as the objects of that security – the 
preservation of Finland‟s independence, the protection of the basic 
values governing the country‟s society and the ensuring of a capacity 
for action – were concerned. The difficulty of combining national and 
international security thinking and the priority given to national 
security were most clearly in evidence in the views put forward in 
Parliament regarding international crisis management. Although the 
report mentioned that Finland will take an active part in international 
crisis management operations as a means of strengthening the 
country‟s own security, it was criticized in Parliament for placing 
excessive emphasis on this, and a number of speakers insisted that 
crisis management assignments should be subordinated to Finland‟s 
own defence needs.50 The same conflict between national and 
international security could also be seen in the discussion concerning 
the need for anti-personnel mines.  
A rather different picture of Finland‟s security environment was 
presented in the defence policy part of the government report, the 
report submitted by the Parliamentary Defence Committee and in 
Parliament, especially in the speeches made by Coalition Party 
                                                 
49 Ibid. p. 41. 
50 See, for example, speeches by Juha Korkeaoja and Olli Nepponen in the preliminary 
debate in Parliament. Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelu 5.9.2001, PTK 87/2001 vp. 
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members. The Defence Committee criticized the government report 
for failing to distinguish the main threats from second-degree 
uncertainty factors, and for paying little attention to geopolitical and 
many other viewpoints. In the committee‟s opinion the report had not 
succeeded in explaining the various phenomena connected with wars 
and crises, “so that the consequence may be an excessively rosy 
picture of developments in international relations”.51 Criticism was 
levelled at the minor weight placed by the report on military threats 
(relative to non-military ones), and attention was drawn to the need to 
take the significance of Finland‟s geographical position into account 
in threat analyses. “There are two crucial directions of interest in the 
areas adjacent to Finland where conflicts could lead to a military 
threat extending to this country: the Baltic region and the sea areas to 
the north.”52 The Defence Committee referred to this description as a 
“threat derived from geostrategic factors” and regarded it as a matter 
of importance that this should be clearly stated, demanding that it 
should certainly be taken into account in the 2004 security and 
defence policy report. The perceived threat was framed as arising 
directly or indirectly from Russia, whose internal development, as 
noted in the 2001 report itself, “was still beset by many uncertainty 
factors”.53 The discussion of the perceived threats mentioned in the 
government report may be looked on as a struggle to lay more 
emphasis on military threats relative to non-military ones, as opinions 
were greatly divided over what constituted “real” threats and which 
should be assigned priority. 
One illustration of the difference of opinion over the definition of 
threats concerns the impression of the improbability of Finland being 
involved in a war and of the exacerbation of non-military threats that 
was built up in the security policy section of the report by comparison 
with the statements on “the maintenance of a military deterrent to 
eliminate threats in advance” and “the development of a defence 
capability in keeping with the security threats” contained in the 
defence policy section.54 This apparent inconsistency may be 
interpreted as suggesting that an attempt was made to be more broad-
minded with respect to non-military threats even though these were 
                                                 
51 Puolustusvaliokunnan mietintö 14.12.2001, PuVM 2/2001 vp. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, p. 15. 
54 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, pp. 47, 53. 
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not believed to impinge directly on Finland‟s sovereignty as a state, 
precautions for the protection of which were to be made by 
developing a defence capability to cope with military threats. The 
impacts of non-military threat images on Finland were framed in 
general terms in the report, as uncertainty factors existent in a 
globalizing world, and by emphasizing these an attempt was made at 
the same time to effect a change in the country‟s security policy 
identity. On the other hand, it was also noted in the report that 
“Finland will decide on its defence policy and the development of its 
defences on the basis of its geopolitical position and historical 
experiences”,55 which creates an impression of considerable 
importance being attached to state security and a national defence 
identity. No corresponding accentuation of perceived military threats 
on historical grounds had been mentioned in any previous government 
report on security and defence policy. Continuous references were 
made to geopolitics and geostrategy in the defence policy section, 
while the state-centred aspect of security was also to the fore in the 
defence policy evaluations of other states: “regardless of their 
estimations of threats at the national level, all states will retain a 
sufficient military capacity to defend their own territory as a basic 
element in their security provisions”.56 Thus the connection between 
national and international security and perceived threats would appear 
to have been somewhat equivocal in this report.  
The threat scenarios defined in the 2004 Government Report on 
Finnish Security and Defence Policy were foreshadowed in the 
committee reports and statements on the 2001 report and in the 
feedback discussion on it in parliament. Thus the definitions put 
forward that departed from those set out in 2001 may be seen as being 
parliamentary securitization proposals, especially in view of the 
specific demands made in Parliament that the threat images to which it 
had drawn attention should be taken into account in the next such 
report. Particularly significant in this respect is the fact that the attack 
on the United States on 11.9.2001 took place after the submission of 
the report, on 13.6.2001, and the preliminary debate on it in 
Parliament, on 5.-7.9.2001. There was in fact considerable discussion 
in Parliament as to whether the report “should be updated to 
correspond to the age of global terrorism and anti-terrorist activities”, 
                                                 
55 Ibid. p. 41. 
56 Ibid. p. 24. 
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since “the threat descriptions in the report proved outdated before the 
committee stage of the parliamentary discussions on it had even 
begun.”57 No attempt was made to re-write the document, however, 
but rather the necessary new points of emphasis raised in the 
discussions that departed from those in the report itself were recorded 
in the minutes of the committees. Although terrorism was in any case 
discussed in this report more extensively than in any previous one, no 
special evaluation was made of the intensity of the threat or its degree 
of political priority. It was simply stated that “terrorism is a threat to 
international security, the implementation of human rights, democracy 
and constitutional government.”58 Considered together with weapons 
of mass destruction, this threat could nevertheless be framed as an 
extremely serious one: “the prospect of weapons of mass destruction 
falling into the hands of terrorists constitutes and extremely serious 
threat indeed.”59 
The opinions expressed by the parliamentary committees and in the 
feedback discussions in Parliament were that the report‟s threat 
analysis was outdated as far as the threat posed by terrorism, the 
military situation in the Baltic region (a reference to possible NATO 
membership for the Baltic States) and developments in relations 
between the United States and Russia were concerned, and it was 
noted in Parliament that these trends would affect the evaluations of 
threats facing Finland to the extent that the points in question would 
have to be revised in the next report. Typical of the feedback 
discussion in Parliament were statements of the kind “the events of 
September 11th put the last full stop to the era known as the Cold 
War” or “terrorism is now a major threat”,60 regardless of party 
affiliations. Thus the opinions expressed in Parliament foresaw a 
greater priority for the threat of terrorism by the time of the next 
report. 
                                                 
57 Speeches by Pertti Hemmilä and Kari Uotila in the feedback discussions in Parliament, 
Eduskunnan palautekeskustelu 19.12.2001, PTK 157/2001 vp. 
58 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, p. 17. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See, for example, speeches by Aulis Ranta-Muotio, Anni Sinnemäki, Ismo Seivästö, 
Marja Tiura and Matti Väistö, Eduskunnan palautekeskustelu 19.12.2001, PTK 157/2001 
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The report dealt more precisely than earlier with the uncertainty 
factors (but not threats) associated with Russia, and also reached the 
conclusion that in the context of Finnish security and defence policy 
planning it would be as well to allow for the possibility of an 
unfavourable future trend in this respect. At the same time, however, 
the situation in Russia was discussed much more openly than in 
previous reports of this kind, stating that developments there could 
lead to a crisis in Northern Europe and the Baltic region under three 
sets of circumstances: 1) an environmental disaster brought about by a 
technological failure or error, 2) increased tension between Russia and 
the Baltic States, or 3) failure of Russia‟s policy of renewal, isolation 
of Russia and a change in direction within the country‟s foreign and 
security policy.61 Nevertheless, although the more detailed framing in 
this report relative to earlier ones clearly conveyed the uncertainty 
associated with the unpredictability of developments in Russia and the 
deviant nature of the country‟s identity policy, the general picture of 
the Russian situation was more positive than previously. 
As far as the more precise definition of the broad concept of security 
was concerned, both the report itself and the opinions of the 
parliamentary committees referred to the 1997 government security 
and defence policy report and contented themselves with observing 
that “Finland‟s security and defence policy sets out from a broad 
concept of security.”62 It was noted, however, that the broad concept 
of security had gained in significance and that the intensity and 
probability of the new threats were framed as having increased. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee even identified the broad concept of 
security with the security of mankind. Although the definition of 
broad security in it remained indeterminate, the understanding of 
security conveyed by the report can be estimated to be more complex, 
with greater weight placed on the interconnections between threats 
and on an international perspective. The threat factors were also 
framed as less applicable to the level of the nation-state than 
previously. Although the report succeeded in framing the new threats 
in a more detailed manner than in 1997, the question of their impact 
                                                 
61 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, p. 32. 
62 The accent on a broad concept of security was most prominent in the statement issued by 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, from which this quotation is taken. Ulkoasiainvaliokunnan 
lausunto 27.11.2001, UaVL 6/2001 vp. In the report itself the broad understanding of 
security was framed as a concept mostly in connection with the EU and the UN. Suomen 
turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, pp. 14, 21. 
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on Finnish security policy was largely left open. One characteristic of 
the new threat images, however, was that the means of controlling 
them were fundamentally non-military. 
The most serious non-military threats described in the report were 
environmental problems and major disasters, especially of a nuclear 
kind in the Baltic and Kola regions and oil spills in the Gulf of 
Finland. The danger of illegal immigration and an influx of refugees 
from the direction of Russia was observed to have increased, 
professional crime was seen to have become more violent and 
epidemics of AIDS and tuberculosis were seen to have spread. In all 
these instances the source of the problem was closely associated with 
Russia. Very much more international, more comprehensive and more 
general threats were framed in the report as being the uncontrolled 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and 
handguns, the rise of financial frauds and cybercrimes, threats to 
information systems, infringements of human rights, damage inflicted 
on the basic structure of society, general changes in the environment, 
various disease epidemics, drug and human trafficking and mass 
migrations of population. These images were first and foremost 
presented as threats to the international community (as the object to be 
securitized), with which Finland was associated on the principle of the 
global indivisibility of security. The sources of these latter threats 
were still more difficult to locate, but their priority and intensity were 
regarded as being relatively low as far as Finland‟s security was 
concerned. The statement of opinion issued by the Parliamentary 
Defence Committee also proposed that racism, hostility towards 
foreigners and changes in the welfare state should be added to the 
threat analysis.63 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, pp. 12–17, 74–79, Puolustusvaliokunnan 
mietintö 14.12.2001. 
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The procedure for drawing up the report as a constructor of 
threat images 
In accordance with the constructivist frame of reference, the perceived 
threats facing Finland at the beginning of the new millennium were 
constructed as a continuum of cultural „handicaps‟, in that previously 
constructed threat images were allowed to influence both the current 
cognitive understanding of threats and the understanding based on the 
national identity. Finland‟s history as a borderland between world 
powers and distinct cultural spheres of influence, the Second World 
War and the Cold War era and the various events that went with it all 
left their mark on the country‟s security policy and general 
understanding of security. The acquired starting points for thinking 
about national security – the avoidance of new wars and the 
preservation of the country’s independence and territorial integrity – 
were essentially still involved in the interpretation of Finland’s threat 
policy as laid down in security policy agendas during the Cold War 
era and thereafter. It should be noted, of course, that the reality of 
these agendas as made public was not directly identifiable with the 
“facts of the case”, but rather the interpretation as such was 
constructed through a process of political compromise and with a 
political purpose in mind. Thus what was written down as security 
policy included conflicting views and assumptions regarding the 
actual threats that faced Finland at particular moments in time. 
The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
Finland‟s entry into the EU had fairly rapid effects on the perceived 
threats mentioned on security policy agendas. Thus as the 1990s were 
ushered in it could be said that the probabilities attached to the 
military threats had diminished considerably64 and the social 
atmosphere in which threats were discussed had become very much 
less restrained. Broad-based governments that remained viable from 
one general election to the next, the stabilization of internal policy and 
the changes that had taken place in the security environment 
nevertheless created pressures for the parliamentary discussion of 
security policy issues, and the adoption of the security and defence 
policy report procedure may be seen as a parliamentarianization of 
                                                 
64 According to Nokkala, one could have expected “official” policies in the early 1990s to 
have included descriptions of the security environment in which the ”new threats” played a 
more prominent role. Nokkala, Laajeneva sotilaspolitiikka, p. 258. 
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these policies. At the same time more lively discussions emerged on 
topics such as broad-based security and the new threats. The question 
of broad-based security was linked to the optimism aroused by the 
retreat of the military threat and the emergence of new regional and 
international means of handling security threats through co-operation. 
Although broad-based security and its appearance on security policy 
agendas had begun to be discussed during the Cold War era, Finland’s 
security policy may be regarded as having moved into the “broad-
based security age” with the government security and defence policy 
reports of 1995 and 1997. The foundations for the concept of a broad-
based, comprehensive view of security were laid in the initial 
assumptions of the 1995 report. 
The reports of 1995, 1997 and 2001 gradually increased the weight 
assigned to non-military threat images of a kind presupposed by the 
notion of broad-based security, and the intensity of such threats was 
framed as being on the increase, but (in accordance with the dualistic 
structure of the reports) these non-military threats were clearly 
separated from the military ones. This “juxtaposition“ was observable 
in all three reports, even though the 2001 report did build a bridge 
between the military and non-military threats by drawing attention to 
the need for a national strategy of preparation for comprehensive 
security. Russia was treated as a source of non-military threats 
(especially in the 1995 and 1997 reports) and Finland as the target of 
these threats, whereas by 2001 the understanding of the threat scenario 
was on their complex, multisectoral cross-border nature, their constant 
integration one with another (with an accompanying increase in 
intensity) and their powerful geographical bond with Europe and the 
areas adjacent to Finland (as both source and target areas). On the 
other hand, the new threats were also framed as being general in 
character and indistinct in their impact on the primary object of 
securitization, the preservation of Finnish independence.65 With the 
appearance of the new threats on the scene, more weight came to be 
placed on general uncertainty (insecurity), and the reports began to 
emphasize the importance for Finland of constructing international, 
chiefly European, security and of the country‟s obligations to combat 
                                                 
65 “Finland‟s foreign, security and defence policy measures are aimed at the preservation of 
Finnish independence and the ensuring of a capacity for taking action in pursuance of 
Finland‟s interests.” Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, p. 37. 
 
45
the new threats as a part of a general European front. The reality of the 
common, non-military international threats was represented in the 
reports as being more serious, even though no clear connection was 
demonstrated between Finland‟s political and military security and 
international security. 
The government security and defence policy reports have established 
themselves as political instruments for laying down the main outlines 
of the country‟s security and defence policy and the threats facing it. 
In this respect the adoption of the government report procedure in the 
mid-1990s permitted a more open discussion of perceived threats and 
a certain degree of public debate, but it also made the achievement of 
common interpretations of the threats a more challenging goal than 
ever. The procedure has now become an established one, however, 
with the consequence that this report submitted by the Council of State 
(Cabinet) to Parliament once during the government’s term of office is 
regarded as a political document in which the government presents 
Parliament with a statement of its policy, defends this in public and, 
having obtained parliamentary approval for it, commits itself to 
following it.66  
The role of the report as a statement of policy and an expression of 
political will has also meant that there has been a growing political 
and administrative desire to influence its contents. With the more open 
atmosphere surrounding discussions of security policy, the adoption 
of a broad-based concept of security, the greater element of 
parliamentarianism attached to the procedure for handling the report 
and the more open evaluation of threat interpretations within society 
at large, it has become very much easier than it used to be to put 
forward deviating views on security and the threats to it. On the other 
hand, the public nature of the reports and their thorough examination 
in Parliament may be regarded as creating a firm foundation for 
unanimity in the adoption of a certain understanding of the threats 
facing Finland. This situation in which criticism can be expressed and 
alternatives suggested can indeed by regarded as giving rise to a 
                                                 
66 On the significance of these reports as definitions of Finland‟s security and defence 
policy, see, for example, Matti Vanhanen‟s speech in the preliminary hearing on the 2004 
report, Puhe valtioneuvoston turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittisen selonteon lähetekes-
kustelussa 28.9.2004, also the speech given by President Tarja Halonen at the Opening of 
Parliament in 2006, Puhe valtiopäivien avajaisissa eduskunnassa 3.2.2006.  
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consensus reached in an atmosphere of open discussion. But given 
that reports approved through the reaching of a broad political 
consensus carry a great deal of political weight, the political interests 
in influencing their content will also be great. 
It can also be argued that the open nature of these reports means that 
they represent attempts to “calm down” the usually lively discussions 
surrounding Finnish security policy. The fact that the reports outline 
the country‟s security and defence policy, its security environment and 
perceived threats at four-year intervals can certainly lead to a situation 
in which its outlines are treated as “boundaries” within which 
discussions of perceived threats should be confined. On the other 
hand, they also allow the basic strategies behind Finnish security 
policy to be subjected to extensive discussion at regular intervals. It is 
clear, however, that they can serve as an instrument for the exercise of 
power by the security policy elite, a field for the distribution of 
security resources and an internal means of putting forward secu-
ritization proposals both to Parliament and the state administration 
and to the general public. Within Finnish society, the public 
descriptions of perceived threats contained in the report drawn up by 
the Council of State are submitted to discussion in Parliament and by 
experts and are also exposed to public opinion and the media. The 
report serves in a sense as the focal point of the whole discussion of 
security issues and carries a great deal of authority. Finnish society 
has substantial, and perhaps excessive, expectations regarding these 
reports, as is reflected by the considerable increases in their length in 
the course of time.67 The process of producing this report every four 
years has also been described as a form of “national security the-
rapy”.68 
It is possible, of course, to look on security and defence policy reports 
simply as one alternative model for defining these policies and the 
associated threat images. There were powerful demands expressed 
during the parliamentary discussions of the 1997 and 2001 reports, for 
instance, for a return to the days of parliamentary defence committees 
                                                 
67 Where the 1995 report amounted to 45 pages, that of 1997 was 92 pages long and that of 
2001 similarly 93 pages, but the 2004 report ran to 170 pages. See comparison at 
www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?s=180. 
68 See Raimo Väyrynen, ”Turvallisuuden käsite kaipaa täsmennystä”, Turun Sanomat, 
1.8.2007. In Väyrynen‟s opinion the report is “a very detailed document that securitizes the 
whole of Finnish social policy”. 
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or select committees on defence policy, particularly on account of the 
non-parliamentary nature of the preparation work that goes into these 
reports. Similarly, the government report procedure has been criticized 
as being too “cumbersome, inflexible and formal”, so that the threat 
images and their prioritization are updated relatively seldom in view 
of the rate at which the security environment alters and develops.69 
This situation was highlighted in 2001, when the description of the 
threat posed by terrorism became outdated before the report had been 
discussed in Parliament on account of the terrorist strike of 11th 
September. Another object of criticism has been the promises of 
financial allocations for particular purposes that have subsequently 
failed to materialize.70 One alternative to the government report 
approach, or means of supplementing it, would be a procedure by 
which the government could draw attention more often to changes in 
the security environment or threat images.71 On the other hand, from 
the point of view of the defence administration the defence policies 
outlined in these reports have enabled political guidance to be 
provided for the planning and development of the Finnish Defence 
Forces over longer periods of time. The reports can thus be estimated 
to serve defence policy ends fairly well, whereas security policy 
situation reports would be required at more frequent intervals, e.g. in 
the form of an annual speech by the Prime Minister on “the state of 
the nation”.72  
A government security and defence policy report can in principle be 
regarded both as a broad-based definition of Finland‟s understanding 
of security and perceived threats and a high-level political programme 
and statement of opinion on the subject. It is nevertheless also a 
political document that has evolved through choices and comp-
romises, which gives expression to the “outer shell” of Finland‟s 
                                                 
69 See, for example, Teija Tiilikainen, Turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko liian raskas, 
internet column, 3.3.2006.  
70 See, for example, Matti Ahola, ”Seuraavaa selontekoa silmälläpitäen”, Sotilasaika-
kauslehti, No. 3, 2007, p. 9-15. Ahola sees a problem in the different time spans applying 
to the govern-ment‟s interests and the development of the country‟s defence systems. 
71 See Pauli Järvenpää, Selko-08, column, 10.6.2007; Liisa Jaakonsaari, Suomen turval-
lisuuspolitiikan näkymät, speech 26.1.2006; Pasi Rutanen, Suomalaisen ulkopolitiikan 
keskus-teluvaje, column, Finnish Broadcasting Company, 9.11.2005. 
72 On alternatives to the government report procedure, see Jarno Limnéll, Toimiiko 
turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittinen selontekomenettely?, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 
Strategian laitos, jul-kaisusarja 4, No. 26, Helsinki 2008. 
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threat politics but not to its “soul”. It is the product of a construction 
process taking place “in the wings” in which various actors‟ world-
views, various administrative proposals and various political interests 
are reconciled. Thus the perceived threats described in the reports are 
constructs emerging from administrative and political processes, put 
together largely by the Council of State itself in the case of the 1995, 
1997 and 2001 reports. This means that the political evaluation and 
discussion of the perceived threats took place in public only after the 
Council of State had submitted its report to Parliament, where the 
more thoroughgoing discussion and evaluation, with the help of expert 
advisors, took place in the parliamentary committees.73  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 On the nature of the government report procedure as interaction between the government 
and parliament, see Ismo Lumijärvi, ”Selontekomenettely poliittisen ja hallinnollisen 
ohjauksen välineenä”, Hallinto, No. 3, 2005, pp. 16–18. 
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3. Construction of perceived threats in the 
2004 Government Report on Finnish Security 
and Defence Policy  
 
The political and institutional context 
Following the general election in spring 2003 the process of drawing 
up a new Report on Security and Defence Policy was set in motion as 
one of the first projects to be undertaken by the new government. The 
two parties that had gained the most support in the election, the Centre 
Party, with 24.7% of the votes and 55 out of the 200 seats, and the 
Social Democrats, with 24.5% and 53 seats, had together achieved a 
majority in Parliament and had formed a government along with the 
Swedish People‟s Party, which had gained 4.6% of the votes and 8 
seats. The government led by Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki 
began its work on 17.4.2003 and noted in its political programme that 
“the government will provide a wider assessment of Finland‟s foreign 
and security policy in a security and defence policy report to be 
completed in 2004.”74 The government began work on preparing this 
report on 23.5.2003 under a decision made by the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy.75 
The mainly political responsibility for guiding the preparation of the 
report was vested in the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy, to which the fields of foreign and security policy belonged, in 
addition to the ministries concerned, under the decision-making 
principles of the Council of State. It may be inferred from the 
procedural regulations governing the Council of State that foreign and 
security policy belonged at that time to the province of the Office of 
the Council of State, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Defence. The same regulations also provided more precise details 
on the position of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
                                                 
74 Pääministeri Anneli Jäätteenmäen hallituksen ohjelma 17.4.2003, Valtioneuvoston 
kanslia, Helsinki 2003, p. 4. 
75 Hallituksen toimenpidekertomus vuodelta 2003, K 1/2004 vp, pp. 3–6, Personal notice 
sent by the Office of the Council of State to members of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign 
and Security Policy, 5.5.2008. 
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Policy, noting that it “prepares matters of importance concerning 
foreign and security policy and other relations between Finland and 
foreign countries and matters of importance concerning the overall 
national defence.” The committee can be regarded as a fairly closed 
forum for discussions and decisions related to a security and defence 
policy report, as its meetings and the documents related to them are 
accessible to only a restricted body of actors. It has been shown by the 
researcher Minna Tiili, for instance, that actors remaining outside this 
cabinet committee have scarcely any opportunity to influence its 
actions or the decisions made by it.76 The committee has no permanent 
obligations to hold meetings, but can meet together with the President 
of Finland whenever circumstances require. In this case it met a total 
of 10 times in connection with the preparation of the government 
report in the course of 2003 and 2004, in all cases together with the 
President. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy can 
thus be regarded, especially when working in conjunction with the 
President, as a crucial decision-making body in matters of foreign and 
security policy, although it must be added that the revision of the 
Finnish Constitution implemented in the year 2000 is generally held to 
provide the Council of State, and also Parliament, with better 
opportunities to participate in and influence foreign and security 
policy decision-making processes than was the case previously.77 
The future outlines of the security and defence policy report and the 
“limitations” to be imposed at the preparatory stage (e.g. with respect 
to the issues of defence alliances, universal conscription etc.) were 
laid down in the programme of the subsequent government headed by 
Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen on 24.6.2003 and in the assignment 
document produced by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and 
Security Policy on 23.5.2003. The government programme described 
the preparation of the report in very general terms, following the 
Jäätteenmäki government‟s wording, but it did lay down points of 
departure for defining threat images, by observing that “national 
                                                 
76 Minna Tiili, Ministerit strategisina johtajina, valtio-opin laitos, Helsingin yliopisto, 
Helsinki 2003, pp. 63–64. 
77 Laki valtioneuvostosta, 175/28.2.2003, § 24, Valtioneuvoston ohjesääntö, 3.4.2003, luku 
3 § 10–24, luku 4 § 25. In particular the powers of decision vested in the President in 
matters of foreign and security policy were restricted under the revision of the Finnish 
Constitution. For another evaluation, see Teija Tiilikainen, Suomen ulkopoliittinen 
johtamisjärjestelmä uuden perustuslain mukaan, Perustuslain seurantatyöryhmän mietin-
nön liite, Oikeusministeriön tausta-selvityksiä 2002, pp. 1–14. 
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precautions and plans for the development of the national defence 
should take account of the new risks and threats that have appeared,” 
and that “environmental destruction and other major disasters should 
be taken into consideration.”78 There was no actual mention of 
perceived threats in the government‟s programme, however, nor was it 
specifically said that the report should be drawn up on the basis of a 
broad concept of security. It is merely significant that the programme 
should have given the question of the security of the population such a 
prominent position in its programme, being assigned more or less the 
same number of pages as foreign and security policy. In fact, the 
programme also discussed separately the international bases for 
Finnish thinking on security, the UN, the EU and transatlantic co-
operation.79 Regarding the Finnish Defence Forces and other aspects 
of the national defence, the programme noted that these would be 
developed in accordance with the outlines given in the security and 
defence policy report.80 
Although the assignment document produced by the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy did define clearer aims for 
the process of preparing the government report, it was for the most 
part fairly general in nature, nor did it lay down any limitations as to 
content or give any more precise instructions regarding the 
understanding of security or perceived threats. One reason for this 
may have been that the Cabinet Committee set up a separate working 
group consisting of Secretary of State Risto Volanen from the Office 
of the Council of State, Jaakko Kalela, head of the President‟s Office, 
Undersecretary of State Jaakko Laajava, who was responsible for 
political matters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Pauli 
Järvenpää, head of the defence policy section at the Ministry of 
Defence, to prepare the report. As mentioned in the assignment 
document, this working group comprising four civil servants with 
Volanen as its chairman was intended to do its job “under close 
                                                 
78 Pääministeri Matti Vanhasen hallituksen ohjelma 24.6.2003, Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 
Helsinki 2003, p. 49. 
79 “The government will support improvements in the functioning of the United Nations 
and other collaborative bodies based on extensive international co-operation, in order to 
strengthen democracy, respect for human rights and the principles of constitutional 
government. Finland will be an active member of the European Union and promote the 
strengthening of its common foreign and security policy and transatlantic co-operation.” 
Ibid, p. 4. 
80 Ibid, pp. 4–5, 47–49. 
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guidance from the Council of State‟s Cabinet Committee on Foreign 
and Security Policy.”81  
In terms of the assignment document, responsibility for drawing up 
and presenting the government report was divided into two parts: 1) 
the security and defence policy operating environment and the outline 
of the security and defence policy itself, for the writing of which the 
working group set up by the Cabinet Committee could call on the 
resources of the Foreign Ministry, after which it was to be put before 
the Cabinet Committee by the Foreign Minister, and 2) the part 
concerned with the development of various branches of the admin-
istration (in accordance with the description of the operational 
environment provided in the first part), for which the working group 
was to make use of resources from the Ministry of Defence and the 
Security and Defence Committee. The aim when preparing the second 
part was to take account of the threats perceived by the various 
branches of the administration and construct appropriate links to both 
the Strategy for Securing Functions Vital to Society (SFVS Strategy) 
and the Internal Security Programme. Responsibility for presenting 
this part to the Cabinet Committee lay with the Minister of Defence. 
Nothing was said at this point about the budgetary effects of the 
recommendations made in the report; it was simply noted that this 
would be taken care of later. The procedural structures that had been 
created and the actors in the preparatory phase (particularly the civil 
servants involved) became apparent later in the preparation process.82 
A stronger parliamentary dimension was introduced into the 
preparation of this report by the Security Policy Monitoring Group set 
up by the then Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, on 13.6.2002 in the 
light of the proposal made in the parliamentary discussion on the 2001 
report to the effect that the following one, in 2004, should be prepared 
in such a way that the main parliamentary select committees should be 
involved in it at the initial stage under the auspices of the Council of 
State. The idea was to bring parliamentary guidance to bear on the 
process of preparing the report (regardless of which parties were in the 
                                                 
81 Valtioneuvoston tiedotusyksikkö (Council of State Information Department), 
Turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittisen selonteon valmistelu käynnistetään, press release 
152/2003, 23.5.2003. 
82 Ibid., see also Risto Volanen, ”Valtioneuvoston turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittinen 
selonteko 2004 - valmistelujen vaiheita ja painopisteitä”, Maanpuolustus, N:o 77, 2004, pp. 
16–19. 
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government at the time and which in the opposition) and allow as 
broad a political front as possible to take part in the preparatory work. 
At the same time the significance of a monitoring group can been seen 
to lie in the aim of ensuring Parliament‟s commitment to the work of 
preparing the report and to the policies expressed in it, as it would 
allow Parliament to monitor the preparatory work and to make 
recommendations (provide political guidance) to the working group 
appointed by the Council of State. The monitoring group was chaired 
by Antti Kalliomäki (Soc. Dem.) from 13.6.2002 to 9.5.2003 and 
Aulis Ranta-Muotio (Centre Party) during the preparation of the 2004 
report. The group working under Ranta-Muotio included 11 members 
of parliament representing eight parties (two each from the Social 
Democrats, Centre Party and Coalition Party and one each from the 
Left-Wing Alliance, the Swedish People‟s Party, the Greens, the 
Christian Democrats and the True Finns.83 
The procedural structure created for preparing the report, a political 
document intended to define the Finnish understanding of security and 
the threats to it, also gave many other actors an opportunity to 
influence and take part in the construction of its content. The working 
group was closely assisted in its practical deliberations by a number of 
permanent expect advisors who took a full part in its activities, three 
of whom, Markus Lyra, Jukka Salovaara (special advisor to Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen on international affairs) and Major-General 
Hannu Herranen of the General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence 
Forces, were engaged in this from the beginning, while Colonel Sakari 
Honkamaa of the General Headquarters joined the group later and 
Ritva Viljanen, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior, 
took part in a few meetings. Anne Sipiläinen of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Janne Kuusela of the Ministry of Defence acted as 
secretaries to the meetings of the working group and gathered together 
the material produced by their respective ministries. The Finnish 
Defence Forces (in practise the General Headquarters, where Admiral 
Juhani Kaskeala was Commander-in-chief at the time, Lt.-Gen. Kari 
Rimpi was Chief of Staff and Lt.-Gen. Olavi Jäppilä was Chief of 
Operations) occupied an important position in the work of preparing 
part II of the report and in constructing the military threat images. 
                                                 
83 Valtioneuvoston tiedotusyksikkö, Turvallisuuspoliittinen seurantaryhmä, press release 
5.6.2002, Valtionneuvoston tiedotusyksikkö, Turvallisuuspoliittinen seurantaryhmä 
asetettiin, press release 13.6.2002, Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantatyöryhmän raportti, 
Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja 9/2004, Helsinki 2004, app. 1. 
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Other persons in influential positions at that time were Matti Ahola, as 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Olli-Pekka Jalonen, 
as head of its international defence policy department, Arto Mansala 
as Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Raimo 
Sailas as Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance. The Security 
and Defence Committee, which had played a prominent role in 
preparing the 2001 report, with Colonel Tapani Hyötyläinen as its 
secretary, was involved to a much lesser extent in the preparatory 
work for the 2004 report, being concerned mainly with work in 
autumn 2003 on the SFVS Strategy and the part of the report dealing 
with this.  
Great expectations were entertained for the new report both in the 
Council of State, Parliament and several ministries and also in Finnish 
society at large, and it was emphasized in numerous speeches that the 
2001 document had been in the nature of an interim survey of the 
situation and that the coming report would be of greater significance, 
being based on a thorough, broad-scale assessment of the security 
situation. A picture was built up in the public eye in advance of a 
comprehensive assessment of the nation‟s security which would for 
the first time achieve full coverage of Finland‟s security environment 
from a broad-based point of view and of the new threat factors at work 
within it.84 Indeed, hopes were raised regarding the new report even 
on the pages of the 2001 version, where no less than 52 matters were 
left to be examined or determined in the 2004 version. As Juhani 
Kaskeala noted somewhat prophetically in the autumn of 2001, after 
the publication of that year‟s report, “much is expected of the 2004 
document”, to which the Minister of Defence at the time, Jan-Erik 
Enestam, added “it will be necessary then to go into certain major 
questions affecting the defence administration which have now 
remained, or have been left, unresolved.”85 Thus a considerable 
political charge was placed in advance on the 2004 report, and 
especially on its description of the security environment. As the 
foreign policy journal Ulkopolitiikka put it in autumn 2003, the 
                                                 
84 See, for example, Tarja Halonen, Puhe suurlähettiläskokouksessa, 21.8.2002; Erkki 
Tuomioja, Globalisoitumisen ilmiöitä ja kehityssuuntia, 6.6.2002; Ville Itälä, Puheenvuoro 
keskustelussa Nato-aloitteesta, 7.6.2002. 
85 Juhani Kaskeala, Turvallisuusympäristö muuttuu, puolustusvoimien kehittäminen jatkuu, 
speech, 1.11.2001, Jan-Erik Enestam, Puhe itsenäisyyspäivän juhlassa, 6.12.2001.  
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preparations for part I of the report were proving to be like “playing 
with fire”.86 
If we examine the mood prevailing in (Finnish) national security 
policy in 2002 and 2003 in the light of Kingdon‟s agenda-setting 
theory, we can say that the speeches made by the President, Prime 
Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister were dominated to a 
great extent (from the perspective of threat politics) by three themes: 
1) the threat of terrorism and its influence on both national and 
international security (in that the terrorism “threat window” thrown 
open in the parliamentary discussion of the 2001 report had been kept 
wide open), 2) the active discussion of the question of Finland joining 
or declining to join a military alliance, with possible reference to 
NATO (a discussion that was reflected in the threats that were 
perceived and the weights attached to them, and 3) globalization and 
its connection with security matters, which was a crucial theme 
pursued by the elite at the core of Finnish security policy. It was with 
reference to these themes that President Halonen observed in her New 
Year speech to the nation on 1.1.2003 that “the preparing of the 2004 
Government Report on Security and Defence Policy will provide a 
suitable framework in which to examine our position in the constantly 
changing international situation.”87    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 Arno Ahosniemi, ”Suomen turvallisuuslinjaukset neljän huippuvirkamiehen käsissä”, 
Ulko-politiikka, No. 3–4, 2003, p. 12. 
87 Tarja Halonen, Tasavallan presidentin uudenvuodenpuhe, 1.1.2003. See also Paavo 
Lipponen, Suomi ja Euroopan turvallisuusrakenteet, speech 16.1.2003, Jan-Erik Enestam, 
Esitelmä Paimion Rotary-klubin kokouksessa, 29.4.2002, Erkki Tuomioja, Puhe 
eduskunnassa, 14.5.2003. 
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Administrative preparation of the report under political 
guidance88 
“Government reports to Parliament are an instrument for managing 
change situations. In the midst of change it is important for our 
country’s political leadership to be able to discern and define the 
directions in which developments are leading and to agree at a 
general level on the main perceived threats and the means of 
controlling them. In matters connected with security and defence 
policy this is done by means of government reports submitted to 
Parliament. The process of drawing up such a report allows a certain 
degree of fine tuning of political viewpoints, first of all within the 
government and then within the whole political leadership.”89  
 
Points of departure for defining threat policy 
It is clear that the procedure developed for preparing the government 
report had an essential influence on the construction of the perceived 
threats described in it. Where the previous such reports had been 
prepared in a fairly well-established manner through consultations 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, it 
was the Council of State that was assigned the leading role in 
preparing the 2004 document. This meant in practise that particular 
emphasis was placed on the roles played by the Office of the Council 
                                                 
88 In addition to the documentary sources mentioned, the analyses and interpretations 
presented here are based on notes made by the author at personal interviews with the 
following people: Matti Ahola 28.4.2008, Jan-Erik Enestam 21.1.2008, Mari Eteläpää 
17.4.2008, Juha Harjula 1.2.2008, Hannu Herranen 11.6.2008, Sakari Honkamaa 
24.6.2008, Tapani Hyötyläinen 30.5.2008, Jyrki Iivonen 21.1.2008, Olli-Pekka Jalonen 
12.2.2008, Olavi Jäppilä 19.5.2008, Pauli Järvenpää 19.2.2008 and 3.3.2008, Jaakko 
Kalela 26.5.2008, Elina Kalkku 2.4.2008, Antti Kalliomäki 12.3.2008, Juhani Kaskeala 
29.5.2008, Juha Korkeaoja 21.2.2008, Johannes Koskinen 12.3.2008, Janne Kuusela 
20.5.2008, Seppo Kääriäinen 22.2.2008, Jaakko Laajava 25.1.2008 and 9.6.2008, Paula 
Lehtomäki 4.6.2008, Markus Lyra 6.5.2008, Tarja Mankkinen 5.6.2008, Arto Mansala 
2.5.2008, Juha Martelius 5.5.2008, Matti Piispanen 29.4.2008, Kari Rajamäki 26.2.2008, 
Aulis Ranta-Muotio 27.5.2008, Raimo Sailas 29.5.2008, Jukka Salovaara 5.5.2008, Kai 
Sauer 7.1.2008, Anne Sipiläinen 12.6.2008, Folke Sundman 8.5.2008, Pekka Toveri 
13.5.2008, Erkki Tuomioja 6.2.2008, Matti Vanhanen 17.7.2008, Ritva Viljanen 15.5.2008 
and Risto Volanen 6.5.2008.  
89 Seppo Kääriäinen, ”Mihin selontekoja tarvitaan?”, Lalli, 24.9.2004. 
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of State, principally the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, 
Risto Volanen. A further innovation was the gathering of a separate 
small, closed group of civil servants to work on the text of the report, 
a group which Volanen then moved over to lead. This was the first 
time that the leading role in the preparation of such a report had been 
entrusted to the Office of the Council of State, and the resulting 
mechanism reflected at the outset the broader goals of the intended 
security assessment, as the argument for assigning the leading role to 
the Office of the Council of State was that the whole broad field of 
security should be open to scrutiny. Indeed that office regarded itself 
as the natural co-ordinator of security activities that united all 
branches of the administration and reflected best the nature of security 
issues in applying to the whole central government sector. 
The Council of State observed in the late spring of 2003 that it was 
now ready to produce the first thoroughgoing report to be based on a 
broad concept of security since the adoption of the new Constitution, 
and that it therefore regarded it as natural that the preparation of the 
Council of State report should be managed from the Office of the 
Council of State. It was also of the opinion that collaboration with the 
parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group called for a clearer 
than ever transfer of leadership to the Prime Minister. From one point 
of view this was a matter of power politics: the explicit aim of the 
structure being created was to underline the position of the Prime 
Minister and strengthen the coordinative capacity of the Council of 
State in matters of security. At the same time, however, it was felt 
desirable to ensure the commitment of the other principal instances 
capable of influencing security policy, i.e. the Foreign Ministry, 
Ministry of Defence, President‟s Office and to some extent the 
Ministry of the Interior, to the process of preparing the report. The 
Foreign Ministry, and still more obviously the Ministry of Defence, 
did not approve of this “position of authority” assumed by the Office 
of the Council of State and the working group appointed from within 
it. In the view of the Ministry of Defence the previous arrangement 
whereby the Security and Defence Committee had been responsible 
for coordinating the preparation of the government report had worked 
well and there was not felt to be any good reason for changing it. 
There were also suspicions within the ministry that Volanen in 
particular was liable to lay too much emphasis on a broad-based 
interpretation of security. 
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The procedure created on this occasion for preparing the report 
implied the existence of three essential points of departure for the 
construction of threat images. In the first place, the administrative 
process of constructing these images was in the hands of a small group 
of civil servants; in fact it was personified by four officials and the 
institutions that they represented. This meant in general terms a 
strengthening of the power of civil servants and expert advisors, and 
more particularly the concentration of power – the opportunity to 
influence the definition of threat images – in a very narrowly 
restricted group of actors.90 In the end the cognitive interpretations put 
forward by the members of this working group proved to be of 
considerable significance (in spite of the political guidance provided), 
and the members of both the working group and the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy admitted afterwards that 
the views of these four civil servants had been decisive for the 
construction of the threat images, especially for the introduction and 
framing of certain weightings with regard to their content. On the 
other hand, the long duration of the preparation process (about six 
months) gave the working group ample time in which to draw up the 
report in a conscientious manner as “executives” of the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, given that the committee 
itself could not have achieved the same degree of thoroughness in 
discussing the issues or preparing the report. 
Secondly, the structure of the preparation process led to the threat 
images being constructed administratively mainly in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Since, in accordance with 
the division of the report proposed by the Council of State in the 
assignment document and confirmed by the working group, the 
purpose of part I was to describe non-military threats in the country‟s 
security environment, the preparation of the models for the military 
threats was handed over entirely to the Ministry of Defence. This 
sectorizing of the threat images (their assignment to different branches 
of the administration) was further reinforced by the initial decision to 
include perceived threats to internal security in the report (the 
                                                 
90 Although the formation of the working group to prepare the report had been agreed upon 
by all the parties making up the government, the people behind the original idea of such a 
working group (and its composition) had been the Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki and 
Risto Volanen. 
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province of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Thirdly, the structure of 
the process may be looked upon as having given the Prime Minister, 
the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence and the President the 
best political opportunities to influence the content of the perceived 
threats to be presented, so that both their personal views and the 
mutual relations that prevailed between these people came to be of 
particular significance. It should be noted, too, that the Minister of the 
Interior in Matti Vanhanen‟s first cabinet was also a member of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy.91    
The main issue regarding the construction of the threat images in the 
report was the independence of the working group in relation to the 
political “background influences” that its members represented. At 
least the Office of the Council of State had been of the opinion that the 
Security and Defence Committee had enjoyed too independent a role 
as a participant body in the preparation of the 2001 report and had also 
been too closely bound to the defence administration, so that it was 
now felt desirable to exert more direct political guidance on the body 
responsible for the 2004 report, and in addition to the government‟s 
programme and the political guidance represented by the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, political views and 
interests could best be brought to bear on the preparation of the report 
through background actors capable of influencing the members of the 
working group. Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen‟s views could be 
communicated to the group by Risto Volanen and Jukka Salovaara, 
and President Tarja Halonen‟s by Jaakko Kalela, as these 
representatives of the offices of the Council of State and the President, 
respectively, held numerous discussions on the subject with their own 
political heads of department and kept them abreast of the matters 
under consideration in the working group. On the other hand, on 
account of differences of opinion, Jaakko Laajava, the representative 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the working group, did not act as 
a link with the Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, a role performed by 
Markus Lyra as a permanent expert advisor to the group. Another 
member of the group who, like Laajava, supported a more inde-
pendent role for the group as a whole, was Pauli Järvenpää, who felt 
to a greater extent than the other members that he was acting inde-
pendently within the group, free of background political influences, in 
his case from the Ministry of Defence. The background to this situ-
                                                 
91 This was no longer the case with Vanhanen‟s second cabinet. 
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ation lay in differences of opinion on matters such as Finland‟s 
possible relations with a military alliance that existed between Jär-
venpää and the Minister of Defence, Seppo Kääriäinen. Thus it may 
be said that the Minister of Defence did not enjoy the same 
“representation of his views” in the working group as did the 
President, the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister.  
Although the working group did discuss the alternative of carrying out 
its task independently of the “political reality” of the day, it was fairly 
soon realized that it was important for the work of preparing the report 
to take account of the constant political guidance that it was receiving 
and the “shadows” influencing it in the wings. In other words, the 
group acknowledged the guiding principle that its work would have to 
achieve political acceptability – including acceptability for its 
perceived threats. It regarded it as important that what was written into 
the report should from the outset be in accordance with the views of 
the security policy elite and have gained their approval. The members 
knew what the political decision-makers whom they represented 
wished to see included in the report and what choices of wording it 
was possible to put before them. The group could not, in its own 
opinion, break away from the instances that had entrusted them with 
the task, and thus the views that they expressed were to a great extent 
those of the political actors whom they represented. One illustration of 
this situation is the statement by a member of the group that “as far as 
my own thinking was concerned, membership of the working group 
was two-thirds a matter of representing an institution and one-third a 
matter of using my own expert knowledge.” The work was basically a 
matter of preparing an administrative proposal that contained crucial 
points and problematic issues that mostly had to be dealt with in the 
course of the preparation work, through political guidance from those 
exercising a background influence on the group members. According 
to these members, this way of working helped to ensure that the report 
passed smoothly through the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and 
Security Policy, but it did mean that the political views that lay behind 
it were powerfully reflected in the content of the perceived threats, 
especially the non-military ones. The good relations that prevailed 
between the political instances working in the background also served 
to increase the weight carried by the political guidance that the 
working group received, with the unofficial channels of com-
munication between the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence 
and between the Foreign Minister and the President of Finland 
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emerging as particularly significant when it came to constructing 
consistent lines of argument to be presented in the report. In other 
words, the messages received by the working group frequently con-
tained indications that matters had been agreed on between the 
background instances. 
The acknowledging of the existence of political guidance provided 
further support for the emphasis on a broad concept of security, as the 
working group was aware that the President and the Foreign Minister 
were both apt to lay stress on non-military threats that were in 
accordance with this interpretation of security. Since the views of the 
President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and to some extent 
the Minister of Defence were most strongly to the fore in guiding the 
administrative construction of the perceived threats discussed in the 
report, the preparation procedure may be said to have been responsible 
for the fact that their construction was dependent on the personal 
views of these actors regarding potential threats – for they had the best 
opportunities to influence the threat images put forward in the report. 
Its link to particular people (the actors responsible at a certain point in 
time) was what made this report unique. One tribute to this effect was 
the serious expression of discontent with which the report was greeted 
in the Ministry of the Interior, which had not had any permanent 
representative in the working group. 
The working group met for the first time in June 2003 and established 
a routine whereby it would meet once a week, for four or five hours 
on Friday afternoons. Meetings then became longer and more frequent 
in spring 2004. All in all, the manner in which the group worked, and 
thus the manner in which the report came into being, was largely 
closed off from the outside world, one might almost say secretive. The 
meetings took place in a sealed-off conference room in the building of 
the Council of State, and the members of the group scarcely said 
anything in public about their work – in fact they felt that they were 
submitting the report to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and 
Security Policy. Discussions within the group, on the other hand, 
would appear to have been fairly informal, and no politicians were 
allowed to take part in the meetings. The four actual members of the 
group never held any private meetings among themselves, as all 
meetings took place in the presence of the secretaries and the 
permanent expert advisors, and the working group was always of the 
same composition when it attended discussions of the report in the 
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Cabinet Committee.92 The working group sought support for its 
assumptions by consulting expert advisors, which in turn led to an 
accent on the power of expert advisors over the construction of the 
content of the perceived threats set out in the report. About 40% of 
the just over 40 expert advisors summoned by the working group, 
mostly in autumn 2003, were from the Foreign Ministry and about 
40% from the Ministry of Defence, while the remainder were 
representatives of epistemic communities and other ministries, e.g. the 
permanent secretaries of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the 
Environment. It was mainly Volanen and Sipiläinen who were 
responsible for choosing the expert advisors who were to be con-
sulted. 
Another major group of actors influencing the construction of the 
perceived threats in addition to the working group and its sources of 
political guidance consisted of the authorities that produced textual 
material and threat evaluations for the working group. The group itself 
did not actually produce threat descriptions, but rather (in accordance 
with the agreed procedure) it was responsible for editing the 
descriptions produced by various branches of the administration and 
for choosing which perceived threats were to be included in the report. 
The material supplied to the group came via Anne Sipiläinen in the 
case of part I of the report and Janne Kuusela in the case of part II, 
and it was these two members who were chiefly responsible for 
gathering together, handling and editing the threat descriptions. 
The dual structure of the preparation process was thus also reflected in 
the production of the threat descriptions. The working group did in 
fact regard this dual structure as somewhat problematic and 
incompatible with the group’s working methods in the early stages, 
although the group can be regarded as having fulfilled its role well in 
this respect, for without such a coordinative body parts I and II of the 
report would probably have been prepared still more obviously as 
separate entities. As it was, the working group attempted from the 
outset to coordinate the material that was produced and ensure its 
compatibility. Altogether thousands of pages of material were 
                                                 
92 The members of the working group did not, however, take part in the meetings of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy in the early autumn of 2004 at which 
decisions were made on the eventual content of the report.  
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produced for the working group by the various branches of the 
administration, which testifies to the thoroughness with which both 
the working group and the civil servants approached their work on the 
report, but also to the laboriousness of that work.93 The working group 
then determined its policy with regard to what was to be contained in 
the report, including its intended length, points of emphasis and table 
of contents. It even contemplated producing a brief report, in the 
manner of the EU security strategy, as none of its members was 
particularly enthusiastic about producing a very long report. One good 
reason for a shorter report (no more than 50 pages in length) was that 
the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy had only a 
limited amount of time available to discuss it. On the other hand, as 
the document from that committee commissioning the report had 
already laid down the division of labour between the various bodies 
responsible for its production, it was difficult for the working group at 
that stage to set about revising its points of departure. The defence 
administration had required that the report should have a detailed 
defence policy section, which meant that part I had to be increased in 
length somewhat at the last stage of preparation to render it 
comparable to part II in terms of the number of pages. The conscious 
need to increase the number of pages is also reflected in the extent of 
the threat descriptions. At the same time chapters six and seven were 
correspondingly shortened considerably at the last minute, so that they 
would not dominate the whole report. A great deal of time and effort 
was in any case put into polishing the wording of the document before 
its release, partly to improve the Finnish and partly to eliminate 
repetitions. The working group also added a number of “boxes” 
containing background facts,94 with the general educational purpose of 
making the report easier to read.  
 
 
 
                                                 
93 The material was rendered more concise (and some of it rejected) within the ministries 
before it was submitted to the working group.  
94 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, pp. 41–42, 46, 54–55, 91, 108, 110–
111, 115, 133–135. 
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The production of textual material and background material for the 
use of the working group was divided up as follows: 
- Chapter 2, The operational environment for Finland‟s security 
and defence policy.  
Prepared mainly in various departments of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The material for section 2.5 (Role and 
activities of NATO) was prepared by the Finnish Delegation 
to NATO in Brussels (at the request of the Foreign Ministry), 
and the writing of sections 2.6 (Changes in Russia), 2.7 
(Significance of the Baltic region) and 2.8 (Military deve-
lopments in areas bordering on Finland) involved major 
contributions from the defence administration. 
- Chapter 3, Outlines of Finnish security and defence policy. 
Written by the working group towards the end of the prepa-
ration period. 
- Chapter 4, Development of external performance capacity. 
Sections 4.1 (Promoting Finland‟s security interests), 4.2 
(Implementation of the development programme, human 
rights and global security), 4.3 (Prevention of conflicts) and 
4.4 (Civilian crisis management) were prepared by the 
Foreign Ministry, and sections 4.5 (Military crisis mana-
gement) and 4.6 (Weapons inspection) by the Foreign 
Ministry and Ministry of Defence. 
- Chapter 5, Development of Finland‟s defence capability. 
Section 5.1. (Principles for the development of Finland‟s 
defence capability) was written by the working group towards 
the end of the preparation period for the purpose of linking the 
two descriptions of the security environment contained in this 
chapter to the remainder of the chapter. The other parts of 
chapter 5 were prepared by the defence administration. 
- Chapter 6, Development of internal security. 
Prepared by the Ministery of the Interior.    
- Chapter 7, Securing functions vital to society. 
Preparation supervised by the Security and Defence Com-
mittee. Material also provided by the Centre for the Security 
of Supplies, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health and the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry. 
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The division of labour in the production of this material gave the civil 
servants who had produced text and background information for the 
Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defence in particular (who had no 
political accountability) the power to influence the content of the 
wording. Although the material was discussed very thoroughly in the 
working group, the civil servants who had actually written it had the 
power to choose the wording for the threat descriptions, for instance. 
It was unanimously agreed in both ministries afterwards that the threat 
descriptions produced by these officials had fared remarkably well in 
passing through the procedure for producing the report. 
The work of writing the material for the report in the Foreign Ministry 
and Ministry of Defence was highly intensive at times and occupied 
large numbers of civil servants. It was also noticeable, however, that 
the resulting threat descriptions differed markedly between the two 
ministries, those received from the Foreign Ministry concentrating on 
the “new threats” belonging to the broad interpretation of security95 
while those from the Ministry of Defence concerned military threat 
models. The threat images that concerned internal security were 
constructed in the Ministry of the Interior. The division of 
responsibilities that had been decided upon led to a challenging 
situation as far as the production of threat descriptions was con-
cerned, which resulted on the one hand in a state of competition for 
weighting between threat descriptions of different kinds and on the 
other hand in the placing of a certain degree of emphasis on the 
branch of the administration from which each threat description had 
originated. 
While the working group concentrated its attention at an early stage in 
the process on evaluating Finland‟s security environment, it was the 
threats perceived by the Foreign Ministry that were accentuated most 
in its discussions and evaluations. The verbal representations of these 
threats were usually very much less formal than those produced by the 
Ministry of Defence and were more in the nature of background 
memoranda, whereas the latter clearly bore the mark of having 
qualified for approval from the leadership of both the Ministry of 
Defence and the Finnish Defence Forces prior to submission to the 
working group. It was also the case that the working group had to wait 
                                                 
95 All non-military threat descriptions and models were referred to by the actors involved 
under the broad heading of “new threats” during the production of the report.  
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very much longer to receive material from the defence administration 
than from the Foreign Ministry. Where the “new (non-military) 
threats” were concerned, it was also noticeable that the Foreign 
Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, himself played an active role in proposing 
perceived threats of this kind to be worked up by civil servants in his 
ministry. Tuomioja also followed assiduously the process of preparing 
the material in the Foreign Ministry and arranged a number of 
meetings at which he brought forward his own opinions on the form in 
which the threat descriptions should be written and points that should 
be emphasized. No real disagreements arose at these meetings over 
the relative prioritization of these new threats; the most essential thing 
for the Foreign Ministry was that non-military threats should be 
emphasized in the perceptions put forward in the report, as the 
ministry regarded it as extremely unlikely that any of the military 
threats mentioned in it would actually be realized. 
Tuomioja also edited and finalized the material written in the Foreign 
Ministry (especially at the end of the preparation process) before it 
was sent to the working group, and likewise the material produced by 
the working group for part I of the report before it was presented to 
the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy.96  Thus part I 
of the eventual report bore distinct evidence of the close involvement 
of the Foreign Minister in its production. In fact it was noted both in 
the Foreign Ministry and in the working group that Tuomioja would 
much rather have written the whole of the first part himself if this had 
only been possible. Illustrative of this fact is Tuomioja‟s book Suomen 
ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, Anno 2004 (Finland‟s Foreign and 
Security Policy 2004),97 which was published in the same year as the 
report and parallels its first part in placing the accent on a broad 
concept of security and in its analysis of Finland‟s security envi-
ronment in the light of the new threats. The Foreign Minister himself 
may thus be assumed to have had a considerable influence on the 
construction of the new threat images contained in the report.  
The preparation work that took place in the Ministry of Defence was 
confined to a much smaller group of civil servants than in the Foreign 
                                                 
96 The Foreign Minister was responsible for placing the material for part I of the report 
before the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy.  
97 Erkki Tuomioja, Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, Anno 2004, Tammi, Keuruu 
2004. 
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Ministry. Pauli Järvenpää, Matti Ahola and a few civil servants 
appointed by them were responsible for the majority of the material to 
come from that ministry. Similarly, there was virtually no discussion 
of matters connected with the preparation of the report, nor was mate-
rial intended for it circulated among the ministry‟s staff. Although the 
Minister of Defence, Seppo Kääriäinen, was aware of how active 
Erkki Tuomioja was being in preparing material for the report, he 
himself did not inspect or edit the material from the defence 
administration before it was presented to the report‟s working group 
or to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. 
Kääriäinen‟s main objects of political guidance within the Ministry of 
Defence as far as the report was concerned lay in regional policy and 
defence policy issues that could have affected the development of the 
armed forces, e.g. preservation of the principle of universal male 
conscription.   
The working group was not satisfied with the way in which the 
defence administration had produced its material (for chapter 5 of the 
report, presenting the military threat models), as it was regarded as 
having set out too obviously on a path of its own. Although experts 
from the defence administration had visited the working group and 
told it in advance of the policies and military threats that would be 
included in this material, the actual content for chapter 5 was only 
handed over in a “ready-made package” at a very late stage in the 
preparation work. This meant that many of the working group 
members were of the opinion that there had not been sufficient time to 
discuss the content of chapter 5 or the military threat descriptions 
belonging to it: “We were left with the feeling that they were trying to 
use the working group to deliver the material directly to the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, where they knew it would 
be accepted.” The working group felt that the defence administration 
had delayed delivery of the material on purpose, whereas the defence 
administration itself insisted that it was because approval had to be 
obtained from the highest authorities in the administration before the 
material could be handed over. The result was, however, that the 
perceived military threats set out by the defence administration never 
managed to be submitted to the same kind of broad-based discussion 
in the working group that the new threats had received, especially 
since the main topics of interest in defence circles by the time the 
material was received were the use of anti-personnel mines, the re-
location of the headquarters of the ground forces and the major 
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reorganization of the Defence Forces‟ command and administration 
system. The working group was nevertheless convinced of the need 
for descriptions of the military threats; it was only a question of the 
way in which they were framed and of the fact that the working group 
itself had been by-passed in the process of producing them. 
The broad concept of security may be regarded at the level of the 
Council of State as comprising, in addition to the government‟s 
programme, a set of three documents intended to guide discussions on 
security and the definition of threats: the Government Report on 
Security and Defence Policy, the Internal Security Programme and the 
SFVS Strategy. The latter two, both of them security documents that 
had been produced in the early years of the new millennium, had 
repercussions of their own for the process of constructing threat 
images for the government report, and both of them described the 
altered – i.e. broadened – nature of Finnish thinking in security 
matters. There was one essential point on which the Internal Security 
Programme and the SFVS document differed significantly from the 
government report, however: both had arisen as decisions in principle 
arrived at by the Council of State, so that they had not been subject to 
extensive discussion in Parliament, nor did they contain any indication 
of the allocation of funds for the implementation of the development 
plans put forward in them. Thus their publicity value and the weight to 
be attached to them were distinctly lower than in the case of the 
government report in the eyes of the politicians and civil servants who 
had been responsible for preparing it. This situation led to interest 
being focused (especially in the Ministry of the Interior) on the 
perceived threats mentioned in the report and the means suggested for 
controlling these.    
It had been decided in the government‟s programme to draw up the 
country‟s first internal security programme at the same time as the 
report on security and defence policy, but coordinated by the Ministry 
of the Interior.98 This was to concentrate on the promotion of citizens‟ 
security and outline the aims of this, the measures to be taken and the 
resources required.99 This programme was published on 23.9.2004, the 
                                                 
98 Altogether nine ministries and a number of expert advisors were involved in drawing up 
the Internal Security Programme. See Arjen turvaa. Sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelma, 
sisäasiainministeriön julkaisuja 44/2004, appendix 1. 
99 Pääministeri Matti Vanhasen hallituksen ohjelma 24.6.2003, p. 48. ”This Internal 
Security Programme is a concrete description of how matters connected with internal 
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day before the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy. 
The production of this document was taken within the Ministry of the 
Interior to be a highly significant achievement in terms of both the 
impact of the ministry‟s own activities and the extension of broad-
based security to the level of the individual citizen. As far as that 
ministry was concerned, it was felt to be one of the central 
embodiments of security policy for Finnish society and to lay 
emphasis on the growth in the intensity of threats to the country‟s 
internal security. At the same time, the ministry maintained that the 
distinction between external and internal security had become more 
blurred in recent times, as Finland‟s internal and external operating 
environments had to some extent come to be subjected to the same 
developmental factors and threats. Indeed, the definition of the 
concept of internal security reflected the point of departure for a broad 
understanding of this field: “Internal security implies a state of affairs 
within society in which each individual can enjoy the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the legal system without any justifiable 
sense of fear or insecurity occasioned by crime, disturbances, 
accidents or changes and phenomena affecting either Finnish society 
or the globalizing world.”100  
The principal responsibility for protecting the people against the 
threats perceived in the internal security programme lay with the 
security authorities operating under the auspices of the Ministry of the 
Interior, primarily the police, customs officials, rescue services and 
border guard service, with additional emphasis placed on the need for 
extensive cooperation between the various organizations.101 The 
implication was, therefore, that society‟s response to perceived threats 
to its internal security should be for the most part in the hands of the 
Ministry of the Interior. It is noticeable, of course, that this 
programme, too, together with the aims set out in it, was constructed 
on the basis of a set of perceived threats, the most serious of which 
seemed to be those associated with alienation, a problematic element 
with regard to social security that was seen to be reflected in all 
                                                                                                         
security affect all people in some way or other and form a major part of people‟s everyday 
welfare.” Arjen turvaa. Sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelma, p. 1. 
100 Arjen turvaa. Sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelma, p. 14. 
101 Other authorities mentioned in this connection were the customs service, the judiciary, 
the prison service, the health service, the social services, transport and communications, 
educational and cultural organizations, youth organizations and the employment and 
environmental authorities. 
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branches of Finnish society. Also connected with social insecurity 
were the increases in alcoholism, unemployment and inequality. In 
addition, the document assigned priority to crime organized from 
outside the country (drug trafficking, prostitution, financial crimes and 
human trafficking), accidents (suffered by individuals), the increased 
vulnerability of the cyber society, illegal immigration and terrorism.102 
These threats were seen in terms of the Internal Security Programme 
to be targeted very definitely at the everyday security of Finnish 
citizens. 
The SFVS Strategy, a document that may be regarded as less political 
than those mentioned above, had arisen out of the 2001 Government 
Report on Security and Defence Policy, on the strength of which the 
Council of State had asked the Security and Defence Committee to 
draw up a national strategy that defined the functions that were 
essential to society and desired conditions of life,103 the factors that 
threatened these and, crossing the divisions between administrative 
branches where necessary, the plans of action and development plans 
necessary for ensuring that such threats could be brought under 
control. The Council of State then approved a decision in principle on 
this matter on 27.11.2003, the preamble to which stated the aim to be 
that of preserving Finland‟s national sovereignty and the safety and 
living conditions of its population by securing those functions that 
were vital to society. All the government ministries were involved in 
preparing the document, with the Security and Defence Committee 
providing the necessary coordination. The document was a markedly 
administrative one, constructed by civil servants in consultation, and it 
was also discussed in the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy, although not “piece by piece” as it was prepared but in its 
entirety when the whole strategy was complete.104 Attempts were 
                                                 
102 Arjen turvaa. Sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelma, pp. 17–19, 100–118. See also Ministry of 
the Interior, Sisäasiainhallinnon vuosikertomus 2004, pp. 11–17.  
103 The SFVS document defines as vital functions for Finnish society central government, 
an external operational capacity, military defence of the national territory, internal security, 
the functioning of society and its economy, the guaranteeing of a livelihood for the 
population and the psychological ability to withstand crisis conditions. Yhteiskunnan 
elintärkeiden toimintojen turvaamisen strategia, Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 
27.11.2003, Helsinki 2003, pp. 21–36.  
104 On the process of producing the SFVS document, see Yhteiskunnan elintärkeiden 
toimintojen turvaamisen strategian arviointi 2005, puolustusministeriö 2005, pp. 12, 26–
28. 
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made to call this a “national security strategy”, but such a term did not 
meet with the approval of the Foreign Ministry, at least, as it was felt 
to assign too much weight to it, especially as it had been prepared 
without any notable involvement of the Foreign Ministry or the 
President‟s Office. One problem with the strategy can be seen to be 
that it was looked on by the Security and Defence Committee (both 
during its preparation and especially afterwards) as very much an 
instrument of the defence administration.105  
The SFVS document was naturally weighted towards the broad-based 
approach to security, and the strategy put forward in it was linked to 
threats perceived in various security sectors and involved the 
strengthening of contacts between the international, national and 
internal branches of security. At the same time it emphasized 
cooperation between branches of the administration in combating the 
perceived threats, as reflected in the notions of perceived threats that 
are not bound to any particular branch of the administration and the 
possibility of combining threats. The spirit that prevailed during the 
preparation of the strategy was very much one of acceptance that 
Finnish society would have to prepare itself for threat factors that 
were liable to become progressively more broad-based and 
multidimensional, and it was also noted at that stage that the threat 
models put forward in the strategy should not be inconsistent with 
those constructed for the Government Report on Security and Defence 
Policy, especially since the aim was that the strategy  should update 
the threat models put forward in the Defence Committee memo-
randum of 1999.106 In the end the SFVS document, when it appeared 
just under a year before the government report, did carry the demand – 
concerning the threat models as well – that “the policies outlined in 
this strategy should be incorporated into the forthcoming Government 
Report on Security and Defence Policy.”107 In the opinion of the civil 
                                                 
105 The question of the role of the Security and Defence Committee was felt to be a difficult 
matter during the preparatory work for the government report, as the SFVS material written 
for the report (chapter 7) was regarded by both the working group and the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and the Interior as being too closely bound to the defence administration. It 
is easy to see in the background to this a certain power struggle between the ministries over 
which branch of the administration should be primarily responsible for securing the 
essential functions of society.  
106 Defence Committee, Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötilanteisiin ja poikkeusoloihin, 
Helsinki 1999. 
107 Yhteiskunnan elintärkeiden toimintojen turvaamisen strategia, p. 12. 
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servants who worked on the SFVS Strategy, and also of the members 
of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, an honest 
attempt had been made to fashion the strategy into a practical 
document that would promote control over perceived threats and the 
improvement of the ability of Finnish society to withstand crisis 
situations, and one that would attempt to reconcile the various 
dimensions of security. No serious differences of opinion emerged 
between ministries or politicians in connection with the defining of the 
SFVS threat models, but rather these differences were targeted at the 
perceived threat content of the government report.  
A total of ten actual threat models that it was the intention to define 
more precisely in connection with the threat descriptions produced by 
the various branches of the administration and their evaluations were 
put forward in the SFVS Strategy, the idea being that these should be 
reconsidered in connection with reviews of the strategy itself, which 
were planned to take place every four years or as required. It was 
noted that if such a threat scenario should come to pass it could cause 
a disturbance or state of emergency in Finnish society. One out-
standing feature of the SFVS threat images was that they had strong 
European connections, i.e. the threats outlined for Finland could well 
be experienced by other members of the European Union.108 
The SFVS threat models may be regarded as representing an attempt 
to construct a general form of overall security for the country. The 
most serious (militarized) threat model, the intensity of which it was 
not deemed reasonable to conjecture in the SFVS Strategy, was a 
strategic strike, a large-scale armed invasion, a war or the aftermath of 
a war. Finland‟s geostrategic position as a neighbour of Russia was 
very much to the fore in considerations of a perceived threat involving 
a serious violation of Finland‟s territorial integrity and a consequent 
war, and it was noted that such a situation could arise through 
political, economic or military pressure. The threat model of a state of 
international tension was described mainly as a situation that could 
increase the intensity of other threat models. The main area in which a 
major catastrophe might occur was regarded as being the Gulf of 
Finland, on account of the density of shipping. As far as organized 
crime and terrorism were concerned, the former was regarded as a 
threat that could well increase in intensity, while the latter was largely 
                                                 
108 Ibid. p. 12. 
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a threat to Finland‟s internal security. In the case of environmental and 
economic threat models, emphasis was laid on the fact that the threat 
factors could be either global or local in nature. The model of a threat 
to the population‟s health and food supplies was linked closely with 
the security of Finnish citizens and stability within society. In 
addition, the SFVS Strategy described threats to information systems, 
illegal immigration and movements of population that were liable to 
threaten security, noting that these were likely to increase in intensity 
in the future. 
The main outlines of the threat images to be included in the 
government report were drawn up by the working group in the early 
autumn of 2003 and were then approved by the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy before the drafting of the actual text of 
the report. One major question as far as the perceived threats were 
concerned – both in the early days of the working group and 
throughout the preparation process – was the difficulty of defining the 
limits to be set on the concept of broad-based security, i.e. the 
question of how broad the understanding of security should be when 
defining threat images specifically for the purpose of the security and 
defence policy report. Although the members of the working group 
were unanimous in the understanding they had of broad-based 
security, the achieving of a balance between the different threat 
images proved extremely difficult and constituted a real problem for 
the internal functioning of the group. At the same time, discussions 
were taking place over perceived threats to be described in connection 
with the Internal Security Programme, the SFVS Strategy and the 
Developmental Policy Programme.109  
The working group was well aware of the political nature of the threat 
descriptions to be included in the government report, and the intention 
was that all the descriptions (but particularly the military ones) should 
be constructed so as to be sufficiently neutral and couched in general 
terms, and also to be timeless, a reference to the rapidity with which 
the 2001 Government Report became outdated on account of the 
terrorist attacks of 11.9.2001. None of the members of the working 
group felt that any ready-made formulations for the threat descriptions 
                                                 
109 Like the Internal Security Programme and the SFVS Strategy, the Developmental Policy 
Programme that was under preparation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was based on a 
Council of State decision in principle. The programme was approved by the Council of 
State on 5.2.2004. 
74
had been politically dictated to them (or asked for by them), but rather 
– bearing in mind the political boundary conditions of the task 
entrusted to them – they had been able to construct the threat content 
of the report “with an open mind” and “on a realistic basis”. One 
crucial issue for the working group at the early stages had been that of 
Finland‟s possible decision to join a military alliance or not to do so, 
as it was realized that this question would have a bearing on the threat 
content that they were constructing. The representatives of the defence 
administration taking part in the working group were extremely 
interested at the early stages in the extent of the budgetary financing 
that the Council of State was prepared to invest in Finland‟s military 
defences. Where the threat descriptions were concerned, however, it 
was established that the document should be one on which all the 
members of the working group were unanimously agreed. It was 
important to achieve a consensus of opinion. 
The process of constructing the threat descriptions set out from the 
aim that the report should give broad expression to the threat factors 
involved, but within a framework in which each could come to the 
fore to the extent that its relative weighting in actual terms merited. 
On the other hand, this was very much a question of the weight that 
should be assigned to the military threats, as the working group held 
lengthy discussions on the time-scale over which Finland might face a 
military threat and what circumstances might lead to such a situation. 
It was important at the same time, however, to remember how security 
should be understood at that moment, in the early years of the new 
millennium. Should the threat descriptions produced for the report pay 
attention to social problems such as violence within the family or 
alienation? Interviews with the members of the working group suggest 
that they adopted five basic criteria for their definitions of perceived 
threats: 1) External threat images were to be the main object of 
concern  when defining threats for inclusion in the report, 2) Threats 
to the security of the individual were not to be included, although it 
was necessary to be aware of the impact of threats at the individual 
level, 3) The threats described in the report should be connected with 
collective security and the security of collectivities (Finland and the 
Finns), 4) The intention was that the report should be broad-based and 
comprehensive in the threat images that it brought forward, which 
may be understood above all as a reference to globalization, increased 
mutual interdependence in matters of security and the general 
appreciation of the need to examine threats in terms of a broad 
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concept of security, and 5) The aim was to discuss and give 
expression to the influences of internationally perceived threats on 
Finland‟s security and to concentrate on threats to Finland originating 
from its neighbouring regions. In this way the constructing of the 
threat descriptions proved to be a matter of perspective, i.e. the 
working group approached the task from a viewpoint defined by the 
above criteria. It was decided in the course of the process of preparing 
the report what the threat images in it should be like, even though the 
dividing lines laid down initially, e.g. that between internal and 
external threats, were found later to be somewhat diffuse. The control 
maintained over the process of constructing the threat descriptions 
thus emerges as a major factor explaining the nature of the threats 
included in the report. 
The changes that had taken place in Finland‟s security environment 
were regarded by the working group as necessitating a new 
understanding of the nature of threats. It was recognized that Finland‟s 
security was linked more powerfully than ever to trends in 
international (global) security, and it was evident to the working group 
that the operating environment for Finland‟s security policy was no 
longer merely a dual one but that the country‟s security policy 
depended for its success on future developments in the relations 
between three major factors: the EU, Russia and the United States. 
Correspondingly, it was also estimated that events in the developing 
countries and the “new threats” would come to exercise an increasing 
influence on relations between the above three actors and thereby 
directly on Finland‟s security. Thus Finnish membership of the EU, 
the terrorist attacks of 11.9.2001, anticipated developments in Russia 
and the generally increasing significance of the new threats were 
regarded as important starting points for the threat images that were to 
be constructed. 
Risto Volanen drew a diagram at the initial stages of the working 
group‟s activities to show the basis on which the threat factors were to 
be examined for the report.110 This represented a multisectoral 
approach to their examination (coming close to the sectors of security 
as recognized by the Copenhagen school) and the mutual bonds that 
exist between threats arising from different levels and threats targeted 
                                                 
110 See also Risto Volanen, Suomi ja vuosikymmenemme turvallisuuspoliittiset haasteet, 
28.8.2003; Jaakko Laajava, Puhe maanpuolustuskurssiyhdistyksessä, 26.9.2003. 
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at different levels. Volanen was attempting by means of this diagram 
to give expression to the broad-based approach required for examining 
threats and the interconnections characteristic of threats. His message 
was that security was something that applied on a larger scale than 
that of the nation-state but that when considering threats, attention had 
to be paid to the national characteristics that were special to Finland. 
This may be interpreted as a reference firstly to increased dependence 
on international threat images and secondly to an awareness of threats 
arising from regions adjacent to Finland. This diagram was regarded 
within the working group as a demonstration of how difficult it was to 
draw distinct boundaries for broad-based security and its associated 
threat images. The group nevertheless regarded it as important that the 
existing threats should be examined in a comprehensive manner. 
There was one important line that was drawn regarding the definition 
of perceived threats in the early stages of the working group‟s 
activities, namely the threat associated with the use of nuclear 
weapons was to be excluded from consideration entirely. It was 
chiefly Jaakko Kalela and Markus Lyra who were reluctant to extend 
the scope of the report in this direction. The working group did 
discuss the nuclear threat a great deal and summoned a number of 
experts to advise on the probabilities attached to it, but there were 
three good grounds for its exclusion: 1) The threat was regarded as 
highly improbable and theoretical, 2) Finland did not have the 
resources to safeguard itself against such a threat to any notable 
degree, and 3) Its inclusion was regarded as likely to undermine 
citizens‟ feelings of security – there was no desire to cause alarm 
amongst the population. It was also noted that the inclusion of nuclear 
weapons as a threat could have exposed the group to the criticism of 
arguing in favour of Finnish membership of NATO (since a nuclear 
attack was regarded as still less probable in the case of countries that 
were NATO members), or else of advocating a substantial increase in 
defence expenditure. Thoroughgoing, open discussions were held on 
various types of perceived threats during the autumn of 2003 in 
particular, but no others were found that needed to be ruled out in the 
same way as the nuclear threat. 
The guidelines decided upon for the threat descriptions and the 
planned structure for the report as a whole were approved by the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy in autumn 2003. 
The committee regarded it as important that the starting point for the 
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report should be a broad concept of security and it scarcely had any 
comments to make on the guidelines for the threat descriptions. It did 
observe, however, that it should be made quite clear in the report that 
the definition of security was based on a broad interpretation of the 
word, and that this should be reflected in the attention paid to the 
examination of non-military threats. This emphasis in the new threats 
was justified in the eyes of the Cabinet Committee in view of the 
changes that had taken place in Finland‟s security environment and 
the spirit of the times in terms of approaches to security. The 
committee was of the opinion that the report should emphasize 
Finland‟s commitment to the EU and that the EU should be defined in 
it as the principal frame of reference for Finland‟s security policy.111 It 
was agreed between the working group and the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy that the material for inclusion in the 
report should be discussed in seminar-like sessions as each section 
reached the point where this was possible. The Cabinet Committee 
clearly wished to adopt a powerful guiding role in defining and 
approving the threat images included in the report, even though it 
gave the working group a substantial amount of freedom in the 
administrative preparation of the report as such. In fact the committee 
gave the working group very clear political guidance when it came to 
the major security issues of a political nature that were raised in it. For 
example, the 3+3 structure for security policy that was built in as the 
core of the report was initially outlined by the committee,112 which 
also insisted that the conclusions reached in the report should be 
justified on the grounds of these six points. The Cabinet Committee 
also decided (at the Prime Minister‟s suggestion) that details of the 
report would not be released to the media while it was still in 
                                                 
111 See, for example, Erkki Tuomioja, EU tärkein tekijä Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolus-
tuspolitiikassa, 20.8.2004. ”Yhteisvastuuseen ja keskinäisiin sitoumuksiin kaikilla aloilla 
perustuvan unionin jäsenyys tukee Suomen turvallisuutta.” Suomen turvallisuus- ja 
puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 6. 
112 Although the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy had informed the 
working group of its security policy guidelines in autumn 2003, it was not until 2004 that 
the draft of the report‟s chapter on policy outlines was brought to the committee (on the 
suggestion of the Prime Minister). The 3+3 structure for Finland‟s security policy refers to 
the basic elements in this policy, on the one hand universal conscription, a regional defence 
system and defence of the whole territory of Finland, and on the other hand military non-
alignment, close participation in developing the EU‟s common security and defence policy 
and the possibility of applying for membership of NATO if the need should arise.  
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preparation and that only brief communiqués on the subject should be 
released by the Council of State.113  
 
Significance of the report for various branches of the 
administration – the struggle for power and funding 
Since the administrative work of constructing the threat images as 
coordinated by the working group was concentrated in the Foreign 
Ministry, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior, the 
disagreements over the threat images to be defined were very largely a 
matter of the different viewpoints adopted by these three branches of 
the administration and of a struggle for power and money taking place 
between them. The government report – in its role as the most 
significant Finnish security document and a basis for the allocation of 
the nation‟s security budget – was a vehicle by which each branch of 
the administration could attempt to emphasize the importance of its 
“own perceived threats” relative to the other proposed threats to 
broad-based security. This may be understood as a state of 
competition over both the political prioritization of threat images and 
the nature of the report as the document that defined those images. 
 
Significance of the report for the Foreign Ministry 
The prevailing opinion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time 
when the 2001 Government Report on Security and Defence Policy 
was in preparation had been that the preparation work should never 
have been placed in the hands of the Ministry of Defence. In the 
background to this lay the view that the primary and dominant 
consideration was Finland‟s foreign and security policy (the province 
of the Foreign Ministry) relative to either defence policy (the province 
of the defence administration) or internal security (the province of the 
Ministry of the Interior). Although decisions regarding the allocation 
of funding did not as such concern the Foreign Ministry, the 
government report was looked on as a crucial forum for outlining a 
                                                 
113 On press releases, see, for example, Valtioneuvosto, Valtioneuvoston viikko 40, 27.9.–
3.10.2003. 
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foreign and security policy for Finland in which the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs would play a leading role, i.e. the ministry‟s interests 
with regard to the report were governed more by power politics than 
by budgetary considerations. Thus, in connection with the 
construction of the threat images for the government report, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (under the direction of the Foreign 
Minister himself) attempted to emphasize not only the importance of 
security policy as a whole and of a broad-based concept of security 
but also the connection between Finland’s security and the country’s 
foreign policy actions and its development, human rights and 
globalization policies.114 This may be seen from the fact that the 
emphasis in the construction of the Foreign Ministry‟s threat 
descriptions was on global issues and non-military threat perceptions. 
Such an emphasis in connection with the defining of perceived threats 
was regarded by the defence administration as leading to the 
production of a government report on foreign, security and defence 
policy. In other words, the Foreign Ministry‟s global approach to 
threat perceptions was seen as leaving room for only a very tenuous 
evaluation of the threats existing in the areas adjacent to Finland itself. 
In terms of functional entities, the Foreign Ministry was aiming 
through the threat perceptions it constructed for the report to 
emphasize both the importance of foreign policy and the need for 
means of implementing a development policy and of controlling 
civilian crisis management threats, with the implication that more 
financial resources would be required for development policy and 
civilian crisis management purposes in the future. It was claimed that 
excessive amounts of money had been allocated to Finland‟s military 
defence and to military crisis management, and that it was now 
important to build up the country’s development activities as one part 
of its security policy. These views were also clearly to the fore in the 
Development Policy Programme, Report on Finnish Human Rights 
Policy and Government Report on Globalization which had been 
drawn up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had been referred to 
in the course of constructing the security and defence policy report.115 
                                                 
114 See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ulkoasiainministeriön vuosikertomus 
2004, Helsinki 2005, p. 14. 
 
115 It was noted in the Development Policy Programme, for instance, that “Finnish 
development policy is also Finnish security policy.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Kehityspoliittinen ohjelma, valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 5.2.2004, Helsinki 2004, p. 14. 
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Considerable weight was also attached to the preparation of the 
Government Report on Security and Defence Policy in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which became a top priority matter to which 
particular attention was to be paid, and the Foreign Minister, Erkki 
Tuomioja, emphasized this in his own actions and in the guidance that 
he gave to the ministry‟s civil servants. 
 
Significance of the report for the Ministry of Defence 
Of all the branches involved, the report was nevertheless of the 
greatest importance to the defence administration,116 and it was looked 
on by the leadership of both the Ministry of Defence and the Finnish 
Defence Forces as the definitive statement by the Finnish government 
of its policy for the future development of the country‟s military 
defences, i.e. there was no corresponding document in existence as far 
as the defence administration was concerned. The procedure entailed 
in placing government reports before parliament was seen as ensuring 
the commitment of both the government and parliament to examining 
the country‟s defence policy decisions in depth at four-year intervals, 
and it was a good thing that a defence policy consensus could be 
reached in this way. It guaranteed a strong measure of political 
support for the decisions reached and longer-term commitment to the 
guidelines that had been agreed upon. “Politicians can be expected 
quite concretely to commit themselves to the affairs of this branch of 
the administration,” as one leading figure in the Ministry of Defence 
put it. The same view of the government report procedure as an 
effective means of ensuring long-term political commitment was 
shared by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, and 
both instances were ready to point out that the procedure also allowed 
defence policy issues to be brought before the general public at 
regular intervals, something that was apt to maintain citizens‟ interest 
in the national defence. 
                                                                                                         
See also Valtioneuvoston selonteko Suomen ihmisoikeuspolitiikasta, VNS 2/2004, Helsinki 
2004; Globalisaation hallinta ja Suomi, valtioneuvoston globalisaatioselvitys eduskunnalle 
10.5.2005. 
116 See Arto Nokkala, Uhka ja Kumppani: Venäjän Suomen puolustushallinnossa, 
Strategian laitos, julkaisusarja 1, no. 28, Helsinki 2009, p. 54. Nokkala observes that the 
report enjoyed almost the same status in the defence administration as the Finnish 
Constitution did. 
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The great significance of the report as a statement of the political will 
of the nation‟s leadership with regard to the outlines of its defence 
policy was reflected in the way in which the preparatory work took 
place in the defence administration. The officials of the Ministry of 
Defence looked on the preparation of the report as one of their most 
important duties, while in the Defence Forces the importance of 
practical guidelines and a “political backbone” led both the upper 
level of command and those responsible for operative planning to pay 
an enormous amount of attention to the report during its preparation 
stage. It should be noted that the actual wording of a report of this 
kind (e.g. part II of the 2004 report, that dealing with defence policy) 
would always be read extremely carefully in the defence 
administration, as a single sentence could lead to substantial practical 
measures, especially in the case of the armed forces. This means that 
individual things that are written into a government report to 
parliament during its preparation in the defence administration can 
take on great significance. At the same time, of course, the 
construction of military threat images was a matter of justifying the 
activities of this branch of the administration in public and seeking 
political approval for them. The defence administration paid little 
attention to part I of the document, that drawn up by the Foreign 
Ministry, as the core of the issue was seen to lie in part II. Indeed, the 
points of emphasis in part I – its concentration on the “new threats” 
and its institutionally centred and globally inspired viewpoint – were 
regarded from the defence policy perspective as erroneous. It was felt 
that excessive emphasis on the new threats could well lead to a 
situation in which military threat perceptions were underestimated. 
Cooperation between the Finnish Defence Forces and the Ministry of 
Defence (in coordinating the preparatory work for the report) ran into 
some difficulties and conflicts,117 but it proved possible to achieve 
agreement relatively painlessly at the “upper level”. In the view of the 
defence administration, preparation of the report should as a whole 
have been more distinctly in the hands of the Ministry of Defence. 
The defence policies and financial allocations approved for inclusion 
in the report were sufficient in the opinion of the defence 
administration to enable a long-term rhythm of planning and 
                                                 
117 It was thought in the Ministry of Defence that the General Headquarters of the Defence 
Forces had acted too independently when preparing the wording of certain sections.  
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development to be established, so that it would be possible, for 
instance, to plan the defence forces‟ material investments and 
activities more economically and over a longer period of time. The 
financial resources detailed in the report were felt by the defence 
administration to be of the utmost importance, as the report was 
looked on as representing a political commitment to the provision of 
these resources and at the same time as giving the defence 
administration an opportunity to justify its financial needs and 
development programmes. The defence administration regarded it as 
important that it should be able to set out its financial requirements 
clearly, concretely and as unambiguously as possible at four-year 
intervals (rather than having to do this annually), and also that it 
should be able to refer back to the report in questions of finance. The 
question of the assurance of adequate financial resources through the 
medium of the government report procedure was something to which 
the leadership of both the Defence Forces and the Ministry of Defence 
attached particular importance, as was reflected in numerous speeches 
made by the Commander of the Defence Forces at that time.118   
 
Significance of the report for the Ministry of the Interior 
The commission to produce an Internal Security Programme, one of 
the items belonging to the political platform of Matti Vanhanen‟s first 
cabinet, was taken as a matter of some importance by the Ministry of 
the Interior, where it was regarded as an indication that internal 
security had gained a more prominent position as a part of the overall 
picture of Finnish security and that the Ministry of the Interior was 
one of those ministries that had a serious stake in matters of security. 
The ministry was therefore ready to stress in the present connection 
that the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy was not 
the only Finnish security document but that the Internal Security 
Programme was of considerable importance for understanding the 
reality of the threats facing Finland and for developing new means of 
combating these threats. As a Council of State decision in principle, 
however, the Internal Security Programme did not have the same 
                                                 
118 See, for example, Juhani Kaskeala, Puhe Maanpuolustuskurssien avajaisissa 24.1.2004, 
where he asserts that ”Regardless of their various coalitions, governments have committed 
themselves in their budgets to implementing the existing government defence policy 
reports in an exemplary fashion.” 
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status in the “hierarchy of administrative documents” as did the 
Government Report on Security and Defence Policy, a fact that was 
felt in the Ministry of the Interior to be a weakness in the system. The 
ministry therefore proposed that this programme should be upgraded 
to the status of a government report on internal security, which would 
have meant that it warranted the same kind of extended discussion in 
parliament and allocation of budgetary funds as the security and 
defence policy report was to receive.119 This would have created a 
firmer framework for the activities of the security agencies that were 
subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. 
A second alternative in the eyes of the Ministry of the Interior would 
have been the conceiving of a broad-based “rainbow report” in which 
the various aspects of security such as defence policy and internal 
security were all dealt with in a single document, and a similar motive 
of raising the profile of internal security and the ministry itself was 
also to be detected in its proposal that the mandate of the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should be extended to 
cover internal security as well. The defence administration did not 
look kindly on these proposals, which in any case were never acted 
upon, and it was also somewhat perplexed by the fact that the eventual 
Internal Security Programme had been published, at the suggestion of 
the Ministry of the Interior and for obvious tactical reasons, at almost 
exactly the same moment as the Government Report of Security and 
Defence Policy, although it had originally been intended for 
publication some time after the report.  
Although the Internal Security Programme had a major influence on 
the actions of those security agencies that are subordinate to the 
Ministry of the Interior, the above circumstances did create a situation 
in which the Ministry of the Interior was trying to construct internal 
security threat images as part of the Security and Defence Policy 
Report. The report was seen by that ministry as a document that 
strengthened the central principles of Finnish security policy, and for 
this reason internal security and the perceived threats to this should be 
                                                 
119 Sisäasiainministeriö, presentation, Poliisiasiain neuvottelukunta 7.2.2003, Poliisi-
asiainneuvottelukunnan arkisto. The background to this suggestion was the constant 
uncertainty felt in the Ministry of the Interior with regard to the budget available to the 
police force.  
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one part of it. The threats to internal security were seen to be targeted 
at Finland to an increasing extent from the outside, so that it was 
justifiable to include these threats and the means of controlling them 
in the government report. There were numerous issues, such as the 
prevention of terrorist acts, violent radicalism, movements of 
population and organized crime, which gave rise to threats in which 
foreign relations and internal security (matters of concern to the 
Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, respectively) were tightly 
linked together. The Government Report on Security and Defence 
Policy was nevertheless regarded for practical purposes by the 
Ministry of the Interior as a slower and more static document than the 
Internal Security Programme, if only because the threats to internal 
security were more pressing ones that were being actualized day by 
day. 
 
The struggle for power and money over perceived threats    
Apart from the question of finding the right balance between the non-
military threats perceived by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
military threat images constructed by the defence administration, 
another problematic issue during the preparation of the government 
report was that of taking due account of perceived threats to internal 
security. The working group encountered difficulties in handling these 
as threat images to be put forward in the report, since, although its 
members acknowledged the existence of a connection between 
internal and external threats to the nation‟s security, they wished in 
principle to concentrate in the report on external factors posing a 
threat to Finland. Meanwhile, the defence administration was 
reminding the working group that internal threats to security should 
not be dealt with very prominently, as they could not be regarded as 
belonging to the scope of a security and defence policy report. This 
led to quite substantial conflicts of interest over the construction of the 
threat images, not so much between politicians as between the civil 
servants of the respective branches of the administration. It was 
indeed partly a question of where the boundary between the threat 
images should in the opinions of the various actors be drawn in the 
context of the disputed concept of broad-based security and what the 
intensity of the threat should be estimated as being in each instance. 
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The struggle over power and money between the various branches of 
the administration (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Defence and Ministry of the Interior) was at times very tangibly 
present in the preparation work, especially since there were 
considerable differences of opinion between them with regard to the 
prioritization of the threat descriptions. It was a struggle that, on the 
one hand, could be regarded as a quite normal situation in which each 
branch attempted to bring to the fore those matters that belonged to its 
jurisdiction, but on the other hand, it was a demonstration that the 
whole process of constructing descriptions of perceived threats was 
bound to particular branches of the administration and that these 
branches wished to perpetuate the situation – for reasons of power and 
money. In the course of interviews carried out as part of the present 
research, representatives of these three branches all attributed this 
struggle that had arisen in the early years of the new millennium over 
the allocation of funds to the combating of particular perceived threats 
to the difficulty of defining the concept of broad-based security. The 
crucial issue was that the construction of threat images was no longer 
restricted to the Ministry of Defence but was taking place more 
extensively than ever before in other government ministries, and at the 
same time it had become a question of each ministry using these threat 
images to satisfy its need to justify its own activities. 
The Ministry of the Interior made active and determined efforts during 
the process of drawing up the report to emphasize the significance of 
the threats to internal security that it was identifying. The Minister of 
the Interior, Kari Rajamäki, and the Permanent Secretary, Ritva 
Viljanen, perceived that their ministry was being edged out of its role 
in defining perceived threats and generating the means for controlling 
these, and thus an attempt was made – by assigning greater priority to 
perceived threats to the country‟s internal security – to increase the 
negotiating power of the Ministry of the Interior to the level enjoyed 
by the principal actors in the preparation of the government report, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry 
of the Interior was thus attempting to secure a more significant role for 
itself in both the preparation stage and the eventual government 
report, which naturally aroused opposition from the Foreign Ministry 
and the Ministry of Defence. It was, of course, inclined to interpret 
this opposition as a manifestation of a certain territorial way of 
thinking: they wanted to keep the preparation of the report very firmly 
in their own hands and did not want the Ministry of the Interior to be 
86
involved in it. The Ministry of the Interior also attempted to place 
questions of internal security on the agenda of the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy, but many of these attempts were 
frustrated by the Prime Minister, who was responsible for deciding on 
the committee‟s agenda. The Prime Minister’s argument was that both 
the government report and the Cabinet Committee should be dealing 
with perceived threats that at least to some extent had a foreign policy 
dimension. It was only threats of this kind that needed to be discussed 
by the Cabinet Committee in the presence of the prime minister. There 
was in fact a great deal of discussion in the Cabinet Committee about 
whether bird „flu, trafficking in human beings and organized crime 
were threat images that called for action in the field of foreign policy, 
and it was observed that the boundary was an indistinct one and that 
the committee was not willing to define it any more precisely as far as 
perceived threats were concerned. 
The accent in the proposals made by the Ministry of the Interior was 
on the security of individual citizens, which was to be the focus of the 
security discussions and occupy a significant position in Finnish 
security thinking. The ministry‟s approach was that external and 
internal security were closely combined in its threat images, which – 
in order to promote securitization – were framed with an external 
dimension. In its opinion the criticism of its perceived threats put 
forward by the defence administration was attributable to the fact that 
that administration‟s own military threat models were outdated, 
whereas the Ministry of the Interior‟s models represented real threats 
that existed in the present. Thus the ministry regarded the defence 
administration as taking a critical view of all threat definitions that 
came from instances outside its own sphere and which approached the 
reality of the threats facing Finland from a different angle from that 
customarily adopted by the defence administration itself. In the eyes 
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior, the defence 
administration‟s thinking with regard to threat images was antiquated 
and set in its ways, while the Ministry of the Interior in turn regarded 
the Foreign Ministry‟s commitment to political pressure and concrete 
measures for reducing the “new threats” as inadequate, which 
generated friction between the two ministries. 
The views of the Foreign Ministry and the defence administration on 
the nature of the perceived threats were far removed from one another 
at times during the process of preparing the government report, 
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although the division of labour between parts I and II of the report was 
felt on both sides to be a good thing. The differences of opinion were 
connected with Russia, which was not regarded by the Foreign 
Ministry as representing any relevant military threat, whereas the 
defence administration had rather different ideas of the possibility of a 
military threat and in particular of the need to allow for this possibility 
in the long term.120 Both branches admitted at an early stage in the 
preparation of the report that the difference in approach towards the 
evaluation of perceived threats between parts I and II would not make 
for a particularly logical overall structure, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs could also be interpreted as having insisted that the defence 
administration should not exceed its mandate with respect to the 
definition of the perceived threats at the preparation stage but should 
concentrate exclusively on military threat models. At the same time, 
however, the Foreign Ministry was suspicious of the more pronounced 
role being adopted by the Ministry of the Interior in the construction 
of threat descriptions for the report. Meanwhile the defence 
administration looked on the Foreign Ministry‟s “peace policy” 
attitude as one barrier to collaboration, so that it may be interpreted as 
suspecting that by emphasizing the “new threats” the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and the Interior wished to encroach on the position of 
the defence administration as a source of national security. Con-
versely, it was felt in the Ministry of the Interior that the work of 
preparing the government report was very much a matter of a power 
struggle over threat perceptions between the defence administration 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The Ministry of the Interior‟s enhanced conviction of its role as a 
provider of security in the effort to combat the new threats was clearly 
reflected in the budgetary issues discussed in the report, and thereby 
came to impinge on relations between that ministry and the defence 
administration. The working group was aware of the disputes 
surrounding the financial aspect of the threat images described, but 
nevertheless adopted a more severe attitude than ever towards the 
defence administration‟s financial arguments and the views put 
                                                 
120 It was also felt in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the defence administration was 
doing too much to generate an interest in Finland joining a military alliance, a policy that 
did not command much support in the Foreign Ministry itself. The difference of opinion on 
this point further exacerbated the problems affecting cooperation between the two 
branches, as also did the substantial differences over the relation between military and 
civilian crisis management.  
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forward to justify these. The group had considered at one point setting 
out all the resources to be devoted to means of dealing with the 
perceived threats in the actual government report, but had decided 
after much discussion to abandon this plan. An intention to limit the 
allocation of funds in connections with the defining of perceived 
threats may nevertheless be seen in a message sent to the working 
group by the Prime Minister to the effect that the forthcoming 
government report should not lead to any increase in the security 
budget.121 Both the civil servants and the politicians who took part in 
preparing the report were of the opinion that the definition of 
perceived threats was at least in part a question of dividing up the 
available resources and of competition to obtain as large a share of 
these resources as possible. This competition took place mostly on the 
administrative level, but also on the political level to some extent. 
Internal security had been discussed for the first time in the context of 
the government reports to Parliament in connection with the 2001 
report, in which about four pages had been devoted to the subject. 
Even at that stage the Ministry of the Interior had drawn attention to 
the fact that the report was apt to serve as a “cash point” for the 
defence administration – i.e. the government report provided the 
defence administration with a high-level political document which set 
out its budgetary allocations, i.e. the resource base for its activities, for 
the term of office of that government. When the time came to prepare 
the 2004 report, the ministry realized that it was necessary to 
incorporate internal security, the related threat perceptions and the 
means of combating those threats more firmly into the government 
report than on previous occasions. The emphasis on the concept of 
broad-based security, the changes that had taken place in Finland‟s 
security environment and the urgency attached to certain threats 
facing the country‟s internal security (such as terrorism, cybercrime 
and illegal immigration) were regarded as cogent reasons for 
extending the discussion of budgetary allocations in this field to other 
security authorities as well as the defence administration. It was a 
matter of the political prioritization of perceived threats in the 
                                                 
121 In simple terms, the working group may be said to have concluded that however they 
constructed the perceived threats in the government report, no new funding for combating 
those threats would be forthcoming. In such a situation we may reciprocate by asking to 
what extent the financial resources determined the perceived threats and to what extent the 
threats determined the resources allocated. Were the threats at least partially constructed 
with a view to what security the country could afford?  
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framework of a general competition for finance, or at least a more 
even distribution of funding between the relevant branches of the 
administration. Thus the Ministry of the Interior suggested during the 
process of drawing up the report that the whole “security budget” 
should be lumped together and then evaluated politically so that it 
could be distributed in relation to “the real nature of the threats”. It 
should be noted, too, that some of the members of the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy were favourably disposed 
towards this suggestion (which nevertheless remained as nothing more 
than a suggestion), a fact that could be interpreted as implying that 
demands may arise in the future for a more egalitarian distribution of 
budgetary allocations in the field of security that takes other branches 
of the administration into account. Representatives of the Ministry of 
the Interior admitted in retrospect that its intention in connection with 
the 2004 report had been to give expression and added weight to the 
significance of perceived threats to internal security, partly for 
budgetary reasons, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even more 
obviously the defence administration considered that the Ministry of 
the Interior had gone too far in this respect. 
The defence administration had considerable reservations regarding 
the activities of the Ministry of the Interior, and particularly of the 
minister, Kari Rajamäki, and the permanent secretary, Ritva Viljanen, 
which it looked on as intended to weaken the position of the defence 
administration and gain access to a share in the defence budget. The 
Ministry of the Interior, for its own part, considered that the defence 
administration was stepping on its toes by planning the creation of 
local defence troops, extending its offers of executing assistance to 
other authorities and providing a wider range of services to the public; 
in brief, by extending its activities to include the management of 
threats other than those of a military character (such as terrorism). 
This appeared to be a natural course of development as far as the 
defence administration was concerned, as the Defence Forces already 
had the personnel and equipment needed for combating threats of that 
kind, and it emphasized that it was no longer possible in the 21st 
century to divide perceived threats into internal and external ones. At 
all events, financial considerations and the context created by the need 
to contain new threats led to major disagreements between the defence 
administration and the Ministry of the Interior, especially at the 
permanent secretary level.  
90
The conflicts over funding are well reflected in the financial tables 
that were eventually left out of the published version of the 
government report. The defence administration prepared its own such 
table for inclusion in the report, on the lines of that published in 
2001,122 which detailed the financial requirements over the period 
2005–2012, with the intention that it should be approved as a part of 
the report, but this was deemed by the Ministry of the Interior to be a 
“one-sided” procedure that departed from the normal framework and 
budget procedure followed in government finances. Nevertheless, the 
ministry produced a financial table of its own (in the same manner as 
the defence administration) that was aimed at defining its financial 
requirements over a longer period than the annual budgetary 
decisions. Both tables aroused lively discussions both in the working 
group preparing the government report and in the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy, until the latter eventually decided, at 
the instigation of the Minister of Finance, Antti Kalliomäki, that 
neither table would be printed in the report. This decision meant that 
the defence administration‟s financial table that had already been 
included in the draft of the report had to be removed. This situation 
was somewhat annoying as far as the defence administration was 
concerned, even though it was in general believed that its table had 
met with the Cabinet Committee‟s “tacit approval”, while Ministry of 
Finance officials regarded it as “multiply ambiguous” for practical 
purposes, as it left the definition of the financial requirements in the 
defence sector quite vague and subject to differing interpretations.123 It 
is notable, however, that the eventual report still contained a table 
comparing defence expenditure in Finland, Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark,124 showing the low level of this expenditure in Finland 
relative to the other Nordic countries. In the opinion of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs the table should not have been there at all, whereas the 
defence administration regarded it as good evidence of the moderate 
policy Finland had pursued in matters of defence expenditure. 
It is illustrative of the overall situation that financial disagreements 
between the various branches of the administration that arose from the 
work of constructing the threat scenarios for the report meant that 
when the next report was to be prepared the secretary of state at the 
                                                 
122 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2001, p. 50. 
123 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, pp. 126–127. 
124 Ibid. p. 72. 
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Ministry of Finance was appointed as a member of the working 
group.125 This meant some degree of expert adjudication in matters 
concerned with the relationship between the perceived threats and the 
resources available for controlling them, which had been found (by 
the Cabinet Committee on Security and Foreign Policy and the 
working group) to be absent from the 2004 report. The financial 
conflicts that had accompanied the preparation nevertheless remained 
mostly “beneath the surface”, away from the public eye, in the final, 
published version. Another consideration in the view of the members 
of the Cabinet Committee was that the financial resources proposed 
for combating given threats were related to how well the various 
branches of the administration and individuals persons within them 
managed to justify – “frame” – their perceived threats. Likewise, it 
was estimated in the Ministry of Finance that the budgetary 
allocations for the defence administration would have been smaller if 
it had not been for the justifications put forward in the course of 
constructing the government report. 
 
The Security Policy Monitoring Group 
In its own report the parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group 
observed that “this report evaluates the changes in the security 
environment and raises certain questions that in the monitoring 
group‟s opinion should have been dealt with in the Council of State‟s 
Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy.”126 This point of 
departure may be looked on as a form of political guidance provided 
by Parliament and a demand that the threat perspectives mentioned by 
the monitoring group should have been taken into account in the 
report. One can presume that the perceived threats set out in the report 
could not have deviated very markedly from those drawn up in 
parliament (and presented in public before the publication of the 
report), if only because the report and its perceived threats were to be 
discussed in Parliament and the memorandum on it approved there. It 
was thus the report of the parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring 
Group that constructed the report that eventually came before 
                                                 
125 Council of State Information Department, Uuden turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittisen 
selonteon valmistelu käynnistyy, press release 210/2007, 14.8.2007. 
126 Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantaryhmän raportti, p. 9. 
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Parliament. The instructions issued by the Prime Minister were that 
the monitoring group should submit its report in the early spring of 
2004, and this it did, handing the document over to the Council of 
State on 9.3.2004. 
The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy and the 
political parties represented in Parliament considered the involvement 
of the Security Policy Monitoring Group in the preparation stage of 
the report a good move, one that added political value to the 
document. Above all, it was seen to increase the exercise of power by 
Parliament itself and to enable the views of a group assembled from 
various political parties to be taken into account among the ideas put 
forward by the Council of State.127 The parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee, on the other hand, was not entirely in favour of the 
existence of a Security Policy Monitoring Group, and felt that its own 
influence and powers of decision in matters of security policy would 
be jeopardized. Likewise it was the general feeling among the civil 
servants in the various ministries that the monitoring group was not 
particularly necessary and that it gave rise to a great deal of extra 
work, as similar reports to those prepared for the working group now 
had to be prepared for the monitoring group as well. The working 
group itself and the defence administration, on the other hand, 
regarded it as a useful body, especially because of the broad 
representation of political parties on it, so that it could be expected to 
promote the achieving of a substantial political consensus in favour of 
the security and defence policy outlines laid down in the eventual 
government report. 
It cannot be denied, however, that the work of the monitoring group 
overlapped in a sense with that of the working group appointed by the 
Council of State, and that, in spite of the fact that, as a parliamentary 
body capable of opening up the discussion of security policy issues, it 
could be estimated to have supported the emergence of a will to 
construct a consistent understanding of the perceived threats, it 
undoubtedly constituted a challenge to the functioning of democracy, 
for once Parliament had been active in drawing up the report it was 
unlikely than any very genuine discussion or formulation of opinions 
                                                 
127 See, for example, Puolustusvaliokunnan mietintö 16.12.2004, PuVM 1/2004 vp. 
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would take place after it had been submitted to Parliament.128 It is 
normal parliamentary procedure for the cabinet (Council of State) to 
place bills before Parliament for discussion and approval, so that the 
relation between the executive role of the Council of State and the 
supervisory role of Parliament could be badly confused by the 
existence of a parliamentary monitoring group, leading to a report that 
was “a bill that belonged to no one”. Also, the views expressed by the 
monitoring group in its own report, if they depart to any essential 
extent from those expressed in the government report, could be looked 
on as challenges to the authority of the Council of State, and it was in 
fact the case that certain opinions held by the monitoring group and 
intended to be brought up during the discussion of the government 
report in Parliament were voiced in public during the preparation 
process, a situation which was felt to be somewhat embarrassing for 
both the working group and the defence administration. 
The composition of the monitoring group had been adjusted following 
the general election of 2003, when Prime Minister Anneli 
Jäätteenmäki demanded that its chairman should be a representative of 
the Centre Party, which was now the largest party in Parliament, 
although the Social Democrats would have liked to hold on to the 
chairmanship. In the end, Liisa Jaakonsaari (Soc. Dem.) was 
appointed as the first vice-chairman and Ilkka Kanerva (Coalition 
Party) as the second. Otherwise the composition of the monitoring 
group was decided by Parliament itself, a situation looked on 
especially favourably by the True Finns, as it meant their inclusion in 
the group.129 The monitoring group then adopted the name “The 
Security 2004 Group”, in order to emphasize its direct connection 
with the 2004 government report. Both in its general activities and in 
the preparation of its report the group worked with thoroughness and 
on a broad scale, meeting 24 times in all, calling numerous experts for 
interviews, consulting with the President of Finland, members of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and other 
authorities, taking part in two research seminars and making six 
journeys abroad.130 The group also arranged four open discussion 
                                                 
128 In other words, if Parliament played a major role in preparing the report, how could one 
speak any longer of a government report to Parliament (which was the official title of the 
government report in Finnish)?  
129 See Timo Soini Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelussa 28.9.2004, PTK 97/2004 vp. 
130 See the summary of the group‟s activities in Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantaryhmän 
raportti, app. 2. 
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sessions in order to inform the public about security policy issues and 
hear citizens‟ opinions, and its members felt at the end that the whole 
operation had been “a thoroughgoing security policy learning process” 
carried out in a positive spirit – to the extent that that they had taken to 
referring to themselves as a “study circle”. 
The monitoring group had not received any particular orders or 
instructions from the Council of State or the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy as to how they should handle the reality 
of the perceived threats or how they should write about NATO or 
Russia, for instance, a situation that the members themselves thought 
slightly odd and surprising (perhaps even an oversight), although they 
also realized that it gave them an opportunity to examine Finland‟s 
security environment and perceived threats without any excessive 
external guidance. Thus the group‟s work cannot be said to have been 
steered in any way by the Council of State, even though collaboration 
and exchanges of information did place in the form of joint meetings. 
The principal political guidance received by the group in fact came 
from the parliamentary political parties, whose views were 
communicated by their representatives among the group members. 
Similarly, there were no attempts to dictate ready-made solutions for 
the group‟s investigations into the perceived threats; on the contrary, 
the members were agreed at the outset that they should themselves 
reach a consensus on what was to be written into the report, as this 
would put more political weight behind what they had to say. It was 
admittedly the case, however, that the Council of State had made it 
known that a unanimous report would be a highly desirable outcome. 
The great difficulty in achieving unanimity lay in persuading the Left-
wing Alliance to commit itself to the report‟s pro-NATO policy 
statements.131 
Contacts between the monitoring group and the working group mainly 
took place through the permanent expert advisors to the monitoring 
group, Pauli Järvenpää and Markus Lyra, and its secretary, Jaakko 
Laajava, and it may well be said that it was their presence in the 
                                                 
131 This applied particularly to the view expressed in the report (p. 51) to the effect that    
“It is important from a Finnish point of view that membership of NATO should continue  
to be a realistic alternative in terms of security policy.” There was a great dealing of 
discussion over the exact wording of this statement. See also Martti Korhonen, Ei mitään 
vikaa liittoutumattomuudessa – Nato voi olla riskitekijä, 9.3.2004. 
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monitoring group that made the transmission of information in both 
directions possible. It was also mainly Järvenpää, Lyra and Laajava 
who were responsible for deciding who were to be invited to the 
meetings as expert advisors and for settling on the form in which the 
final report was to be written. However, neither group regarded itself 
as having received specific guidance from the other.132 It was 
important for the working group, however, to hear what views the 
various political parties were putting forward regarding security and 
perceived threats at the time when the report was in preparation. The 
monitoring group and working group also held a few joint meetings, at 
which cooperation was found to proceed smoothly and without any 
major conflicts, although the monitoring group clearly felt that it was 
working quite independently on the preparation of its own report, an 
impression that was reinforced by the fact that its meetings were held 
behind closed doors and the group had agreed on the principle that 
their discussions should be treated as confidential. 
The starting point used by the monitoring group for defining potential 
threats was the broad concept of security, as reflected in the 
recommendation made in the covering message to the Council of State 
when submitting its own report: “The security policy outlines 
contained in the government report should be drawn up from the 
perspective of the broad concept of security.”133 A common 
understanding prevailed in the monitoring group from the outset that 
both its discussions and its published report should concentrate on the 
new threats. As far as external actors were concerned, the aim was to 
focus on the European Union and Russia, as it was these that were felt 
to be of the greatest significance for Finland‟s security and the 
construction of its threat perceptions, but in the defining of the threat 
realities the group adopted a fairly critical (or even constructivist) dual 
approach: “It is difficult to find objective criteria for defining threats, 
as the acquisition and analysis of data is largely defined by what data 
are gathered and by whom. Threat images inevitably comprise both 
real threats and imagined threats.”134 
                                                 
132 The greatest expectations that the working group entertained with regard to the 
monitoring group concerned the line that that the latter would take on Finland‟s options for 
a possible military alliance. 
133 Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantaryhmän raportti, p. 9. 
134 Ibid. p. 22. 
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The monitoring group‟s analysis of the security environment (both in 
its discussions and in the eventual report) may be regarded as threat-
centred,135 and in general this was characteristic of those threats that 
were not military ones. Although military threats were also discussed 
(particularly the probability of a large-scale offensive or the nature of 
a possible strategic strike), no military threat models were put forward 
in the monitoring group‟s report, nor was the relevance of perceived 
military threats evaluated to any notable extent. This was quite 
consciously left to the defence administration as part of its preparatory 
work, which may be regarded as a somewhat extraordinary solution. 
The monitoring group was nevertheless of the opinion that the 
possibility of a military threat did exist (although of low intensity), 
and consequently a conclusion was written into the report to the effect 
that “The traditional military threat in Europe has decreased but has 
not been totally eradicated. It is still important for Finland to preserve 
its national defence capability and its territorial defence system.”136 In 
order to guard against military threats, therefore, Finland should retain 
a credible national defence capability, in which defence of the whole 
national territory should play an important part. It was observed that 
the consultations with expert advisors had done much to ensure an 
understanding of the possibility of a military threat, so that the 
monitoring group scarcely questioned the need for military threat 
descriptions and unanimous agreement among its members on the 
existence of such threats (without being any more precise about them 
or describing them in the report) was achieved fairly easily.137 When it 
came to drawing up the report, however, it was decided to adopt a 
perspective in which the new threats were examined rather than 
military threats. 
The monitoring group held extensive discussions on the new threats, 
those related to a broader understanding of security than only military 
security, and regarded it as something new that such a great amount of 
attention should be given to these, observing that the emphasis on the 
                                                 
135 One indication of this is the occurrence of the word uhka, “threat”, a total of 122 times 
(in various grammatical forms) in the course of the report.  ”This report in concerned with 
perceived threats to security and the ways in which different countries and organizations 
attempt to respond to these threats and succeed in doing so.” Turvallisuuspoliittisen 
seurantaryhmän raportti, p. 19. 
136 Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantaryhmän raportti, p. 22. 
137 The existence of a military threat was disputed to some extent by the Left-wing Alliance 
and the Greens. 
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new threats was justified in view of their topical relevance, the 
probability of their realization and their growing intensity (all relative 
to the military threats). Thus the monitoring group‟s report carried a 
clear message for those concerned with producing the government 
report itself, that “the report should treat the new threats to security in 
a comprehensive manner,” and that “the new threat factors are 
realities for which the country must be prepared.”138 One important 
point here is that in presenting and evaluating the new threats the 
monitoring group made abundant reference to the EU security 
strategy. “The content of the European Union‟s new security strategy 
forms the major background to this report,” and “the new EU security 
strategy is based on a broad-based concept of security which supports 
Finland‟s views and policies.”139 In other words, the monitoring group 
was stating that Finland should build up its own understanding of the 
threat situation as a part of the threat descriptions set out by the EU. 
And this was indeed the case, as the list of new threats contained in 
the group‟s report pointed very much in the same direction as the 
threat images in the EU security strategy: “The new threats include 
disintegrating states, regional conflicts, terrorism, the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, cybercrime, 
pandemics, uncontrolled migrations of population, the state of the 
environment and the availability of natural resources.”140 These new 
threats were described as being cross-border phenomena that are 
common to all the western countries and are apt to emphasize the 
mutual dependence that exists between these countries. Particular 
stress was laid on the threats associated with terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction and cybercrime, although the monitoring group‟s 
evaluation of the threats involved did not suggest that it was able to 
point to any direct connection between these and Finland‟s security. A 
consensus regarding the choice of threat images was achieved by dint 
of extensive discussions, although some of the group‟s members 
would have liked to stress the new threats and means for combating 
them still more and in greater diversity. It was thus emphasized that 
Finland‟s security policy, and also its defence policy, was bound up 
with the new threats, and it was for this reason that the monitoring 
                                                 
138 Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantaryhmän raportti, pp. 21–22. 
139 Ibid. pp. 20, 41. 
140 Ibid. p. 20. 
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group insisted that these threats should be dealt with comprehensively 
in the government report.  
In the case of terrorism the monitoring group noted that the United 
States‟ “war on terrorism” and the recent terrorist incidents in Madrid 
would have had the effect of accentuating the perceived threat from 
this source on an international scale, but it was clearly recognized as a 
current, specifically western threat image, the “reality” of which 
should be duly noted in Finland. Although the terrorist threat was felt 
in the monitoring group‟s discussions to be to some extent illogical 
and improbable as far as Finland was concerned, it was still ranked as 
more probable than any military threat and manifestations of it were 
regarded as probable on a European scale. The terrorist threat was 
framed in the monitoring group‟s report as permanent, of increasing 
intensity and associated with globalization and fanatical religious 
groups. 
Similarly the threat image arising from weapons of mass destruction 
was regarded in the group‟s report as more of an international than a 
Finnish-oriented risk factor. It was noted that the threshold for using 
such weapons (chemical and biological weapons or nuclear weapons) 
had become lower on an international scale and that the intensity of 
the threat had increased (owing to the possibility of such weapons 
falling into the hands of terrorists). In the end it was concluded that 
these posed an “especially serious” threat on account of the wide-
ranging consequences that could arise from their use. The threat 
connected with weapons of mass destruction was also linked with 
Russia, in which connection it had aroused a lively discussion within 
the monitoring group. “From a Finnish point of view it is extremely 
important that good care is taken of the huge and extremely dangerous 
stock of weapons of mass destruction inherited from the Soviet 
Union.”141 It was also noted that Finland‟s resources were inadequate 
to cope with a large-scale strike executed with weapons of this kind. 
Cybersecurity threats were felt by the monitoring group to be of 
current relevance, likely to increase in intensity, capable of being 
targeted specifically at Finland and potentially able to increase the 
vulnerability of the Finnish “information society”. Virus attacks, 
disruptions of the electricity distribution grid, incursions into data 
                                                 
141 Ibid. p. 27. 
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networks and disinformation campaigns were all presented as threat 
images that the group associated with the field of cybersecurity in its 
discussions. These threat images were also associated with two 
military threat models put forward in the 2001 Government Report: “It 
is possible that an attempt could be made to destroy the military 
command system by means of a cyberattack as a part of a strategic 
strike and/or a political pressurization campaign.”142  
Practically all the other new threats the monitoring group attributed 
(directly or indirectly) to Russia. There had in fact been a great deal of 
discussion on Russia as a source of threats in the group‟s meetings, 
and members were frequently of the opinion that one of the major 
benefits of the group‟s activities was that “for once we can speak of 
Russia and the extensive security problems that it causes by their 
proper names.” There was nevertheless a desire to exercise restraint 
when writing about Russia in the monitoring group‟s report. In 
particular, there was no desire to embark on a discussion of the 
possibility of a military threat from Russia in the report, and in other 
respects, too, the group wished to be more cautious in public. In fact it 
was even decided at the last minute to smooth over the wording of the 
section on Russia still further, but even so the working group itself 
was still of the opinion that the section dealing with Russia in the 
monitoring group‟s report was bolder and more critical than the 
government report proper was able to be, as it was mentioned very 
poignantly as far as Finland‟s security was concerned in connection 
with both the new and old threats that “in addition to the traditional 
security issues, Russia is of great importance to Finland for combating 
the new threats.”143 There was also a reference to the possible 
existence of a military threat when it was said in the report that 
“Russia will retain a military capacity for operations in neighbouring 
areas.”144  
The monitoring group also spoke together at length about the internal 
problems affecting Russia, an analysis which was also reflected in its 
report. The war in Chechnya, the infringement of human rights, the 
control maintained over the media and the unsteady progress being 
made in economic and political reforms, i.e. towards democracy, were 
                                                 
142 Ibid. ps. 30. 
143 Ibid. p. 31. 
144 Ibid. p. 33. 
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all framed as matters that made it particularly difficult to predict 
future developments in that country. A general uncertainty surround-
ding military and political developments in Russia was prominent in 
the group‟s deliberations, and it was important to communicate this 
message to the Council of State as well: “the difficulty of predicting 
developments in Russia is a factor that will have to be taken into 
account in an appropriate manner in future planning. The government 
report should deal comprehensively with the challenges and 
uncertainties connected with developments in Russia that are likely to 
affect our security environment.”145 
 In term of identity policy, the monitoring group linked the perceived 
threats affecting Finland to those applying to the west in general; i.e. 
the significance of the European Union as both a target for 
securitization and a producer of methods designed to improve security 
was emphasized and considerable weight was placed on the 
importance for Finland of good transatlantic relations. Especially 
where it came to combating the new threats, it was felt that Finland 
was acting as a part of a broader European front and in collaboration 
with the United States, which could be construed as a reference to the 
existence of geographically distant crises and to an indivisible concept 
of security brought about by globalization. Thus, although the target 
for securitization in the eyes of the monitoring group was the security 
of the Finnish state, this was clearly linked to the EU and western 
culture, at least as far as non-military threats were concerned. It was 
indeed written into the monitoring group‟s report that “in connection 
with the new threats the EU has already proved itself to be an 
important actor as far as Finnish security is concerned.”146 Similarly, 
note was taken of the connection with the United States when it came 
to the defining of threats: “the United States and the EU share the 
same threats and interests.”147 The new threats were seen as good tools 
for use in the cause of Finnish identity policy, i.e. for linking Finland 
to the western block. It was thus on the grounds of the new threats that 
the monitoring group recommended that Finland should take part in 
all the security and defence policy cooperation that was agreed upon 
within the EU. 
                                                 
145 Ibid. p. 34. 
146 Ibid. p. 39. 
147 Ibid p. 44. The differences in emphasis on particular threats between the EU and the 
United States were nevertheless acknowledged. 
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There was less discussion within the monitoring group on matters of 
internal security, if only because it had been decided at the outset to 
concentrate on external threat images, and similarly there was no 
extensive discussion of methods for improving security or of the 
allocation of money for actors engaged in such work. As far as means 
of combating threats were concerned, however, the group did stress 
the increasing significance of both international cooperation and 
cooperation between different security agencies within Finland. “In 
matters of combating threats to security, emphasis should be placed on 
the adoption of a broad battery of political and economic measures 
and the importance of emergency strategies that cover all sectors of 
society.148 As far as funding was concerned, the group nevertheless 
did place one demand on those preparing the government report: “the 
necessary resources for combating these threats in all branches of the 
administration should be taken into account in their entirety in the 
state budget.”149 This reference to financial resources applied mostly 
to other security actors rather than to the defence administration, and 
in any case the monitoring group did not wish to contemplate the 
question of finance in any detail or put any more precise proposals 
before the Council of State.150  
The report submitted by the monitoring group may be regarded as 
having set out certain obligations to be fulfilled in the Government 
Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy as drawn up by the 
Council of State, and it was indeed discussed in depth in the latter‟s 
working group, although it was admittedly already known (through 
Järvenpää, Lyra and Laajava) that its recommendations were in line 
with the threat images to be presented in the government report. Once 
it had been published it was studied in detail at one meeting of the 
working group, when it was established that the recommendations 
made in it would for the most part be implemented in the forthcoming 
government report. Some of the working group members interviewed 
were nevertheless of the opinion that the monitoring group report had 
no practical implications for the final government report; the most 
                                                 
148 Ibid. p. 20. 
149 Ibid. p. 9. 
150 The monitoring group‟s report (p. 46) contained an interesting remark concerning the 
targeting of defence budget funds, which should, according to the government report, be 
”evaluated on the basis of the EU security policy priorities, taking into account the new 
threats to security.” It was also noted that “the new threats should be added to the practical 
planning” of defence funding. 
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important thing, they thought, was that Parliament had made its voice 
heard in the report – for its own sake. At all events, the working group 
did not produce any very specific evaluations of the threat images 
proposed by the monitoring group, nor did it question any of them. In 
fact, it had no difficulty in approving the monitoring group‟s report as 
it stood. The two groups were of the same opinion regarding the 
necessity for a broad-based concept of security and the placing of 
weight on the new threats, but the monitoring group maintained that 
the threat descriptions in the eventual government report were less 
precise than they had been in its own version.  
 
Influence of external actors on the perceived threats 
The influence of threat images projected by external actors (the UN, 
the United States, NATO, the EU and Russia) on the perceived threats 
identified in the government report was recognized in the interviews 
with members of both the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy and the working group responsible for drafting the report. 
Neither group had explicitly gone through the potential external 
threats, but they were undoubtedly reflected in the general threat 
content of the report, and they had been evaluated in considerable 
detail by the civil servants attached to the working group who had 
been responsible for the wording of the report. It is reasonable at this 
point (before going into the matter in any greater detail) to call 
attention to three general interpretations of the influence of threat 
images associated with external actors. Firstly, the politicians and civil 
servants involved in preparing the government report were aware of 
the need to start out by laying emphasis on the broad concept of 
security as generally observed in international circles, and it was 
acknowledged that the importance of non-military threat images that 
conformed to this concept of security had increased especially 
markedly in the western countries, where the presentation of perceived 
threats had come to be dominated by threat descriptions other than 
military ones. Thus it was necessary to understand threat factors in 
Finland, too, in a broad sense, as arising from various security 
sectors, partly for the simple reason that other western countries were 
doing so. It was also noted that non-military “threat tendencies” 
conforming to the broad concept of security reflected the spirit of the 
times; in other words that the awareness of threats that prevailed 
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internationally was being reflected more easily at the national level, in 
the content of Finland‟s perceived threats. This may be regarded as 
one characteristic of the broad concept of security. 
Secondly, there was no desire to allow the dominant role of the broad 
concept of security to open the way to a questioning of the existing 
line of thought in matters of security policy, namely the principles of 
military non-alignment and a credible national defence capability. In 
terms of the preparation of the government report, this led to a 
reluctance to put forward precise evaluations of military developments 
in the Baltic region, as these could have led to the “wrong” political 
conclusions. On the other hand, this point of departure demonstrated 
the culturally bound nature of the national process of constructing 
military threat perceptions for Finland, as it was clearly stated in the 
report that military threat descriptions were still needed. It should also 
be noted that (on account of the structure imposed on the report) the 
means of controlling the perceived threats that were detailed in it 
applied exclusively to the military threats. 
Thirdly, in terms of identity policy, there was a desire that the report 
should give expression to Finland’s commitment to the western bloc 
and to western values. It was recognised that the process of 
constructing threat descriptions for Finland was dependent on western 
threat perceptions; i.e. there was a conscious desire to identify with 
the threats perceived by the EU, the United States and NATO. The 
western nature of the threat content shared by Finland was emphasized 
especially clearly in connection with the means of combating non-
military threats, and through the stress placed on the importance of 
western interests where relations with Russia were concerned. Telling 
comments in this respect were those made in public by members of 
the working group to the effect that “We have to set out from the 
principle that we share western values. We share a certain notion of 
what security is,” “Alongside this, Finland continues to be concerned 
about stability in Northern Europe, and that concern is becoming a 
more complex matter day by day,” and “Considering common western 
interests with respect to Russia, we can undoubtedly make our own 
views and experiences available for general use.”151 In view of its need 
                                                 
151 Jaakko Laajava, Transatlanttiset suhteet, speech 28.8.2003, Risto Volanen, ”Suomi etelän ja 
lännen välissä”, Helsingin Sanomat 22.9.2003; Jaakko Laajava, Alustus Atlantti-seurassa, 
12.4.2003. 
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for positive association and identification, Finland can be looked on 
as an adaptable country in relation to western non-military threat 
perceptions. Thus the construction of non-military threat images for 
the report was a manifestation of Finland‟s identification with the 
perceived threats that prevailed in the western countries in general. 
Although Finland‟s perceived threats were stated to be part of a global 
trend in threat images that united countries in a mutual dependence in 
security matters, there was a desire in the report to give expression, 
above all politically, to this country‟s commitment to the same threat 
reality shared by all western nations, in the form of non-military threat 
images that conformed to the broad concept of security. Thus the non-
military threat descriptions in the report were very largely a synthesis 
of those put forward by the EU, the United States and NATO, and also 
by the United Nations. 
Although it is difficult to arrange the external actors that influenced 
the construction of threat images for the report in any precise order of 
importance, the preparation of the report clearly laid more emphasis 
on the influence of threats perceived by the EU and by Russia, the 
former in connection with non-military threats and the latter with 
military ones. The influence of UN, US and NATO threat images was 
reflected mainly in the political prioritization of certain individual 
threat perceptions, e.g. terrorism or climate change. As far as the 
means for combating the threats were concerned, the intention, based 
on political grounds, was evidently to create an impression of the 
primary significance of the EU and the UN.   
 
The European Union 
It was generally accepted at the preparation stage (among both the 
politicians and the civil servants) that the government report should 
not conflict with the guidelines laid down in the EU security strategy, 
and this was taken to apply equally well to the threat images set out in 
that strategy. It was conceded that, as an EU member state, Finland 
was obliged to commit itself to the perceived threats agreed upon and 
decided upon jointly by all its members. These EU threat perceptions 
were indeed of considerable significance when it came to constructing 
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the non-military threat descriptions for the report.152 This 
consideration for the EU dimension was regarded during the 
preparation stage as the “natural way” of approaching threat factors 
that were common to all EU member states, and the significance of 
the EU security strategy and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe were mentioned by name in the introduction to the report: 
“The provisions of the European Union‟s security strategy, as 
approved by the European Council in December 2003, and the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, approved by the same body in 
June 2004, with regard to a common security and defence policy have 
been crucial in laying down the framework and starting points for this 
statement of Finland‟s own policies.”153 Thus the European Union can 
be regarded as having provided a major frame of reference for the 
securitization of Finland’s perceived threats.154  
The working group was pressurized by the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy into taking full account of the 
significance of the EU in the report, the committee expressing a desire 
that the EU should be treated as an actor of essential importance in the 
construction of Finland‟s security and should be understood as a 
participant in constructing that security world-wide and in promoting 
stability in Finland‟s immediate neighbourhood. The natural way of 
examining common European threat factors that were shared by 
Finland when constructing the threat descriptions for the report was to 
take the EU dimension into account; i.e. commitment to the perceived 
threats arising from terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime was 
regarded as justified by politicians and civil servants alike and was 
deemed to be in accordance with the direction chosen for Finland‟s 
security policy. Symptomatic in this respect was the view that 
prevailed among the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of how 
                                                 
152 Many of the members of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
observed that Finland “could not afford” politically to ignore the threats perceived by the 
EU. 
153 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 16. 
154 The Internal Security Programme contained a direct reference to a common European 
threat reality in the observation that ”Since Finland is a part of the European Union, all the 
factors that constitute a threat to the member states of the European Union in general 
constitute a potential threat to Finland.” Arjen turvaa. Sisäisen turvallisuuden ohjelma, p. 
48. 
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difficult it would be to imagine drawing up the report without taking 
account of the perceived threats laid down in the EU security strategy. 
The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy noted that, in 
the context of the EU, the perceived threats identified in the EU 
security strategy would in any case affect Finland at least indirectly, 
and that Finland should be prepared to join a common European front 
aimed at combating these threats. It regarded the EU threat images as 
belonging to Finland and the Finns, and felt that Europe and the 
Europeans were closer to Finland‟s process of developing its thinking 
on potential threats that any other international actors and therefore 
constituted a more straightforward and more logical channel for 
approaching threats to global security (as far as means of combating 
these threats were concerned). Meanwhile, the working group 
affirmed that in its own threat evaluations during the preparation of 
the report it had had no difficulty in opting for descriptions that were 
similar to those contained in the EU security strategy. This strategy 
was also felt to be a document whose content with respect to threat 
descriptions could be influenced by Finland through its own actions. 
As an EU country, Finland had been involved in constructing the 
threat descriptions for that security strategy and had approved them 
politically. They were therefore common threat perceptions that had 
been agreed on at a high political level and called for commitment 
from member states. In spite of this common security strategy, 
however, it was also recognized at the stage of preparing the report 
that Finland should reserve the right to define its own national threat 
perceptions, particularly military ones. 
 
The United States 
Although the urgency of the threat posed by terrorism that became 
clear in the process of constructing the government report was also 
communicated through the EU and NATO, it was felt that the 
international role of the United States in constructing the image of a 
threat from terrorism was still more prominent. The prioritization of 
the terrorist threat, for example, was regarded as being very much a 
matter of a prevailing international trend and a serious disruption of 
the international system that the United States was anxious to 
emphasize and which should therefore be reflected in the Finnish 
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understanding of the threat situation. The terrorist threat was also a 
prominent theme in international relations involving Finland at the 
time when the government report was in preparation. Both the 11/9 
incident and the terrorist attacks in Madrid were regarded as 
demonstrating the urgency and high intensity of the threat posed by 
terrorism, not so much in Finland as in the western countries in 
general. The events of September 11th 2001 nevertheless appeared to 
bring the threat of terrorism to the forefront in the Finnish discussion 
of potential threats regardless of the level of seriousness of the threat 
to Finnish security. At any rate, the working group treated it as 
marking a substantial change in the international threat policy 
environment. Above all, it was by emphasizing the threat of terrorism 
that the authors of the report wished to announce to the western 
countries that Finland was abreast of the times and wished to be 
included in western anti-terrorist activities, although not in a war as 
such. It was noted that the perceived threats as formulated by the 
United States had their repercussions for the activities of the whole 
international community and for the threat factors experienced by it. 
“It is necessary to understand the threat perceptions and security 
strategies put forward by the United States as they will influence what 
is brought to the fore in the Finnish context,” as one member of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy put it. Once the 
United States had come to perceive terrorism as a more serious factor 
than any other threat, it was felt that other countries had to take it into 
account in a quite different way from previously, and the Finns were 
anxious to demonstrate to both the EU and the US that they were 
taking the terrorist threat seriously. The same logic was also reflected, 
in fact, in the report‟s attitude towards the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction (as emphasized by both the EU and the United States) and 
the activities of unstable governments. Clear references were made to 
joint western values in this connection, and to the crucial role of the 
United States in world politics.155 The way in which the threat of 
terrorism was framed in the report may be interpreted as one means of 
expressing solidarity both with the United States and with the other 
EU member states on whose security agenda the threat of terrorism 
had gained a position of high political priority, although a further 
factor lying in the background was undoubtedly the views voiced by 
                                                 
155 Cf. Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen: ”We will seek our own security and defend western 
freedoms by appearing genuinely in a joint front with those who share such values with 
us.” Helsingin Sanomat 5.4.2004. 
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the United States regarding the revision of that country‟s relations 
with others in the light of their appreciation of the terrorist threat and 
their commitment to countering it. In this respect relations between 
Finland and the United States were under scrutiny at the time when 
the government report was in preparation.156 It should be remembered 
that the declared programme of the existing Finnish government, in 
contrast to those of previous governments, had the intention of 
strengthening Finland‟s transatlantic relations built into it.157 Although 
the principal idea in the report was to present Finland in an EU 
context (with respect to combating the threat of terrorism), the 
formation of a consistent understanding of the threat between the EU 
and the United States was also represented as being of importance. 
“The United States and the EU are united by global threat factors … 
Europe is by far the United States‟ most important partner in 
responding to global challenges.”158 It was also noted that the EU had 
defined the new threats in just the same way as the United States, so 
that the threat perceptions put forward by them could be said to 
complement each other as far as Finland was concerned. 
 
NATO 
Being very similar in content, the NATO threat perceptions had the 
effect of backing up the influence of their EU and US counterparts on 
those presented in the Finnish government report. NATO was 
regarded as a western actor whose threat perceptions had been 
                                                 
156 As Risto Volanen put it, ”It is important for the shaping of Finland‟s security policy 
environment and for the sake of many economic ties that good bilateral relations should 
exist between Finland and the United States.”, See his ”Suomi ennakoi kriisejä 
lähentymällä Yhdysvaltoja”, Helsingin Sanomat 18.12.2002. 
157 The foreign and security policy section of the programme contained the following 
observation: “As a member state of the European Union, Finland will be active in 
strengthening its common foreign and security policy and promoting  transatlantic 
cooperation.” These last words were new to government programmes and represent a 
desire to indicate that relations between Europe and the United States were also of the 
utmost importance for Finland. Pääministeri Matti Vanhasen hallituksen ohjelma 
24.6.2003, p. 4. Cf. the remark by Jaakko Laajava that ”Taking the geopolitical realities 
into account, it may be said that the maintaining of American interest in Europe has always 
been in accordance with our fundamental interests.” Jaakko Laajava, Transatlanttiset 
suhteet, speech 28.8.2003. 
158 See Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, pp. 47, 56. 
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instrumental in giving rise to the western understanding of the threat 
environment. In general terms, it was difficult (and unnecessary) to 
make clear distinctions between EU, US and NATO threat images, as 
the members of the working group and those responsible for the 
wording of the report had decided among themselves that they 
paralleled each other. Similarly, it was difficult to understand the 
NATO threat descriptions separately from the United States and EU 
equivalents. In other words, there had been a substantial degree of 
interaction between these three actors in the construction of their 
perceived threats. 
There was one respect, however, in which the NATO threat per-
ceptions aroused a notable discussion in the working group, namely it 
was observed that NATO‟s aims and field of activities had altered as a 
consequence of the incursion of 11th September 2001, so that its chief 
emphasis was now on international crisis management and responding 
to the new threats. This was perceived by the working group as 
implying a greater concentration on non-national security issues. The 
disappearance of military threats and the threat posed by Russia from 
NATO’s official documents and the threat assessments put forward by 
NATO leaders was seen by the working group as problematic as far as 
Finland was concerned, and this was regarded as making it more 
difficult to include Finland‟s own threat response models (both the 
territorial defence system and universal conscription) in the 
government report. How could Finland justify its military threat 
models when even the military alliance had forsaken them and the 
western world had built up a powerful image of terrorism as the 
primary threat? At the same time, however, it was recognized in both 
the working group and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and 
Security Policy that some EU countries continued to experience 
military insecurity on account of Russia. On the other hand, general 
developments in Europe, and particularly in areas adjacent to Finland 
(such as the granting of NATO membership to the Baltic States and 
the views expressed in Sweden regarding the improbability of any 
military threat and the resulting defence policy solutions arrived at in 
that country159) were deemed to support existing Finnish security and 
                                                 
159 A restructuring of the Swedish armed forces had taken place on the basis of an estimate 
that no major military attack on that country would take place in the foreseeable future. 
The principal emphasis in Swedish security policy and the activities of its armed forces 
was on international operations and participation in international crisis management. See, 
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defence policy. These developments were regarded as strengthening 
Finland‟s interests (as a non-member of NATO) in maintaining strong 
defence systems of its own, for the sake of its own security and to 
avoid the creation of a militarily unaligned vacuum in Northern 
Europe. The removal of the military threat from the NATO agenda 
may thus be seen as having served as one reason for insisting on the 
need to include military threat perceptions in the Finnish government 
report. It must be admitted, of course, that the question of whether or 
not Finland should join NATO was an essential background factor in 
all the discussions that took place in the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy and in the working group. 
 
The United Nations 
As far as the United Nations is concerned, its influence on the threat 
perceptions included in the government report may be interpreted as 
having been on the one hand distant and on the other surprisingly 
strong. The working group was inclined to view the UN as a generator 
of global security and international security discourses, a general and 
broader frame of reference for perceived threats which had an 
influence of its own on the appreciation of global threats. Both the 
working group and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy set out from the assumption that Finland could discuss its 
security policy solutions and the perceived threats to be presented in 
the government report in isolation, without any substantial reference 
to the state of the world in general or global trends in security. The 
broad-based understanding of threats that the UN provided – bound up 
as it was with general security and development, social justice and 
environmentally sustainable development – was nevertheless reflected 
in the evaluation of global development and the new threats presented 
in part I of the report. Above all, it was President Halonen and the 
Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, who attempted to build up a close 
connection between Finland‟s security and the global threats described 
                                                                                                         
for example, Vårt framtida försvar, Regeringens proposition 20/05:5, 23.9.2004, 
Stockholm, pp. 13–14, 30–36.  
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by the UN in the course of the construction of the government 
report.160 
References were made to the UN Millennium Development Goals 
during the preparation of the government report when discussing the 
cross-border, mutually interconnected and ubiquitous nature of the 
non-military threats, and the UN was seen as defining the basic 
principles for perceived threats, principles that were aimed at guiding 
international behaviour and to which Finland had committed itself 
politically. As for threat perceptions, particular reference was made to 
environmental questions, pandemics, poverty, infringements of human 
rights and migrations of population, as these were regarded as 
affecting Finland‟s security to an increasing extent in spite of the long 
geographical distances involved. UN views on these threats (and on 
non-military threats in general) undoubtedly influenced the way in 
which these phenomena and threats were evaluated, especially in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was a desire, in response to 
political guidance received by the working group, that the government 
report should emphasize the role of the UN as an important focus for 
international cooperation and a producer of means for controlling and 
combating threats, and the expectation was that elimination of the new 
threats would require strengthening of the UN role.161 It was also 
noted with reference to the UN threat perceptions that Finland carried 
a certain responsibility for the security of the Third World and that 
control over these threats called for long-term international 
cooperation.162 Thus the threat descriptions put forward by the UN 
can be seen to have led to the assigning of greater prominence to the 
broad-based security philosophy and the global nature of the non-
military threats when drawing up the government report; in other 
words, the UN‟s global threat perceptions were at work in the 
background when part I of the report was being prepared. 
                                                 
160 See also, for example, Tarja Halonen, YK:n vahvistaminen tärkeämpää kuin koskaan, 
speech 3.8.2003; Erkki Tuomioja, Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittinen toimin-
taympäristö muutoksessa, speech 5.2.2004. 
161 It was observed in the report that “response to the new threats will lay more emphasis 
on the flexibility and adaptability of the UN as a multicentred organization.” Suomen 
turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 33. 
162 The UN‟s global policies were directly reflected in the Development Policy Programme 
dealing with Finland‟s global policies, which was taken into account when preparing the 
government report. See Ulkoasiainministeriö, Kehityspoliittinen ohjelma, pp. 5–10. 
112
Russia 
Russia had a very significant influence on the construction of threat 
images for the report, but this influence was manifested in a different 
manner from that of the other actors discussed above, not by virtue of 
the threat perceptions that it put forward in public but in other ways 
that were not related to the starting point represented by what it had 
recorded as its national (publicly declared) perceived threats. Russia 
was regarded as a crucial actor as far as Finland‟s security was 
concerned – regardless of how it defined its strategies, goals and threat 
images. Finland‟s construction of its own threat images was not felt to 
be identical to Russia‟s construction of its (military and non-military) 
threat images, even though Russia was also known to lay stress on the 
threat posed by international terrorism, for instance. The perspective 
from which Russia viewed security and the threats that faced the 
country was felt to be a very much state-centred (incorporating 
elements of a juxtaposition of Russia versus the rest of the world), and 
its perceived threats as expressed in the early years of the 21st century 
possessed a powerful internal policy dimension and an orientation 
towards improving the country‟s international status. The tragedy of 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union was also seen to continue to affect 
Russian security thinking and the threat images that were presented, 
with the result that considerable attention was paid during the 
preparation of the government report to estimates of military, political, 
economic, environmental and social development in Russia, although 
these estimates were admittedly frequently based on sources other 
than information released by Russia itself. More attention was paid to 
the monitoring and evaluation of Russia‟s threat perceptions and 
security decisions during the preparation of the report than to those of 
any other external actors. 
The crucial starting points when evaluating the threat reality 
associated with Russia were the geographical location of the two 
countries as neighbours, Russia‟s military capability (including its 
possession of nuclear weapons) and environmental and border security 
issues. In short, Finnish thinking on matters of security was seen as 
being directly connected to Russia’s political policies and perceived 
threats, something that applied to all sectors of security, and it was 
necessary for Finland to be able to react appropriately to any changes 
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that might occur in these political policies.163 It may indeed be claimed 
that during the process of drawing up the government report Finland‟s 
security was viewed to a considerable extent from the perspective of 
estimates regarding developments in Russia, in that any changes that 
occurred would be interpreted both by the members of the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and by the civil servants 
engaged in preparing the report as essentially affecting Finland‟s 
evaluations of its own security and the general sense of security 
experienced within the country. Although Russia was discussed a 
great deal in connection with non-military threats in the course of the 
preparation work, the principal emphasis was on military threat 
models. The central position occupied by Russia in Finnish security 
thinking was also reflected in the descriptions of the situation 
regarding that country as put forward in the report. Since it was 
obvious that these descriptions would have foreign policy 
repercussions, they acquired their final form only after a long period 
of discussion and revision in the working group. There were even 
some differences of opinion between the civil servants responsible as 
to how clearly certain matters concerned with Russia should be 
expressed in the report. 
The process of drawing up the government report may well be 
summarized by noting that, although the broad-based security 
viewpoint emphasized by actors in the west had a very marked 
influence on the threat images contained in it, both Russia and 
Finland‟s geographical position as a neighbour of Russia were well to 
the fore in the minds of those responsible for producing it – regardless 
of how directly or indirectly such matters were finally expressed in it. 
Thus further emphasis came to be placed on the permanent role of 
Russia as the determining factor in Finland‟s security environment 
and security decisions. 
 
 
                                                 
163 This was seen to be manifested in the fact that, if Russia felt that the expansion of 
NATO constituted a serious military threat, this would inevitably affect Finnish views on 
NATO and its expansion. 
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Non-military threat perceptions related to the broad-based 
concept of security 
“The major threats to security are terrorism, the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction and the risk that they might be used, regional 
conflicts and the use of military force, organized crime, trafficking in 
persons and drugs, economic and technological risks, environmental 
problems, population growth, migrations of population and 
epidemics.”164  
In the words of the civil servants involved in the process of drawing 
up the government report, “we were living through a concretization of 
threat images of an entirely new kind”. There was evident political 
pressure on them to adopt a broad-based approach to security when 
examining the potential threats. The general discussion at the 
preparatory stage revolved around the concepts of the “new threats”, 
threats to broad-based security and non-military threat perceptions,165 
which in practise meant everything else except the military threat 
models related to defence policy that were built into the report.  Thus 
one essential question during the preparation work was that of striking 
the right balance between the new threat images and the military ones, 
as both the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the 
working group set out from the assumption that it was necessary to 
deal with the new threats more extensively than on previous occasions 
while at the same time recognizing the need to consider the perceived 
military threats alongside these. It was also a matter of how the 
question of Russia should be approached in the report, and of the fact 
that, if it were to be demonstrated that there was not even any 
possibility of a military threat in any form, it would be very difficult to 
justify the defence policy attitudes adopted in the report. At the same 
time both the committee and the working group were of the opinion 
that from the perspective of the preservation of national sovereignty 
the new threat images were in no way comparable to the military 
threats, even though the latter were admittedly of very low intensity. 
                                                 
164 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, pp. 5. 
165 Cf. ”Our concept of threats to security has altered. ... The traditional threat images 
associated with wars between nations have been replaced by threats of a new kind, with the 
consequence that people have begun to speak of perceived threats to broad-based security.” 
Tuomioja, Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, pp. 21, 25. 
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Only the military threat perceptions could be regarded as militarized 
(and not merely securitized). 
Although a clear, shared understanding prevailed among those 
working on the government report with regard to “hard core” security 
(the perceived military threats), it was the new, non-military threats 
that could be said to have dominated the discussions in both the 
Cabinet Committee and the working group. These were discussed 
extensively, and they to a great extent dominated the ideas that most 
of the actors had in their minds with regard to threats. Alongside the 
treatment of the military threats, there was an evident desire to convey 
a powerful impression that the importance of the new threats for 
Finland’s security had increased. Some of the members of the 
working group were even of the opinion that the defence 
administration was attempting to play down the role of the new threats 
and prevent their inclusion in the report (at least with any major 
emphasis). 
One highly essential issue that dogged the preparation process 
throughout was the difficulty encountered in delimiting the new threat 
images. How should the controversial concept of broad-based security 
and the threat images derived from it be presented in the report? Or in 
other words, what was really meant in practise by broad-based 
security and the new threat perceptions? And in addition to this 
problem of defining the actual content of the new threat images, a 
further issue that demanded attention was the choice of such threat 
images for presentation in the report. The problem of choice criteria 
aroused a vast amount of discussion in both the Cabinet Committee 
and the working group, in the course of which they were forced once 
more to admit how difficult (or perhaps impossible) it was to set 
precise limits on broad-based security. Fundamentally, it was a 
question of the actors‟ differing opinions on the nature of the new 
threats and the need to include non-military threat perceptions in a 
government report on security and defence policy. Both bodies had 
some members who declared with hindsight that the threats had been 
allowed to be too broad in content, while others believed that more 
emphasis should have been placed on the new threat images. In the 
end the resulting balance between military and non-military threat 
images was regarded as a negotiated compromise between the broad 
understanding of security and the views on military threats of those 
bearing responsibility for defence policy alone. 
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The point of departure for examining the perceived threats for 
inclusion in part I of the report, those to be contributed by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, was that Finland‟s security should be more closely 
associated than before with the international security situation and its 
development.166 The increased interdependence between globalization 
and security was regarded as implying that risk factors affecting the 
international security environment would have more rapid and more 
serious repercussions for Finland‟s security and that of its citizens. 
The picture presented in part I of the report was a dual one, predicting 
greater stability in the countries bordering on Finland and in Europe as 
a whole but a more challenging international situation from a Finnish 
point of view. Finland‟s security was directly linked to the perceived 
threats to international security, i.e. the feeling of being threatened 
was derived from the broader, global nature of security. This was a 
reference to the increased non-national character of threats, the need 
for a broad-based, humanitarian understanding of security and the 
emphasis placed on foreign and development policy measures and 
broad-based international cooperation in the field of controlling and 
combating perceived threats. The concretization of these threat control 
strategies was the subject of a large amount of discussion in the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. 
The non-military threat images in the report were provided with 
contexts that conformed to the definitions given them by the western 
countries and the UN, in which the human rights, democracy, 
economic and constitutional problems experienced by the Third World 
and the weaker states, together with the conflict of cultures and the 
actions of extremist religious movements were described as acting as 
background factors for the threats existing in the international security 
environment. It should be noted in particular that disintegrating states 
(as they were referred to in the report) were not mentioned as such as 
constituting a perceived threat but as a background factor influencing 
the trend in international security. Their association with many of the 
new threats was nevertheless quite clear from the wording of the 
report. Poverty, inequality, population growth, development crises and 
regional conflicts (mainly framed as internal issues affecting 
individual states) were seen as sources of instability in the inter-
                                                 
166 “Global and transnational problems affect the security of the whole world, Europe, 
Finnish society and individual citizen.” Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, 
p. 18. 
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national system and thereby as entailing security implications for 
Finland. The Foreign Ministry and the working group were aware of 
this internationally accepted means of framing threats and noted that it 
had helped to promote the global nature of the examination of threat 
images in the report. Globalization was regarded as having increased 
the need for conformity among the western countries in the definition 
of threat images and as having improved people‟s general knowledge 
of non-military threat perceptions and their effects on national 
security. It was not thought possible for Finland to make its own 
security policy decisions without taking account of the state of the 
world at large and its population, on which Finland‟s security was 
regarded as being increasingly dependent. The heightened inter-
dependence of nations in terms of security and the strengthening of 
globalization were seen as the principal grounds for extending the 
notion of security.  
Globally oriented non-military threat perceptions couched in a broad 
context were generated for the working group by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to the extent that section 2.1.6 (Global and cross-
border security problems) became extremely long and very much 
broader in terms of the threat images dealt with than was the case in 
the eventual report, i.e. these threat descriptions were limited and 
shortened quite considerably in the final stage of producing the report. 
The main problem with the global threats to security as far as the 
working group was concerned lay in establishing a concrete 
connection with Finland’s security: how could the overall effects of 
global security be expressed as effects on Finnish security, as positive 
efforts had to be made in the report to find a Finnish perspective from 
which to view global security.167 It should be noted that the object to 
be securitized was defined in the report as being the security of 
Finland and the Finnish people, for which the Finnish government 
regarded itself as primarily responsible.168 The working group did 
indeed attempt to emphasize the importance of adjacent areas in its 
examination of the new threats, which made it easier to demonstrate 
                                                 
167 The Foreign Ministry was of the opinion afterwards that the report had not scrutinized 
the combining of development policy with security policy as widely as it should have done, 
in spite of the efforts made to place more weight on it. 
168 “Finnish security and defence policy is aimed at protecting Finnish independence and 
democratic constitutional values and promoting the security and welfare of the country‟s 
citizens.” Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 77. See also p. 30, where it 
is stated that “every state is primarily responsible for the security of its own citizens.” 
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the impact of these threats on Finland‟s security, and the defence 
administration similarly criticized the Foreign Ministry‟s description 
of the country‟s security environment that placed emphasis almost 
exclusively on global issues, so that the threats were shifted far away 
from Finland itself. On the other hand, the closer one came to Finland, 
the greater caution and deliberation the various actors may be 
interpreted as having shown in their attitudes towards the framing of 
perceived threats. Another difficulty attached to global threats was 
that of framing any detailed impacts on security, as the statements 
made by experts tended to vary greatly in their estimates of the 
influence of the threat factors, e.g. environmental threats, on security 
policy. 
Considerable differences of opinion arose between the Foreign 
Ministry and the defence administration when defining the back-
ground factors lying behind the new threats, e.g. with regard to 
limitation and taxation of the arms trade. Partly on account of its 
critical attitude towards the United States, the Foreign Ministry 
attempted to build into the report an impression of the arms trade as a 
threat to global security, whereas the defence administration (and 
particularly Pauli Järvenpää) attempted to dispel this criticism and to 
brand the Foreign Ministry‟s suggestion that arms deals concluded by 
the Finnish defence industry should be taxed as something that did not 
belong to the scope of the government report. In the end matters 
connected with the arms trade were discussed in a neutral manner in 
the report. 
The emphasis placed on the new threats also came to the fore in an 
appeal made by certain citizens‟ organizations to the working group 
responsible for preparing the report. Although the working group did 
not actually take papers of this kind from outside instances for 
discussion in its meetings, they did have some measure of impact on 
the background material for part I of the report that was worked up by 
the secretaries to the working group. At the sub-unit level, members of 
the working group were aware of appeals made by pressure groups at 
least as far as the Peace Organizations‟ Security and Defence Policy 
Report of 2004 and a statement on behalf of global security and non-
violent philosophy were concerned.169 These documents laid stress on 
                                                 
169 Suomen Rauhanliiton ja Suomen Sadankomitealiiton turvallisuuspoliittinen työryhmä, 
Rauhanjärjestöjen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittinen selonteko 2004, Helsinki 2004, 
Vetoomus Selonteko-työryhmälle, Lääkärien sosiaalinen vastuu, Kasvattajat rauhan 
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the significance of globalization for the emphasis being placed on the 
new threats, the importance of a humane concept of security, the utter 
improbability of any military threat and the existence of non-military 
means of controlling perceived threats, e.g. through development 
policy measures. The target of securitization in these appeals by 
citizens‟ organizations was usually something broader than national 
security, and the threat descriptions were constructed in an 
international context and referred to structural factors arising out of 
such a context. On the other hand, the report by the Peace 
Organizations included a commendable attempt at defining the limits 
of perceived security policy threats within a broad-based concept of 
security.170 In other words any excessive extension of the concept of 
security or securitization of perceived threats was regarded as 
detrimental. In this sense the emphasis on the new threats may be 
interpreted as a means of stimulating criticism of military threat 
perceptions and military responses to them. 
 
Non-military threat perceptions in the report 
The threats of terrorism and the spread or use of weapons of mass 
destruction gained a prominent position in the eventual report. 
Terrorism was framed as specifically a threat to the western countries, 
a threat that, in the context of the EU (by virtue of the principle of 
joint responsibility and its possible consequences), also posed a threat 
to Finland. Thus identification with the west was a crucial element in 
defining terrorism as a perceived threat to Finland and the definition 
itself followed the western model. The events of 11th September were 
regarded as having established terrorism as part of the western threat 
reality, the seriousness and European focus of which was only 
confirmed by the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid. The working 
                                                                                                         
puolesta, PAND, Psy-kologinen sosiaalinen vastuu, Rauhankasvatusinstituutti, Suomen 
kristillinen rauhanliike, Tek-niikka elämää palvelemaan, 1.6.2004. 
170 “For the concept of security policy to remain clearly bounded, it is important for its 
scope to be defined in such a way that it concerns threats of violence that have a political 
purpose behind them and which can be contained by security policy measures.” 
Rauhanjärjestöjen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittinen selonteko 2004, p. 10. The Peace 
Organizations‟ report also warned of the excessive militarization of perceived threats, a 
reference to the mission of the armed forces (p. 22): “The army should not be given a 
mandate to extend its field of activity beyond that of the defence of the national territory by 
force of arms.” 
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group also received messages during the preparation of the report to 
the effect that Finland could be the target of a terrorist incident, 
although in general the probability of this being the case was regarded 
as being relatively remote at that time. The terrorist threat was also 
emphasized in certain internal threat images recorded in chapter six of 
the report, in connection with which the role of the police in 
combating terrorism was underlined. All told, a great deal of weight 
was assigned to the perceived threat of terrorism in the report, even 
though the extent to which it was framed was reduced somewhat and 
the emphasis lightened by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and 
Security Policy.  
The threat attached to weapons of mass destruction was similarly 
framed as increasing in intensity, i.e. the risk of their use was regarded 
as greater than earlier.171 Weapons of mass destruction were looked on 
as posing a threat to Europe that could quite clearly be said to reflect 
upon Finland. Public statements made by the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister concurred with the general tones to be heard in the 
west, laying emphasis on the passage of such weapons into terrorist 
hands as a result of the actions of unstable nations as the most serious 
international threat scenario of all.172 The threat of the spread and use 
of weapons of mass destruction may be regarded as having been 
treated as one of the major trends in western threat images at that time, 
and one that without doubt belonged to the content of the report. On 
the other hand, reference was made to Russia‟s weapons of mass 
destruction only as far as their dismantling or safe storage was 
concerned.173 
Threat images connected with uncertainty factors such as organized 
and cyber crime, trafficking in persons and drugs, uncontrolled 
migrations of population and illegal immigration (border security), 
epidemics (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis etc.) and technological 
developments were quoted in the report both as international threats 
(associated with globalization) and threats to internal security. In the 
case of epidemics, migrations of population and organized crime, 
                                                 
171 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 22. 
172 See, for example, Matti Vanhanen, “The Peacekeeping law should not tie Finland‟s 
hands”, Verkkouutiset, 16.11.2004; Erkki Tuomioja, Turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko – 
suuntaviivat tulevalle, speech 20.8.2004. 
173 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 24. 
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fairly clear allusions were made to Russian sources, although the 
threats involved under the first two of these headings were not 
regarded as particularly serious. In spite of the fact that there was in 
general little desire to place the non-military threat images in any kind 
of order of priority, it was clear that organized crime (combined with 
trafficking in drugs and human beings, prostitution, various financial 
crimes and terrorist connections) and threats to computer systems 
(especially with reference to electricity and energy supplies and the 
use and maintenance of data systems) occupied a prominent place in 
the report at its preparation stage. There was a desire to project these 
threats as ones that were increasing in intensity. The growing reliance 
of Finnish society on technical systems was felt to be giving rise to 
security threats of a new kind and necessitating more distinct means of 
threat control. Descriptions of threats to electronic data and 
communications systems were framed in the report in connection with 
both the examination of the international security environment and the 
internal security of Finnish society. 
Alongside terrorism, it was organized crime and immigration 
questions174 that were felt by the Cabinet Committee and the working 
group to be the threats (arising from Russia) that the Ministry of the 
Interior was pushing forward for inclusion and special emphasis in the 
report.175 The ministry attached great importance to the securitization 
of these perceived threats and placed emphasis on a broad-based 
understanding of threats in accordance with the concept of overall 
security and on concretization of the new threats rather than simply a 
listing of them. It should be noted that the same non-military threats 
were described in the second chapter of the report, that prepared by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the sixth chapter, that prepared by the 
Ministry of the Interior and the seventh chapter, the writing of which 
was coordinated by the Security and Defence Committee.176 
                                                 
174 Immigrant groups were framed at two levels in the report: as potential objects of 
recruitment for terrorist activities and from the point of view of large-scale (uncontrolled) 
movements of population. 
175 Cf. Kari Rajamäki, Puhe selonteon 2004 yleisötilaisuudessa, Joensuu 8.11.2004. 
176 In the case of internal security and the perceived threats detailed in the SFVS Strategy, a 
solution had been reached in which both topics received ”sufficiently brief” sections of 
their own in the report. The following words on limitation of the extent of the perceived 
threats to internal security were included in chapter 6 “This chapter will examine mainly 
areas of internal security that fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and are of central importance for the Security and Defence Policy Report as a whole.” The 
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One conspicuous feature of the eventual government report was the 
partially militarized understanding of the perceived threats from 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and of those connected 
with data systems and information warfare, in that the combating of 
these threats was  largely entrusted to the defence administration,177 
which in turn saw the handling of non-military threats as requiring 
more efficient deployment of the Defence Forces‟ knowhow and 
equipment, an idea that was not especially well received by the 
Ministry of Interior. Further complications were envisaged in that 
some of the new threats were also perceived to be crucial factors in 
the creation of threat situations that would called for military action. 
The question of drawing attention to threats to environmental security 
in the government report aroused much discussion in the working 
group. This was largely a question of delimitation: is climate change 
to be regarded as a security policy threat or not? The necessity for 
taking account of the security implications of environmental threats in 
the report‟s examination of broad-based security was recognized, but 
it was thought desirable to frame them as having a dual nature. 
Gradually accumulating environmental hazards (such as climate 
change, eutrophication of the Baltic Sea or the exhaustion of natural 
resources) were felt to be difficult to counteract but of increasing 
intensity and security impact. More serious attention had to be paid, 
however, to sudden accidents or environmental disasters, such as 
those potentially associated with the increased transportation of oil 
and chemical products in the Gulf of Finland. These latter threats were 
assigned a significant weight in the framing process: “the most 
probable environmental risk, and a constantly increasing one, is the 
rising volume of oil transportation via the Baltic Sea.”178 Other major 
catastrophes were also regarded as serious threats (above all accidents 
                                                                                                         
perceived threats concerned were those arising from serious and organized crime, 
cybercrime, terrorism, immigration and threats to border security and the environment. 
Chapter seven, on the securitization of functions vital to society, followed the SFVS 
Strategy in concentrating on questions of securing essential supplies and emphasizing 
electronic communications systems, transportation and threat factors associated with 
radiation, chemicals and contagious diseases. See Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustus-
politiikka 2004, pp. 129–147. 
177 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, pp. 9, 123. The report called for 
further development of the executive assistance functions of the Defence Forces to cope 
with other new threats (without defining them any more precisely). 
178 Ibid. p. 137. 
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at nuclear power stations). It was also the case that, contrary to most 
of the other new threats, the environmental threats were ones in which 
the area immediately adjacent to Finland was seriously implicated, 
since Russia‟s inadequate infrastructure, the environmental loading 
from its industry and the poor safety standards of its nuclear power 
stations were seen as constituting threat factors for Finland. Prediction 
of the effects of these environmental threats was felt to be central to 
Finland‟s security policy. 
As a general observation, it may be said that the new, non-military 
threats put forward in the report were in accordance with the western 
trend in the framing of threats in the early years of the 21st century, 
although they admittedly had national points of emphasis attached to 
them, e.g. in references to areas immediately adjacent to Finland, 
particularly Russia. It was also significant as far as the new threats 
were concerned (as also with the military threat models) that apart 
from the President and the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence 
Minister and to some extent the Minister of the Interior, the members 
of the Cabinet Committee on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy had 
no chance to influence the construction of the threat descriptions until 
after the actual wording had been produced for them by the working 
group – and it is also notable that, partly for this reason, no major 
changes were made by the Cabinet Committee to the wording 
concerning the new threats. The decisions with regard to the inclusion 
and framing of the new threats had very largely been made during the 
administrative preparation of the project, under the political guidance 
of the security policy elite, and the role of the Cabinet Committee was 
mainly one of polishing the wording used in the framing and 
approving the threat images for publication in the report. The other 
committee members in many cases mentioned that they had not felt 
able (partly through shortage of time) to indulge in any serious 
criticism of the threat images submitted to the committee for 
discussion. Even so, the new threats were discussed in the committee 
to a greater extent than were the military threat models. The 
differences of opinion between the actors that arose in the discussions 
over the non-military threats pointed to both differences in world-view 
and differences in the decisions reached on the basis of the threat 
evaluations presented to them. A consensus regarding the eventual 
manner in which the new threat images were to be framed was 
nevertheless reported by all the committee members to have been 
reached relatively easily, even though some were of the opinion that 
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too much weight was given to directions of thought that were to the 
fore at the moment of writing rather than the fruits of their evaluation 
at the national level. 
 
The military threat models 
“Security policy is naturally also a question of being prepared for the 
less probable threats materializing. It is not enough simply to estimate 
that it is improbable that a certain threat might be realized; it is 
necessary to ask whether it is conceivably possible. When a country is 
planning its defence it has to recognize not only threats but also 
potential threats, as it may take ten years to construct the necessary 
defences to cope with these.”179  
The military threat models written into the government report and 
employed in defence planning180 were constructed in the defence 
administration, mostly in the General Headquarters of the Finnish 
Defence Forces, as continuations of the military threat models and 
situation descriptions included in the previous Government Report on 
Finnish Security and Defence Policy (2001) and in the SFVS Strategy 
of 2003.  It should be noted that the defence administration did not 
attach very much weight to the description of the security environment 
provided in part I of the report, but rather the threat models and 
defence policies were defined in a certain sense independently of the 
security environment evaluations presented there.181 In fact, the 
military threat models were framed before the defence administration 
had any knowledge of the security environment evaluations produced 
for part I. Thus it may be said that the military threat models in the 
report were constructed without any obvious administrative 
connection with the description of the security environment included 
                                                 
179 Matti Vanhanen, Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan ajankohtaiset haasteet, speech 
4.11.2003. 
180 The report did not actually speak of military threat images but rather military threat 
models. This concept was used in order to emphasize the fact that the military threats were 
described on a very general level rather than with any detailed evaluations. 
181 One exception to this concerned sections 2.6–2.8, the writing of which took place in 
close collaboration with the defence administration. The wording of section 2.6, on Russia, 
which had largely been produced by the defence administration, was nevertheless 
alleviated somewhat by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. 
125
in the government report. In the defence administration, and 
particularly in the Defence Forces, part I of the report, that produced 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was regarded as “one perspective 
on security and the threat situation” which was secondary to the “real, 
true threats that faced the Finnish nation”. The defence administration 
observed that part I had concentrated on global issues and the threat 
images that came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, images that were excessively idealistic, so that instead of 
providing a realistic security analysis, they described the world as the 
authors hoped it would become. Thus the defence administration did 
not attach much significance to part I in connection with its own work 
of constructing the military threat models but took its principal aim to 
be that of gaining political approval for the policies laid down in 
chapter five, “Development of the National Defence”.  
It was a source of some annoyance to the defence administration in the 
course of the preparation of the report that messages were received 
from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the 
Interior accusing the defence administration of over-emphasizing the 
importance of the military threats and the state of uncertainty that 
prevailed in Russia at a time when the probability of a military threat 
was an extremely far-fetched idea. “People in Finland will die for 
quite different reasons, which have nothing to do with rifle bullets.” 
The messages questioned whether military threat models were 
necessary at all. The defence administration, for its own part, saw its 
mission, through its military threat models and Finland‟s territorial 
defence system, as being to make adequate preparations for the more 
serious alternatives among the eventualities that could be envisaged, 
although at the same time it remained conscious of the increased need 
to steer the activities of the Defence Forces more than ever towards 
the provision of executive assistance in combating the new threats and 
towards international crisis management operations. The construction 
of military threat models was grounded in the notion of Russia, 
especially in evaluations of that country‟s military capability, its ways 
of acting and the probability attached to the military threat it posed. 
Interviews with representatives of the defence administration suggest 
that this was something on which complete unanimity prevailed. The 
basis for the threat models to be included in the government report, on 
the other hand, lay in a technique of producing “publishable” models 
that were sufficiently loosely phrased and avoided pointing a finger at 
anyone in particular. Similarly the members of the working group and 
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the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy were 
disinclined to open up the content of the threat models, insisting 
instead that they should be framed in superficial and generalized 
terms. It was felt politically to be important that the threat models 
should not be targeted in any specific direction. For the defence 
administration, the loose form in which the models were presented 
was also a good thing as far as their functionality was concerned. 
The defence administration was well aware during the work of 
preparing the government report of the general security discourse 
prevailing in the western countries which maintained that no actual 
threats existed, and this was perceived as increasing social pressure to 
justify Finland‟s persistent references to military threat models and 
defence policy decisions (e.g. the maintenance of a territorial defence 
system and universal male conscription).182 It was also clear to the 
Finnish Defence Forces that the military threat images that were to be 
constructed (and the resulting defence policy recommendations) 
would contribute towards justifying and legitimizing the existence of 
the Defence Forces and the allocation of budgetary funds to the 
defence administration. Both the Minister of Defence and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces emphasized the funding 
aspect and the resource needs of the defence administration in 
numerous speeches during the preparation of the report. “Although we 
have a good defence system, even that will not function without 
money.”183 “There are few privileges to be granted in the distribution 
of government money. The defence budget is in a state of open 
competition with other categories of government expenditure.”184 It 
was also the case, of course, that the military threat posed by Russia 
was felt to be more serious because of the political decision to remain 
outside NATO. 
 
 
                                                 
182 Cf. Juhani Kaskeala, Puolustusvoimilla on kykyä ja valmiutta sopeutua turval-
lisuusympäristön muutoksiin, speech at the opening of the 168th National Defence Course, 
Puhe 168. Maanpuolustuskurssin avajaisissa 22.9.2003. 
183 Juhani Kaskeala, Suomella ei ole tarvetta muuttaa omintakeista puolustusjärjes-
telmäänsä, 8.3.2004. 
184 Seppo Kääriäinen, Tervehdys maanpuolustuskurssin avajaisissa, 22.9.2003. 
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Production of military threat models by the defence administration 
Construction of the military threat models for the 2004 Government 
Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy may be regarded as 
having begun immediately after the publication of the previous report, 
since monitoring of the situation with regard to Russia and updating of 
the estimated threats was a continuous process taking place in the 
Operations Division and intelligence arms of the Defence Forces‟ 
General Headquarters and it was from these sources that the military 
threat models were extracted. The monitoring was based above all on 
evaluations of military capability and to some extent the will to use 
this capability; i.e. what military action could be taken against Finland 
and how likely this was. Such evaluations were not made public, but 
they were used to draw up threat models couched in general terms that 
were intended for publication, and discussions with broadly the same 
content (what Russia was militarily capable of and what the likelihood 
was that it would resort to military force) also took place within the 
working group and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy in the course of preparing the 2004 report. The outcome was a 
clear desire to indicate in the report that Russia was still the most 
significant military power in the areas adjacent to Finland and that it 
retained the capability to deploy traditional military forces.185 
The threat models for the report were produced in the Operations 
Division of the General Headquarters as part of the Defence Forces‟ 
normal operational planning. Although it was realized in the Ope-
rations Division at a relatively early stage that there was little need for 
any major changes to be made to the military threat models included 
in the 2001 government report, discussions did take place there and in 
the General Headquarters as a whole regarding the content of the 
models as they were to be presented in the new report and especially 
the manner in which the descriptions were to be made. In the words of 
the headquarters staff who took part in constructing the models, they 
were based on a protracted and thoroughgoing underlying assessment 
of the existing situation, from which they could be derived relatively 
easily. The Operations Division did not produce any actual alternative 
models, although various alternatives were discussed in the initial 
stages. The draft models were then evaluated in the General 
Headquarters, with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Operations, 
                                                 
185 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 68. 
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together with the Commander-in-Chief, exercising the greatest 
influence on their final framing. The wording of the models and the 
descriptions of their content were weighed up very carefully in the 
General Headquarters, but no specific political guidance was provided 
during this process, not even by the Minister of Defence, so that the 
models may be understood as having been constructed entirely within 
the Headquarters of the Defence Forces. It is true, however, that the 
Commander-in-Chief discussed the threat models and the principles 
underlying them through both official and unofficial channels with the 
President of Finland in particular and also with the Prime Minister and 
the Minister of Defence. The guidance received from the Ministry of 
Defence, on the other hand, concerned other parts of the government 
report that were to be prepared in the General Headquarters more than 
it did the military threat models.186 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, Admiral Juhani 
Kaskeala, played a central role in the construction of the military 
threat models, taking an active part in their evaluation and in working 
up their content and in practise granting his approval to the models 
produced by the General Headquarters before they were passed on for 
political discussion. In fact it is possible in a sense to view the models 
as statements of the will of the Commander-in-Chief, whose authority 
in these matters it is very difficult to question in the political arena. 
The hand of the Commander-in-Chief was perhaps most distinctly to 
be seen in the deletion (as a separate model) of the threat of a large-
scale offensive directed at Finland. The decision to abandon this 
scenario was taken in the Commander-in-Chief‟s own office, on the 
grounds that he no longer regarded its manner of presentation as 
credible and believed that the quoting of this outdated model would 
only arouse criticism in political circles; i.e. the model was difficult to 
justify or “sell” to the politicians. He regarded the words “large-scale 
offensive” as old-fashioned, and it had in any case been concluded in 
the General Headquarters that as a threat this was extremely 
improbable. Although it remained in existence as far as defence 
                                                 
186 The civil servants in the Ministry of Defence expressed a certain amount of 
dissatisfaction with the independent manner in which the General Headquarters set about 
preparing material for the government report, both the military threat models and the other 
defence policy sections for which the defence administration was responsible.  
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planning was concerned, the idea was that it should be framed in quite 
a different form for the government report, partly in order to 
demonstrate that the Defence Forces were abreast with the times and 
prepared to make changes even to military threat models that had been 
regarded as more or less permanent. A more important goal was that 
the possibility of military force being deployed should be retained in 
the threat models. There were admittedly some people in the General 
Headquarters who were critical of the decision to leave out the 
reference to a large-scale offensive, but it should in all fairness be 
noted that the idea behind this threat model was not actually removed 
from the report; it was merely expressed in a different manner from 
previously.  
One place that became an important venue for internal discussions 
within the defence administration was the Guards‟ Cabinet, where the 
Minister of Defence, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Defence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and the 
Chief of Staff    used to meet together with the aim of increasing the 
opportunities for open discussion between the leadership of the 
ministry and the armed forces and creating a body of parallel and 
coincident opinion. A great deal of discussion took place there on the 
military threat models, as also on other aspects of the government 
report that had been entrusted to the defence administration, and it was 
there, in the Guards‟ Cabinet, that approval was sought from the 
leadership of the Ministry of Defence, and above all from the minister 
himself,187 for the models produced by the General Headquarters 
before they were sent on to the working group and eventually to the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. Unanimity with 
regard to the threat models was achieved relatively easily in that 
forum, and no changes were made to them other than a few 
adjustments to the wording. 
The preparatory work in the General Headquarters and the 
negotiations in the Guards‟ Cabinet led eventually to the presentation 
of three threat models for inclusion in the report. The first of these was 
the Regional Crisis model, which referred to a situation in which a 
                                                 
187 The staff of the Ministry of Defence, and more particularly the General Headquarters of 
the Defence Forces, had reservations regarding the views of the Minister of Defence, 
Seppo Kääriäinen, who was known to place more weight on government policies, to be 
dubious of the “opinions of the generals” and to take regional policy issues very seriously 
even in matters of defence.  
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crisis affecting a geographically restricted area lying outside the 
borders of Finland were to have repercussions for Finland itself. The 
second was that of Political, Economic and Military Pressure, with an 
associated threat of the use of military force and possibly its actual use 
on a limited scale. This presupposed that another state or an actor of 
some other kind were to attempt to influence decisions made by the 
sovereign government of Finland. Both of these models were put 
forward in the same manner as they had appeared in the corresponding 
report of 2001. The third model was that involving Use of Military 
Force, implying either a strategic strike or an incursion beginning 
with a strategic strike and intended to occupy some area or areas of 
Finnish territory.  This was in effect a combination of the Strategic 
Strike and Large-scale Offensive models of the 2001 report, and it was 
noted that events consistent with the model could lead to a large-scale 
offensive. In addition, it was stated in Finnish defence planning that 
preparations should be made to prevent or restrict all attempts to use 
the methods of asymmetrical warfare. Asymmetrical warfare was not 
put forward as a threat model of its own, however, but was treated as a 
feature that could be combined with the other military threat models 
or with precautions taken in all branches of the administration within 
Finnish society.188  
As far as the military threat models were concerned it should be noted 
that the core mission of the Defence Forces continued to be to 
maintain “the capacity to defend their own area against military 
aggression or the threat of this”189; in other words, to provide security 
for the territory of Finland in the face of a military threat. This 
statement of policy may be regarded as indicative of both recognition 
of the possibility of a military threat and political acceptance of the 
threat models put forward. 
                                                 
188 It was written into the report that “the principal asymmetrical threats are regarded as 
being terrorism and sabotage, the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction and 
information warfare.” Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 101. The 
military threat models have also aroused criticism within the Defence Forces. ”The image 
of war that prevails today in Finland, for example, is based to a high degree on experiences 
gained during the Second World War and operational models, equipment and 
organizational structures dating from the Cold War era.” Raitasalo & Sipilä, ”Näkökulma 
sotaan”, p. 8. 
189 Ibid. p.75. 
131
Discussion of the threat models by the working group and the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
The working group and the Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
made no changes to the content of the military threat models as drawn 
up in the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces and confirmed 
in the Guards‟ Cabinet, so that they were written into the report in the 
form in which they had been framed by the defence administration. 
They did discuss the models at length, however, especially on account 
of the low probabilities attached to them, and again the Defence 
Forces exercised a substantial influence on these discussions and on 
the political acceptance achieved by the models. The papers presented 
to the working group by the Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations and 
Chief of Intelligence at the General Headquarters on the necessity for 
the military threat models and the nature of the models themselves 
were regarded by the members of the group as having been highly 
convincing, so that it may be concluded that the Defence Forces, by 
dint of their expertise and the information that they provided, had a 
considerable influence on the working group‟s evaluations of the 
military threats, i.e. the working group believed in the facts presented 
by the Defence Forces. Some of the members of that group were 
nevertheless critical of the manner in which the military threats had 
been framed in the report itself, regarding the models as outdated and 
attributable more to the Second World War and the Cold War era.190 
Certain tensions were introduced into the working group‟s discussions 
by the differences in outlook between those members who wished to 
emphasize the “topical” (i.e. new) threat images and those whose 
evaluations favoured long-term (i.e. military) threat factors. Although 
the working group was well aware of the uniqueness of the Finnish 
estimate of the military threat, which deviated markedly from the 
western frame of reference, and found it necessary to ponder over the 
term “strategic strike”, it did not seriously challenge either the 
existence or the content of the military threat models. In the end the 
group came to the conclusion that one should not put too much trust in 
the generally accepted favourable trend in Finland‟s security 
environment. 
                                                 
190 Some members of the working group were also highly critical of the means put forward 
for countering the threats referred to in the models. One member, for instance, observed 
that “the territorial defence system belongs in the same class as an open-air museum.” 
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The President, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence were in a 
better position to evaluate the military threat models placed before 
them than were the other members of the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy, as the defence administration was in the 
habit of holding a separate information session once or twice a year to 
brief these members of the security policy elite on strategic 
developments in the areas bordering on Finland, the principles on 
which the defence administration was conducting its operative 
planning, other military defence matters and military threat factors and 
the models based on these that were being used in defence planning. 
More emphasis than ever was placed on these contacts and the 
openness with which information was exchanged during Juhani 
Kaskeala‟s term of office as Commander-in-Chief. In addition, the 
Commander-in-Chief held regular meetings with the President and the 
Minister of Defence. It was thus natural that the President, Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence should be the best informed 
members of the Cabinet Committee with regard to Russia‟s military 
capabilities and the backgrounds to the threat models, although the 
other members were also in principle familiar with these matters. In 
this way it may very well be said that political acceptance had already 
been obtained for the military threat models contained in the report, 
especially since the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence 
made it clear in meetings of the committee that they regarded the 
models proposed for inclusion in the report as being appropriate for 
the purpose. This meant, of course, that the other members felt that 
against this background they could scarcely set out to criticize the 
military threat models, which were consequently ratified in the 
Cabinet Committee without any changes. 
One significant fact about the political confirmation of the military 
threat models was that scarcely any attempt was made during the 
preparation process to question the threat evaluations put forward by 
the Defence Forces, i.e. the members of the working group and the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy had the utmost 
confidence in them. The Cabinet Committee members felt that the 
defence administration was best equipped and suitably trained to 
evaluate military threat factors, and thus even in this forum the 
discussions paid less attention to the military threat models and 
concentrated instead on the new perceived threats. Thus the Cabinet 
Committee did not actually doubt the necessity for the military threat 
models nor did it dispute their existence (nor that of the territorial 
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defence system, for instance), but it was of the opinion that the new 
threats would be more likely to demand increased attention in the 
future, including work on defining means of combating them. It was 
also felt in the Cabinet Committee that the published military threat 
models should to some extent be couched in guarded terms, a view 
with which the defence administration concurred. Thus the 
representatives of the Finnish Defence Forces who were interviewed 
for the purposes of this work consistently maintained that the military 
threat models came as close to the truth as they conceivably could 
given the nature of the report as a public and essentially political 
document.        
  
How was retention of the military threat models justified? 
It is true that the chances of any of the threat models put forward in 
the 2004 Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 
being realized were regarded in general (in both the defence 
administration and the working group and Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Defence Policy) as very slight, and both the Minister of 
Defence and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces stated in 
public on numerous occasions that there was no real military threat 
aimed at Finland.191 At the same time the civil servants and politicians 
engaged in preparing the report were well aware that the perceived 
military threats had faded somewhat in the western countries and the 
threat posed by terrorism had increased and understood the 
securitization pressures created by the new threats, which they 
regarded as making the traditional defence policy conclusions set out 
in the document more difficult to accept. Indeed, the defence 
administration, too, had observed that the justifications for its military 
threat models had become less acceptable both to politicians and to 
Finnish society in general, and admitted that the arguments for the 
existence of a defence force contained in this report had to be 
grounded more firmly than previously in duties related to international 
crisis management and the provision of executive assistance to other 
authorities.192 One pertinent question regarding the military threat 
                                                 
191 See, for example, Seppo Kääriäinen, Puhe Reserviläisliiton maanpuolustusjuhlassa, 
24.11.2003; Juhani Kaskeala, Puolustusvoimien toiminta kansainvälisen rauhan ja turvalli-
suuden tukena, 24.11.2004. 
192 Cf. Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, pp. 92, 101–102, 123. 
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models is therefore what facts were felt to constitute the principal 
justifications for the retention of the military threat models at the stage 
of preparing the government report. 
The defence administration was well informed about the positive 
attitude of the major political parties towards the retention of the basic 
outlines of Finland‟s defence policy (e.g. universal male conscription) 
and their views on the possibility of a military threat in the future. On 
the other hand (against this background) it was also felt within the 
defence administration – on account of the need to justify the threat 
models – that the general nature of these models (e.g. the fact that they 
did not name any specific external actor) and their widely recognized 
low intensity made it difficult to justify their inclusion. Thinking 
along the same lines, it was stated by a representative of the Defence 
Forces that “it would have been very much easier to formulate 
perceived military threats in a manner that would have gained the 
acceptance of both politicians and ordinary citizens if there had been a 
clearly defined external factor to point to” and that “a very small 
probability attached to a military threat doesn‟t attract attention.” 
Although the defence administration was agreed that no sources of 
possible military threats should be named in the government report, it 
was nevertheless felt that this facelessness of the threats made them 
more difficult to legitimate.193 The interviews carried out for the 
present work suggest that the members of the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy in particular adopted a responsible 
attitude up to a certain point towards the national defence and the 
seriousness of the military threat models. Although they conceded that 
the risk of a military threat was small, they nevertheless wished to 
support the defence policy solutions put forward in the report as a 
matter of Finland‟s security: “we must always take care of our 
defence,” as one committee member put it. 
The views put forward in the defence administration, the working 
group and the Cabinet Committee regarding the necessity for retaining 
the military threat models and the manner in which the perceived 
                                                 
193 As far as legitimation of the military threat models was concerned, the Defence Forces 
regarded the regional and national defence courses as playing an especially important role, 
as the models were discussed in these in greater detail than in the government report.  On 
the influence of the defence courses, see  Peter Ekholm, Ymmärrystä yli rajojen: Valta-
kunnallisten maanpuolustuskurssien vaikuttavuus, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian 
laitos, julkaisusarja 2, No. 32, Helsinki 2006. 
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threats should be framed may be interpreted as comprising four 
entities which complement and reinforce each other: 
1) The continued existence of a military capability in the area 
adjacent to Finland, a reference to the Russians‟ military capacity and 
the potential threat posed by it. In such circumstances Finland should 
possess sufficient military resources, as “an attempt should be made 
by means of a credible national defence capability to pre-empt the 
development of a security risk focused on the territory of Finland.”194 
It should be possible to respond to military capacity with military 
capacity; in other words, the Defence Forces should be in a position to 
demonstrate a sufficient performance capability to deter the use, or 
threat of use, of armed forces against Finland. This was a matter of a 
“fire insurance” intended to prevent and safeguard against the most 
serious threats to Finnish security that could be envisaged. The decline 
in the probability attached to such a military threat was not regarded 
as altering the basic starting point, the fact that Russia was a 
neighbouring state with which Finland did not have a relationship of 
equality in terms of military capacity. The military capacity remaining 
in the areas adjacent to Finland was estimated to be such that 
realization of the military threats was conceivable at some time in the 
future: “Russia remains the most significant military power in the 
areas bordering on Finland, and although it is going through a critical 
stage of development in military terms, it is still capable of deploying 
conventional forces in the region.”195 Thus Russia’s military capacity 
served as a major justification for the military threat models. This was 
above all a matter of awareness of the possibility of a military threat, 
and the existence of the possibility of military threats was not called 
into question during the preparation of the government report, even 
though widely differing views were expressed regarding the 
probabilities attached to their realization. 
2) Uncertainty about developments in Russia. At the same time as 
those preparing the report were aware of the military capacity existing 
in the area adjacent to Finland, they were also aware of a certain 
anxiety and uncertainty regarding future developments in Russia and 
in the global situation and relations between the superpowers as a 
whole. Although Finland‟s security environment was felt to have 
                                                 
194 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 85. 
195 Ibid. p. 68. 
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become more stable and the probability of the use of military force 
against Finnish territory to have diminished, future developments in 
the security situation were approached with caution. Illustrative of this 
were the comment by one member of the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy that “we cannot know with any certainty 
what our security environment may be like in ten years‟ time” and the 
view expressed by the Prime Minister that “in spite of the favourable 
developments in our immediate environment in the last few years, it is 
important that we should be prepared for military crisis situations of 
various kinds.”196 This may be taken as a reference to possible 
changes in the state of political will lying behind the deployment of 
military force: “Who would remember any longer that only ten years 
ago there were still Russian troops stationed in the Baltic States?”197 
Future uncertainties were also alluded to in order to justify the long-
term development of the Finnish Defence Forces: “Run-down military 
capacity and diminutive armed forces cannot be revived overnight.”198 
3) Finland’s geographical location. Reference was frequently made 
when framing the military threat factors to the geographical proximity 
of Finland to Russia, and to the long common boundary between the 
two states. It was accepted that Finland‟s security evaluations and 
conclusions were inevitably affected by “geographical realities”, and 
that the situation was different for states that “in view of their 
geographical location are able to adopt other defence policy 
solutions.”199 Another geographical aspect, of course, was the 
difference in territorial size between Finland and Russia. 
4) The lessons of history. The members of the Cabinet Committee felt 
that the whole task of constructing the perceived military threats was 
hampered by a certain historical handicap which on the other hand 
                                                 
196 Matti Vanhanen, Puhe turvallisuus- ja puolustuspoliittisen selonteon 
lähetekeskustelussa, 28.9.2004.  
197 Juhani Kaskeala, Suomella ei ole tarvetta muuttaa omintakeista 
puolustusjärjestelmäänsä, 8.3.2004. 
198 Seppo Kääriäinen, Puhe 169. maanpuolustuskurssin avajaisissa, 10.11.2003. 
199 Cf. Tarja Halonen, who observed in public that ”We have a fairly large territory to 
defend, and we are in a geographical situation that means we can choose the Swedish 
option of leaving defence to our neighbours.” Helsingin Sanomat 28.4.2004; see also the 
view of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, “We should not set out to make 
changes just because other people are doing so.” Kaskeala, Suomella ei ole tarvetta 
muuttaa omintakeista puolustusjärjestelmäänsä.. 
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was regarded as a necessary component when evaluating both the 
possibility of a military threat and the uncertainty regarding future 
developments. “Finland has faced challenges of many kinds during its 
history, and a readiness to defend itself has proved decisive at 
moments of crisis.”200 History was seen as reminding the Finns that 
they had had to rely on military force previously to ensure their 
freedom of action as an independent state, and the continued presence 
of war veterans in Finnish society was seen constructing a mood of 
acceptance of the existence of a military threat and a feeling that the 
country might be subjected to such a threat in the future. In the course 
of the interviews the military threat models were often accentuated by 
placing them within a historical framework.  
 
Parliamentary approval of the perceived threats  
The Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy was 
subjected to a very thorough discussion in Parliament, which was 
informed of its arrival on 24.9.2004 and held its preliminary debate on 
the subject (before the committee stage), which attracted no less than 
206 speeches, on 28.9.2004. Particularly vehement opinions were put 
forward regarding the parliamentary committee in which it should be 
discussed, the Defence Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
and it was emphasized in many speeches that this was a question of 
who should determine the basic parliamentary outlines of Finland‟s 
future security and defence policy. Those in favour of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee stressed the relationship between ends and means, 
concluding that it was the task of that committee to define 
Parliament‟s line of argument on security policy, on the basis of which 
its defence policy could be developed.201 It was nevertheless decided 
after a vote on the matter to uphold the view of the speaker‟s council 
and ask the Defence Committee to prepare the actual parliamentary 
evaluation of the report, while the Foreign Affairs, Treasury and 
Administrative Committees could submit statements of their own.202 
                                                 
200 Matti Vanhanen, Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan ajankohtaiset haasteet, 4.1.2003. 
201 See, for example, Liisa Jaakonsaari Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelussa 28.9.2004, PTK 
97/2004 vp; Heidi Hautala Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelussa 29.9.2004, PTK 98/2004 vp. 
202 The comprehensiveness of the committee stage is reflected well in the work done by the 
Defence Committee alone, which held 31 meetings on this topic, questioned 141 expert 
advisors and even made journeys abroad to examine certain issues first-hand. It is 
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Many of the speakers in the preliminary hearing predicted that the 
Defence Committee would be more inclined to support the defence 
policy outlines contained in the report than would the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. All in all, the hearing gave the impression of a state of 
competition between the two committees which reflected the 
dichotomy between the military and non-military concepts of security. 
At least it may be said that the content of the document approved by 
Parliament as an evaluation of the Government Report on Finnish 
Security and Defence Policy was influenced to a considerable degree 
by the choice of committee to draw up that document. As far as the 
broadening of the concept of security was concerned, one issue that 
arose out of the preliminary hearing was the suggestion that 
Parliament should have a separate Security Committee. 
Before the approval of the Defence Committee‟s evaluation and the 
five statements appended to it on 21.12.2004 (after which these 
documents were sent to the Council of State for appropriate action to 
be taken), a feedback discussion was held in a plenary session of 
Parliament at which a further 162 speeches were made. Given that the 
part played by Parliament in the production of the Government Report 
also included the work of the Monitoring Group during its 
preparation, it may be said to have discussed the report extensively. 
The manner in which the report had been prepared was generally 
praised in Parliament, and it was noted that the Monitoring Group had 
formed a useful parliamentary bridge at the preparation stage, and one 
in which the voice of the opposition parties could be heard as well. It 
was also noted in the feedback discussion that the suggestions made 
by the Monitoring Group had been taken into account to a creditable 
extent in the eventual report. Thus the final statement on the 
Government Report as approval by Parliament included the provision 
that the same preparation procedure should be adopted in the case of 
the 2008 report.203 There was not a single speech in Parliament in 
which a return to the procedure involving parliamentary defence 
committees was advocated; on the contrary, it was agreed that the 
government report procedure as it stood had proved to be a suitable 
                                                                                                         
significant as far as the use of expert advisors was concerned that the majority of these 
were on the staff of the Defence Forces or interest groups with links to the national 
defence. The committee‟s procedure thus involved consultations with a large number of 
experts, the information provided by whom will have greatly influence the content of their 
evaluation. 
203 Eduskunnan kirjelmä 21.12.2004, EK 35/2004 vp. 
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means of evaluating Finland‟s security environment, security and 
defence policies and defence budget at regular intervals. The report 
was criticized for its excessive breadth, its descriptive use of language 
and its “all-embracing nature”, and particularly lively discussions took 
place in Parliament (in connection with the perceived threats) over the 
assignment of budgetary funds to the various branches of security and 
the determination of priorities between these branches. 
The discussion of the Government Report in Parliament may be seen 
to have been inspired by a broad understanding of the threats 
involved, in which the representatives’ various opinions and world-
views were eventually reconciled to create a relatively unanimous 
basis for action. Given the frank and open atmosphere that prevailed 
in Parliament, this security policy consensus may be said to have been 
achieved precisely through critical discussion, and the parliamentary 
discussions and committee work clearly formed a major public arena 
in which to construct a truly Finnish (national) line of thought on 
perceived threats, thereby demolishing the hegemony of the security 
policy elite that had been criticized earlier. The openness of the 
discussion was much praised In Parliament: “Now everybody can join 
in the discussion, even those who do not think on the same lines as our 
foreign policy leaders.”204 It was noted that the handling of the process 
of approving the Government Report in Parliament had given rise to 
“an unprecedentedly lively bout of public discussion,”205 and that the 
threat images for which the Council of State had sought parliamentary 
approval had been subjected to a broad-based critical evaluation. This 
also meant, however, that other motives such as regional policy or 
party-political ones could easily have become associated with these 
images.206 Nevertheless, the active debate that took place over the 
perceived threats can be seen to have created a good foundation for 
the preparing of the next such report, enabling a consensus to be 
achieved within the political decision-making system and increasing 
confidence in the nature of jointly defined threat images. 
                                                 
204 Outi Ojala Eduskunnan palautekeskustelussa 20.12.2004, PTK 143/2004 vp. 
205 Suvi-Anne Siimes Eduskunnan palautekeskustelussa 20.12.2004, PTK 143/2004 vp. 
206 See, for example, Mia-Petra Kumpula Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelussa 28.9.2004, PTK 
97/2004 vp; Markus Mustajärvi Eduskunnan palautekeskustelussa 20.12.2004, PTK 
143/2004 vp. 
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Four general remarks need to be made concerning the parliamentary 
handling of the Government Report. 1) Although one can see that the 
report (and the expectations associated with it in advance) provided a 
wealth of material for extensive, profound discussions on the nature of 
security and perceived threats, the actual parliamentary discussion 
remained relatively meagre in this respect, especially where the 
evaluations of the security environment and critical examinations of 
the threat images presented in the report were concerned.207 2) The 
discussions in Parliament were dominated by the anti-personnel mines 
issue, the line adopted in the report with regard to NATO and the 
concept of military non-alignment. Also, the discussions on matters of 
defence policy frequently became centred around regional policy 
considerations. 3) The extensive parliamentary handling of the report 
tended to promote the politicization of security and the perceived 
threats. The remark made by the Prime Minister when placing the 
report before Parliament that “security and defence policy in Finland 
are political matters”208 was referred to in many of the subsequent 
contributions to the discussion and was interpreted as increasing the 
politicization of security, and this in turn led other contributors to 
speak of the growing political nature of security and of the need to 
recognize that the defining of security and perceived threats is a part 
of politics just as other political actions are.209 This may be 
understood as suggesting that the political room for manoeuvre in the 
defining of perceived threats had broadened, so that these threats 
could be more freely interpreted in different ways. Members of 
parliament occupied a political vantage point when it came to 
observing the politicization of security and perceived threats, but at 
the same time they were themselves promoting this trend. 4) The 
discussions of the report in Parliament may be seen to have enlivened 
the already fairly high profile of the largest opposition party at that 
time, the conservative Coalition Party, in matters of security and 
defence policy. 
 
                                                 
207 The members of the working group were in fact slightly disappointed with the 
discussion of the report in Parliament.  
208 Matti Vanhanen Eduskunnan lähetekeskustelussa 28.9.2004, PTK 97/2004 vp. 
209 See, for example, Liisa Jaakonsaari, Suvi-Anne Siimes and Lauri Oinonen Eduskunnan 
lähetekeskustelussa 28.9.2004, PTK 97/2004 vp. 
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Conclusions 
The consensus principle, guarded language and frank discussion 
The descriptions of the “new” perceived threats included in the 2004 
Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy that had 
been defined in accordance with the broad-based concept of security 
were produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to some extent 
by the Ministry of the Interior, while the military threat models were 
provided by the defence administration. In all cases the final framing 
and political approval was the responsibility of the working group and 
the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The 
evaluation document issued by Parliament after its extensive 
discussion of the report was drawn up by the Parliamentary Defence 
Committee. In view of the above, it is understandable that the threat 
descriptions contained in the government report itself and in the 
parliamentary evaluation should be couched in guarded terms on 
account of their highly political nature and the seriousness of their 
content. 
The construction of the perceived threats for the report was guided by 
a desire to achieve a consensus, a politically achieved state of 
unanimity. Both the working group and the Cabinet Committee, and 
indeed also the Monitoring Group, regarded it as highly important that 
unanimity should be achieved on the elements of security and defence 
policy that were put forward, and also on the threat descriptions, and 
this consensus arrived at in the course of preparing the report   was 
praised after the event.210 There was similarly a conscious desire to 
express the perceived threats in a neutral, generalized manner, which 
would facilitate the reaching of a political understanding over them 
and, given that they served as clues to the direction of Finnish foreign 
policy, would obviate any needless damage to foreign relations. Thus 
the military threat models may be seen as a kind of compromise 
between a public declaration and a covert agenda: there was a genuine 
desire to bring them to the fore in the report, but only as generalized 
models that were not targeted at any specific actors. It is highly 
improbable, in fact, that any true concealed agenda of perceived 
                                                 
210 See Erkki Tuomioja, Seppo Kääriäinen, ”Konsensusta kannattaa tavoitella”, Helsingin 
Sanomat 10.10.2007. 
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threats that departed markedly in content from that published in the 
report ever existed. 
The consensus principle was a cultural factor that undoubtedly 
influenced the process of constructing the threat perceptions, a 
tradition, as it were, that governed the formulation of security and 
defence policies. The threat images for the report were constructed in 
such a way that it would be as easy as possible for all the political 
parties and actors involved to approve them, and therefore they may 
be described as essentially functional, and also innocuous. The desire 
to achieve a broad political consensus may be regarded as having 
influenced the development of a generalized and comprehensive 
framing technique, just as it may also be thought to have introduced a 
certain permanence and acceptability into the military threat models in 
particular. On the other hand, the drive for a consensus meant that the 
report as a whole adopted a more declarative perspective that was 
adapted to the realities of the security environment rather than 
providing a clear description of the (purposeful) will of the Finnish 
people with regard to security policy. The threat perceptions set out in 
the report should be looked on as compromises, matters agreed on 
politically through processes of preparation and discussion. The 
composition of the government of the time cannot be taken as having 
exercised any substantial influence on the threat images constructed 
for the report, even though the close participation of certain actors 
such as the Foreign Minister did affect the ways in which the new 
threats were framed. It can nevertheless be assumed that differently 
constituted governments will inevitably introduce different emphases 
into the content of the threat descriptions in their reports. 
The parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group may be said to 
have assisted greatly in the forming of a consensus, as one of the 
purposes of the group was to ensure that the views of all the parties 
represented in Parliament regarding the content of the country‟s 
security and defence policies came to the attention of those 
responsible for preparing the report and in this way to expedite the 
unanimous approval of the report when it came to be discussed in 
Parliament. It is surprising, therefore, that the parliamentary 
discussion of the perceived threats was fairly critical in its tone, a fact 
which must be taken as an indication of the atmosphere of frankness 
that prevailed in the discussion and the demand for proper 
justifications for the perceived threats. Although it is possible to 
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conclude from the parliamentary discussion that it had become more 
difficult to achieve a consensus among the Finns regarding their threat 
perceptions at the same time as the open politicization of the threat 
images had increased, it should be noted that the discrepancies 
between the views of the major parties on the threats largely 
concerned differences in emphasis, primarily between the new threats 
and the military threats. At any rate, in spite of the contrasting views 
put forward in Parliament and the lively discussions held there, the 
general impression remains of a powerful desire to achieve a broader 
national unanimity in matters of security policy. The expression of 
critical views and differing opinions in Parliament was not seen as 
detracting from the consensus principle but rather as strengthening it. 
The parliamentary approval gained by the report and the associated 
broad-based, frank political discussion may be regarded as a good 
thing as far as Finnish threat perception policy is concerned. 
 
The power of experts and the belief in authorities 
The construction of the threat images for the report may be viewed as 
a field of activity in which political power came face to face with the 
power of the civil service. The structure of the preparation process 
(particularly the role and composition of the working group) provided 
the civil servants with an excellent starting point for influencing the 
perceived threats to be put forward, while the principal political actors 
involved in the process were the President of Finland, the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence, which 
meant in practice that although the administration exercised a 
considerable influence in this respect, all the most significant 
decisions were taken under guidance from the security policy elite and 
the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. In the last 
resort it fell to the Cabinet Committee to determine how the threat 
images were to be presented in the final text of the report and what 
degrees of emphasis should be placed on the individual images. Thus 
the perceived threats for the report were the product of preparatory 
work by the civil servants combined with political approval.  
The influence of civil servants and experts was greatest in the case of 
the military threat models. These models were produced by the 
defence administration and the arguments behind them relied very 
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firmly on experts from that quarter who were summoned before the 
Cabinet Committee, the working group and the Parliamentary Defence 
Committee. Thus the construction of the military threat models may 
be said to have been guided by a certain belief in the authority of the 
defence administration, above all the Defence Forces. On the other 
hand, many of the political actors, including some of the members of 
the Cabinet Committee, felt that they were insufficiently well 
equipped to question the content of the threat models set before them, 
or else were not desirous of doing so. Thus the military threat models 
were not really questioned at all in the course of preparing the report, 
although they were in Parliament, especially by members of the Green 
and Left-wing parties. Political influence came into play to a greater 
extent in the case of the non-military threats, however, and the 
President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were especially active 
in laying emphasis on a broad-based concept of security and in 
guiding the construction of threat images for part I of the report. The 
new threats were also looked on by many as being politically “easier” 
to examine and discuss, an impression that was compounded by the 
complexity of the operational environments involved and the 
concentration of means of combating the threats. Far more non-
military threat descriptions were produced by the civil servants at the 
preparation stage than were actually included in the report, and the 
choice of those to be put forward for securitization was clearly a 
matter for political deliberation. Apart from this delimitation problem, 
however, these threat images could not be said to have been 
questioned politically in the course of the preparation work. All in all, 
the government report may be regarded as have been to a significant 
extent an administratively constructed document. 
 
Changes in the perceived threats 
The construction of perceived threats for the 2004 Government Report 
on Finnish Security and Defence Policy was not so much a matter of 
actual securitization (the definition of entirely new threat images) as 
of adjusting the content descriptions and intensities of threat images 
put forward previously in the corresponding report of 2001. 
Developments in the international security environment, globalization 
and increased interdependence between states in matters of security 
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were felt in general to have accelerated the increase in the impact of 
non-military threats on the security of Finland and the Finnish people; 
i.e. the intensity of the new threats was framed in the 2004 report as 
having grown while that of the military threats models had declined. 
This was a question of laying emphasis on the indivisibility and 
broad-based nature of the concept of security. Terrorism, the spread 
and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and 
threats to environmental and cyber security were those described in 
the report as having increased in intensity most of all. Of these, the 
perceived threats to environmental security and those arising from 
organized crime were closely associated with Russia (the latter 
connection not having been made in the 2001 government report), 
while the others belonged for the most part to the global security 
environment, although epidemics and threats to nuclear security, 
shipping and border security were also attributed more clearly to 
Russia than elsewhere. Similarly, emphasis was laid on the enhanced 
connection between internal and external security and the 
diversification of means of combating threats. A more significant role 
was constructed for internal security than in previous reports.  
The 2004 report depicted a closer link between Finland‟s perceived 
threats and those defined for the European Union than on previous 
occasions and emphasized the country‟s growing obligations as an EU 
member to accept responsibility for international security and control 
over globalization. It also provided quite comprehensive descriptions 
of the factors lying behind the global threats, such as poverty and 
clashes of cultures. At the same time, more emphasis than in the 2001 
report was placed on the significance of overseas development policy 
as one aspect of security policy. Especially noticeable was the 
significant prioritization of terrorism among the perceived threats,211 
although not so much as a threat to Finland as to the western countries 
in general. The events of September 11th 2001 and the terrorist attacks 
in Madrid had served to underline the significance of the threat posed 
by terrorism, and many other threats (such as those associated with 
weapons of mass destruction and disintegrating states) were linked to 
terrorism in the report, as was common amongst other western actors. 
                                                 
211 Illustrative of this was the fact that where the word for terrorism (in its various 
grammatical forms) occurred only 13 times in the 2001 report, it appeared 177 times in the 
2004 version.   
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The major alteration to the military threat models concerned the 
omission of the model of a large-scale invasion of Finnish territory 
contained in the 2001 report and its re-framing as part of a new model 
entailing the use of military force, along with the threat of a strategic 
strike, which had similarly been a separate model in earlier times. This 
did not mark any change in the principles of defence planning but was 
merely a means of gaining political approval for the threat models by 
means of shaping their content in a new, up-to-date way. Another new 
feature of the military threat descriptions was the mention of means of 
combating asymmetrical warfare, whereas the regional crisis and 
political, economic and/or military pressure models remained 
unchanged. 
It was characteristic of the formulation of the threat perceptions, both 
military and non-military, that they were “superimposed on” those 
contained in the 2001 report, with or without alterations in their 
presentation. In other words, those perceived threats that had already 
been securitized in the previous report had a certain built-in value and 
seal of approval, so that deletion of one or more previously perceived 
threats or securitization of an entirely new perceived threat in the 
course of the preparation process proved considerably more difficult 
than the re-formulation of existing ones.  
 
Disputable threat perceptions 
The disputes over threat perceptions in connection with the 2004 
Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy can be 
regarded as having arisen for three reasons: 
a) Problems with defining the concept of broad-based security 
A substantial problem affecting the definition of threats for the report 
concerned the fact that although the concept of broad-base security 
was well established in political parlance, it had never been properly 
defined, leading to difficulties in defining and delimiting the related 
concepts of broad-based and “new” perceived threats. Given that the 
question of what threat perceptions should be taken into account in the 
security and defence policy report, and to what extent, was constantly 
to the fore in the process of producing the report, it is clear that the 
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disputes over these perceptions were frequently connected with the 
problem of delimitation and the failure to define the concepts rather 
than the threats themselves or their content. It should be noted that the 
accepted target of securitization laid down for the government report, 
“the country‟s independence and basic democratic values and the 
security and welfare of its citizens”,212 made it possible to set out to 
examine threats at the level of the individual citizen, which may be 
seen as implying an extension of the conventional concept of security 
but accepting personal welfare as a part of national security policy. 
This means that the definition of security must encompass everything 
from the use of military force to environmental disasters and the 
alienation of individuals from society. 
Thus the failure to set out from proper definitions of broad-based 
security and the “new threats” made it possible to bring a wide 
variety of interests and objetives to bear on the perceived threats that 
were to be presented in the report. This led to conflicts at the 
administrative level (between the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Ministry of Defence) over the content of the threat 
perceptions, and more particularly over the relative priorities to be 
assigned to them and the budgetary requirements associated with 
controlling or combating them. The failure to define the necessary 
concepts meant that the non-military threat perceptions in general 
became politicized still further, partly on account of the weaker 
cultural continuity attached to them (by comparison with the 
militarized threat models) and partly because resistance to the threats 
was possible through routine channels, without resorting to emergency 
measures of the kind envisaged in terms of security theory. The 
indeterminacy of the concepts left them open to broad-scale political 
exploitation; i.e. they could be defined and interpreted as demanded 
by political expediency. It was true, of course, that it was very much 
easier, and politically more apposite, for political actors to understand 
and discuss the new threats than the military threat models, which 
called for a great deal more specialized knowledge. And so it was that 
broad-based security and the new threats, even if only as concepts, 
were objects of lively discussion throughout the process of 
constructing the government report. 
                                                 
212 Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2004, p. 77. 
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b) The dichotomous nature of the report and its problematical status 
as a security document  
The dual nature of the report, the illogical relationship between its two 
parts, devoted respectively to security and defence, surrounded the 
threat perceptions in an air of controversy in spite of the powerful 
general principle of political consensus that lay behind them. The 
internal structure of the report – the description of the security 
environment prepared primarily by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the defence policy section provided by the Ministry of Defence – 
did not bind together to form a logical entity. In other words, it was 
difficult to construct a logical connection between the predominantly 
global, non-military description of the security environment set out in 
part I and the defence policy outlines and means of control as set out 
in part II. This meant that the overall picture created by the report was 
a dichotomous one: on the one hand the government was prepared to 
approve and commit itself to perceived threats to broad-based security 
but the instruments for combating these were not brought forward in 
its report (no measures were recommended for responding to the new 
threats), while on the other hand, the defence policy section 
concentrated almost exclusively on military threat models and 
development of the defence administration to respond to them even 
though attempts were being made at the same time to strengthen the 
Defence Forces‟ capabilities for combating non-military threats (such 
as terrorism). The internal inconsistency in the report should not be 
attributed to a weakness in its preparation but rather to the structure 
created for carrying out the preparation work, which inevitably led to 
such an outcome. 
This existence of “two reports in one volume” led to much 
unnecessary criticism of the threat perceptions and consideration of 
these in opposition to each other during the preparation process, even 
though it was primarily a matter of differences in the means for 
controlling and combating the various threats. The distorted structure 
of the report clearly led to a state of competition between the threat 
perceptions associated with internal, national and constitutional 
security on the one hand and those associated with international 
security on the other, as reflected in the difficulty of reconciling these 
threat perceptions with each other.  The protracted discussion over 
which parliamentary committee should draft the evaluation document 
was a direct consequence of the dual nature of the report itself and its 
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power to steer the parliamentary discussion away from the real 
substance of the report.   
It may indeed be claimed that the procedure of producing government 
security and defence policy reports to parliament is problematical 
from the point of view of constructing threat perceptions. Certainly 
the procedure in itself led to the emergence of differences of opinion 
between branches of the administration with regard to perceived 
threats and the assignment of responsibility for security issues. 
Although a multidimensional coincidence of security interests 
prevailed between the government report discussed here, the SFVS 
strategy and the Internal Security Programme, the report‟s status as 
the principal Finnish security document and the only one to be binding 
on the instance responsible for allocating budgetary funds for security 
matters, the defence administration, meant that all interests were 
focused in its direction. Since the political guidance received was 
exerting pressure towards increasing the emphasis on broad-based 
security and non-military threat perceptions in the report, it was 
natural for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and still more so for the 
Ministry of the Interior, to attempt to append “their own views of 
security and perceived threats” to the report in order to ensure that 
these would be taken into account when allocating funds for 
combating or controlling such threats. This led, of course, to disputes 
between those ministries and the defence administration over the 
relative weights to be attached to particular threat images, which 
served to accentuate further the internal illogicality of the report, 
allowing such matters as the allocation of resources and the balance of 
power between branches of the administration to affect the 
construction of the threat perceptions. Thus the choice of a 
government report to parliament as the procedure for setting out the 
nation‟s security and defence policy – at a time when increased 
emphasis was being placed on broad-based security and comp-
rehensive solutions for coping with the related perceived threats  - 
may be regarded as having promoted the formation of distinct 
approaches to security in the various branches of the administration 
rather than coordination between them. Since, in addition, it had 
proved impossible in the report to provide clear definitions of broad-
based security and the new threats (as far as the presentation of threat 
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perceptions was concerned),213 we may be justified in claiming that 
the whole procedure (of government reports to parliament) is outdated 
and even contrary to the spirit of the times, i.e. the political phi-
losophy of security. It would be important with reference to the future 
to ask what purpose these government reports on security and defence 
policy are intended to serve and what kinds of perceived threats they 
should concentrate on; or better still, how the various Finnish security 
documents could be successfully combined to yield an overall 
philosophy of national security. 
c) Coping with the new threats: the “problem” of Russia 
Both the administrative and the political threat perception discourse 
during the period when the government report was in preparation was 
dominated by the new, non-military threats, as these were felt to be 
more immediate and the military threats to be more remote, a way of 
thinking that was confirmed to a substantial degree by the western 
understanding of threats. Although some of the perceived non-military 
threats were associated with neighbouring areas, i.e. Russia, the 
emphasis among the new threats was more clearly than ever before on 
joint international responsibility and Finland‟s role in this. The need 
for intensifying Finnish participation in joint action (through western 
alliances and especially the EU) was justified not so much on military 
threat model grounds as in the context of the new threats. In other 
words, the references to the new threats and broad-based security 
were built up into a device for pointing to a new and rapidly 
strengthening desire for international cooperation. At the same time 
the report gave a clearer impression, although admittedly left 
somewhat indeterminate by the wording, of a direct connection 
between international security, together with the new threats, and 
Finland‟s national security. Finland wished to be involved in 
combating the new threats primarily for reasons of national security, 
in which international, and especially western, cooperation (but not 
military integration) was presented as the correct way of acting. Thus 
                                                 
213 Chapters 6 and 7 of the report, on the development of internal security and the 
safeguarding of functions of vital importance to society, respectively, may be regarded as 
manifestations of the failure to define boundaries between threat perceptions and of a 
”territorial struggle” between branches of the administration. One may well ask why these 
chapters were included in the report in the first place.   
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the object of securitization, even in the case of the new threats, can be 
seen to be the Finnish nation and its society. 
The emphasis on the new threats nevertheless posed a challenge to the 
primacy of the state-centred concept of security. As the descriptions of 
the new threats reflected their complex nature that spanned the borders 
of nation-states, they constituted a proposal that both global security 
and the security of the individual should be taken into account more 
positively in Finland‟s thinking on security matters. The concept of 
national security thus became something far more complex, as threats 
existing at the international, national and individual levels became 
mixed up together until it became difficult to tell them apart. At the 
same time, emphasis was being placed on non-military measures for 
combating the new threats as they became more urgent. Also, the 
emphasis placed on the new threats in the course of producing the 
government report can be regarded as having brought the whole 
matter of security closer to everyday life; it was no longer necessarily 
connected with war or military threat models but with factors arising 
from various sectors that constituted threats to the individual and/or to 
the broader international community. 
Military threats occupied a strong position in spite of the emphasis on 
the new threats, as they could not be ousted by non-military threats as 
factors actually threatening the existence of the Finnish state. 
Awareness of the possibility of a military threat combined with 
awareness of Finland‟s geopolitical location and the military 
“otherness” of Russia remained the principal point of departure for the 
construction of the threat models and the gaining of political 
acceptance for them. The western pressures for the attenuation of 
military threat perceptions and the general feeling of a very low 
probability attached to military threats persuaded politicians and many 
civil servants outside the defence administration to question the 
necessity of the military threat models to some extent, and especially 
the financial and defence policy decisions related to combating these 
threats. Thus it may be said that the political, and especially par-
liamentary, legitimacy of the military threat models was by no means 
indisputable. 
The weakness of the military threat models presented in the report 
may be said to lie in the lack of justification for them, which may be 
attributed to the difficulty of talking about Russia. There was a desire 
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to be very cautious in these evaluations of Russia that were to be made 
public, even though it was that country that was the obvious source of 
the perceived military threat. The low intensity of that military threat 
did indeed arouse increasing demands in Parliament for formal 
justifications; the “fire insurance” theory or the value of a defence 
capability as a military deterrent was not enough of a justification in 
the eyes of some members. The military threat models were 
nevertheless not seriously challenged at any stage in the process of 
preparing the report, as the “logic of preparing for the worst” that they 
represented was held to be acceptable for national reasons. It should 
also be noted with regard to the military threat models that military 
security was kept strictly apart from non-military security throughout 
the process of preparing and discussing the report, even though this 
made it more difficult to link threat perceptions together or find a 
balance between the old and new threats. The ultimate fact was, 
however, that the military threat models had a powerful element of 
national culture associated with them, the fear of Russia. 
 
4. The Government Report at the Heart of Finnish Threat 
Perception Policy  
The Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy may 
be likened to the political window of opportunity in Kingdon‟s 
agenda-setting theory. The government report procedure that became 
established in the post-Cold War period for defining Finnish security 
and defence policy has been such that each government has produced 
one report during its term of office, so that these have appeared 
approximately once every four years. This has meant in practise that 
the Finnish security policy window has been opened at regular 
intervals to allow broader discussion of potential threats and an 
updating of the threat perceptions. As a result, great store has been 
laid by the report as a national security document and considerable 
political pressure has been exerted on the process of producing it. The 
perceived threats to Finnish security are traced out anew in each 
report, which allows them to be re-evaluated and re-securitized. The 
opening of this threat window, away from the public eye during the 
preparation process and in public during the parliamentary discussion 
of the report, provides actors with an opportunity to influence the 
content and framing of the threat descriptions. At the same time, of 
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approximately once every four years. This has meant in practise that 
the Finnish security policy window has been opened at regular 
intervals to allow broader discussion of potential threats and an 
updating of the threat perceptions. As a result, great store has been 
laid by the report as a national security document and considerable 
political pressure has been exerted on the process of producing it. The 
perceived threats to Finnish security are traced out anew in each 
report, which allows them to be re-evaluated and re-securitized. The 
opening of this threat window, away from the public eye during the 
preparation process and in public during the parliamentary discussion 
of the report, provides actors with an opportunity to influence the 
content and framing of the threat descriptions. At the same time, of 
course, this report procedure forces the government to open its 
security policy threat perceptions to scrutiny and to reconstruct them 
politically at regular intervals, at which points they are also open to 
public evaluation and comment. One favourable aspect of this may be 
regarded as being the attempt to achieve a broad political consensus 
on each occasion, regarding both the threat perceptions themselves 
and the general outlines of security and defence policy. 
An attempt is made via these reports to construct a unanimous 
understanding of the threats facing Finland and to answer the question 
posed at the beginning of this study, “What are the threats that face 
Finland?” Although this consensus tradition in matters of security 
policy was emphatically present during the construction of the 2004 
government report, the improbability attached to the military threats, 
the stress laid on non-military threats and the concept of broad-based 
security and the more frank political atmosphere that surrounded the 
discussion of the threats made it difficult to achieve the same kind of 
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consensus as at the beginning of the new millennium. This change was 
manifested in a need to securitize different things and an increase in 
the politically irreconcilable nature common to many of the perceived 
threats. In particular it was the broadening of the concept of security 
that led to a questioning of both of the premises governing Finnish 
threat perception policy: what things should be defined as security 
policy threats and how those threats should be framed. The 
questionability of these premises emerged very clearly both at the 
stage of preparing the 2004 government report and during its 
discussion in Parliament.  
The fact that the security policy window is opened relatively rarely 
through the medium of a government report has led to a situation in 
which it is politically difficult to make any substantial changes to the 
definitions of the perceived threats or the means of managing these. 
As the threat perceptions are constructed at four-year intervals, it may 
be that any significant change to them would seem politically too 
radical, especially bearing in mind the tradition of continuity and 
caution that exists within the Finnish practise of formally constructing 
threat perceptions. Any notable change in a perceived threat relative to 
the previous government report would imply a highly significant 
alteration in the security environment, a “dramatic event” in the terms 
of agenda setting theory. Thus the government report procedure in 
itself may be said to strengthen the continuity of threat images, so that 
once a threat image has been securitized in a government report it 
becomes difficult to remove. The government reports on security and 
defence policy have indeed been characterized by continuity rather 
than change, the perceived threats detailed in them and the means 
suggested for managing these being framed by honouring the 
permanence of those in previous reports or setting out to develop 
them. Thus the government report procedure may be thought of as 
limiting or even preventing any renewal of the set of Finnish 
perceived threats. 
Where the implication In the security policy agendas drawn up in the 
Cold War era, e.g. the reports of the parliamentary defence com-
mittees, was that the security environment should be controlled almost 
entirely through military action, it is evident from the descriptions of 
security environments provided in the government reports that this is 
no longer possible in the 21st century. The changes in the perceived 
threats mentioned on security policy agendas between the 1970s and 
155
the early years of this new century point to a pronounced secu-
ritization of non-military threat perceptions, particularly around the 
mid-1990s, although some increase in the use of an extended concept 
of security was in evidence even in the 1980s. From the 1995 
government security policy report onwards there has been political 
pressure for the grounding of Finnish security policy in a broad, 
comprehensive concept of security, and a substantial number of new 
threat perceptions were securitized in the reports of 1995 and 1997, 
marking the real transition to broad-based security. The non-military 
threat perceptions in the reports produced in the early years of the new 
century then mark a continuation of the trend that began in the 1990s 
and of the general development in securitization that was made 
possible by the introduction of the government report procedure. The 
turn of the century was simply marked by an extension of both the 
notion of security and the list of perceived threats. The continuity of 
the military threat models, on the other hand, is derived directly from 
the Cold War period. The military threat perceptions have always 
been typically permanent and institutionalized, so that it is very 
difficult to remove them from any security policy agenda. 
The government reports also reflect permanence through the security 
perspective to which they give expression. Their establishment as a 
regular procedure and the considerable political weight attached to the 
construction of security in this manner have meant the emergence of a 
custom for the formulation of perceived threats from a certain 
perspective, a situation that has been justifiably criticized in 
Parliament. One tradition that has survived from the Cold War era is 
that of concentrating only on means of counteracting perceived threats 
that belong to the scope of military security (as criticized in 
connection with the parliamentary discussion of every government 
report), even though the descriptions of the security environment have 
been altered considerably to place more emphasis on non-military 
threat perceptions. Especially where the “new threats” are concerned, 
the present-day government reports do not achieve a balance between 
their description of the security environment and the measures 
recommended on the basis of this. The government reports of the early 
years of the new millennium convey the impression of changes in the 
security environment and the perceived threats but not in the means 
for responding to the threats. 
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As far as the description of the security environment presented in part 
I of the 2004 Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence 
Policy is concerned, it would have been more natural to include the 
SFVS strategy as part II, as this attempts to allow for preparations to 
be made to face broader-based threat factors than were envisaged in 
the military threat perceptions by means of cooperation between 
branches of the administration and strict control over the division of 
responsibilities. Conclusions reached on the basis of the description of 
the security environment provided in the government report go a long 
way towards conforming with the SFVS strategy as far as the control 
measures are concerned, whereas the defence policy section of the 
report itself does not. Also, the influence of the report in guiding 
further developments is unevenly distributed between the branches of 
the administration concerned, whereas it is clear that, on account of 
the adoption of a broad-based concept of security and the powerful 
political pressure applied in that direction, the report, or preferably a 
more comprehensive security strategy than that allowed for in the 
report, should be directed more evenly than at present at developing 
all the branches of the administration that have functions lying within 
the field of security. On the other hand, if a desire were to exist in the 
future to concentrate in a security and defence policy report on 
defining means of combating and controlling perceived threats 
exclusively in the field of defence policy, the description of the 
security environment contained in that report should be geared more 
towards serving the needs of defence policy evaluations and object-
tives. The views put forward above, together with the justifiable need 
to update the description of the security environment more frequently 
than at present, force us to consider the overall functionality of the 
security and defence policy report procedure in its current form.  
It can be concluded from the above that the threat perceptions and 
measures for controlling or combating the threats themselves provide 
an illogical impression of Finland’s security policy . This illogicality 
results to a considerable degree from the established procedure for 
drawing up the government report, in which the part devoted to 
security policy is prepared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
part concerned with defence policy in the defence administration. 
Each branch of the government administration examines the security 
considerations, threat perceptions and proposals for combating the 
threats from its own perspective, and experience has shown that these 
perspectives (associated with perceived non-military foreign policy 
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threat scenarios, military defence policy threat scenarios and internal 
security scenarios) are difficult to reconcile. It should also be noted 
that although each government report to date has been drawn up in a 
different way (since determination of the way in which the report is to 
be drawn up is part of thef political power struggle), the outcome has 
always suffered from this inconsistency. On the other hand, it is 
possible to regard the different approaches to the threat perceptions 
adopted by the various branches of the administration as a positive 
feature, since the different dimensions of security are manifestations 
of one and the same “security generation process”. In this case the 
crucial question is whether efforts to control or combat the perceived 
threats can be coordinated in such a way as to correspond to comp-
rehensively presented threat perceptions. 
The non-military threat perceptions, which add both breadth and depth 
to the state-centred military and political understanding of security, 
pose a challenge for the current procedure for constructing these 
government reports, a procedure which was found in the early years of 
the new millennium to be no longer capable of responding to the 
politically weighted challenges of overall security. Many of the new 
threats to security are such that they cannot be controlled by 
traditional military means, and the effect of a government report in 
guiding future policies has begun to be concentrated to an increasing 
extent on branches of the administration other than defence, 
principally foreign and internal affairs. Since, in spite of changes in 
the descriptions of the security environment, the government reports 
have failed to put forward any proposals for measures to counteract 
the perceived non-military threats, other security documents were 
produced in Finland during those years which both present threat 
perceptions and define means of responding to them. The relations of 
these government-level programmes and strategies to the security and 
defence policy reports (in terms of directing future actions) have 
nevertheless remained unclear. 
As far as its proposals for coping with the perceived threats are 
concerned, the Strategy for Securing Functions Vital to Society may 
be regarded as complementary to the Government Report on Finnish 
Security and Defence Policy, and it may be estimated on the basis of 
the present research that Finland is gradually shifting towards a 
security model aimed at protecting the (broad-based) essential 
functions of society. Correspondingly, the extension of the concepts of 
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security and threats in Finnish society to apply more specifically to 
internal and individual security has resulted in an attempt to define 
means of responding to perceived threats to this security through the 
medium of the Internal Security Programme. Both this latter 
programme and the SFVS strategy were products of the early years of 
the millennium and reflect the Finnish understanding of security and 
threats to it, but at the same time they also reflect a transitional period 
in terms of national security documents and the lack of a security 
strategy that might unite “all the various securities”. The division of 
the field of security among a number of documents would be justified 
if it meant that each one could concentrate on threat perceptions at a 
particular level, but in practise our security discourse gives expression 
to the difficulty of determining the boundaries between perceived 
threats to international, national and internal security and to the need 
for coordinating the measures taken in response to those threats and in 
general for cooperation between the various branches of the 
administration. The present situation creates an unnecessary conflict 
that stands in the way of the construction of an overall security system 
and introduces tensions into the practical implementation of Finnish 
security policy. 
The broad-based concept of security that has become established as a 
part of Finnish security policy and within Finnish society as a whole 
has proved problematic with regard to the construction of both threat 
perceptions and overall security. In the first place it is a question of 
the difficulty encountered in delimiting the securitization of the new 
threats. Very many things have been framed as perceived threats, at 
least in political parlance, and have gradually come to be securitized 
through the various security documents that have been issued – in fact 
the production of new security documents is an illustrative example of 
this trend – and attempts have been made to enhanced the political 
weight of some of these things by referring to them as threat 
perceptions. Indeed, it may be claimed that Finnish security discourse 
in the early years of the 21st century was guided by a threat-centred 
approach, a conscious diversification of the range of perceived threats 
and increase in their number, and in this way by an emphasis on the 
politicization of threat images.  
Secondly, the broadening of the scope of the perceived threats and the 
increase in their complexity have made it more difficult to delimit 
them and assign them to different security documents and branches of 
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the administration. One of the most crucial and most intensively 
disputed issues concerning the process of constructing the 2004 
Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy was the 
decision as to which threat perceptions should be discussed in the 
report and how broad-based the concept of security accepted in it 
should be. It proved impossible to give a clear answer to this question, 
as shown by the difficulties encountered in defining the perceived 
threats and the conflicts between the branches of the administration. 
Particular attention should be paid in future government reports on 
security and defence policy to providing more precise conceptual 
points of departure for the construction of threat perceptions . It is 
essential to set out from the content of the concepts of “security” and 
“threat”, as these affect both the means and the objectives of the 
security policy that is to be elaborated. Conceptual clarity can help to 
promote logicality in terms of policy and consistency in 
administration, and it is an absolute requirement for efficient action in 
controlling and combating threats. One may ask, of course, how broad 
a concept of security is needed to provide an appropriate and logical 
basis for a security policy analysis and properly defined threat 
perceptions – and how this concept should be formulated. The 
government report nowadays covers virtually all the institutional 
dimensions of security in Finnish society, so that (if the intention is to 
continue with this government report procedure) attention should be 
paid not so much to securitization as to desecuritization .  
The explaining of concepts is not simply an academic matter, for their 
accurate definition can be of considerable significance in the field of 
concrete political action (e.g. the defining of broad-based security, 
non-military threats and the new threats in the context of the present 
government report). A failure to analyse one‟s concepts or to define 
them properly can lay the process of constructing perceived threats 
open to political controversy and increase the likelihood that all 
manner of things may be defined as threat images that fall within the 
scope of security policy and all manner of political interests may be 
associated with them. Similarly, if there is a need to make substantial 
changes or extensions to perceived threats that form a part of the 
government‟s security policy, it should be possible to update the 
concept of security policy. It is possible to ask, for example, to what 
extent development policy and the threat perceptions connected with it 
belong within the scope of security policy. Clarification of the 
concepts involved can help in the analysis and discussion of security 
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policy, in that it can ensure that the actors are speaking about the same things. Clearly defined concepts are also useful when dividing the responsibility for action between various actors, especially in connection with the recommendation of means for responding to perceived threats. 
When attempting to clarify concepts it is nevertheless necessary to avoid linking threat perceptions too closely with particular branches of the administration. Although it is in part justifiable to “distribute” these perceptions among a number of branches and a number of security documents, this can easily lead to power struggles or tussles over the allocation of funding between the authorities concerned. This was clearly the case with the 2004 government report, when a certain degree of competition was detectable between the perceived international, national and internal security threats both during the construction of the report and in connection with its discussion in Parliament. It is natural, of course, for each branch of the administration to attempt to lay emphasis on the need to preserve or increase the political weight behind its own threat perceptions, leading to a situation in which it is difficult to develop an overall security policy (which is able to take account of and combine all the dimensions of security) or measures to cope with perceived threats that involve collaboration between branches of the administration. Correspondingly, the increased complexity of the threats and the progressively more difficult task of perceiving the reality behind them clearly necessitate closer cooperation between the various branches of the administration in responding to them. This enjoins us to examine critically the structure of the set of Finnish security documents that were produced in the early years of the 21st century: did they really promote the drive for total security or did they make it more difficult to achieve? 
Security has to be built up in a comprehensive manner – in the form of total security. By analogy with the concept of total defence of the territory of Finland,214 which of course is in itself too closely linked to the defence administration, it should be a matter of collaboration between all the actors involved in generating security. One crucial question for Finland at that time was how the threat perceptions that 
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policy, in that it can ensure that the actors are speaking about the same 
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responsibility for action between various actors, especially in 
connection with the recommendation of means for responding to 
perceived threats. 
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these perceptions among a number of branches and a number of 
security documents, this can easily lead to power struggles or tussles 
over the allocation of funding between the authorities concerned. This 
was clearly the case with the 2004 government report, when a certain 
degree of competition was detectable between the perceived 
international, national and internal security threats both during the 
construction of the report and in connection with its discussion in 
Parliament. It is natural, of course, for each branch of the 
administration to attempt to lay emphasis on the need to preserve or 
increase the political weight behind its own threat perceptions, leading 
to a situation in which it is difficult to develop an overall security 
policy (which is able to take account of and combine all the 
dimensions of security) or measures to cope with perceived threats 
that involve collaboration between branches of the administration. 
Correspondingly, the increased complexity of the threats and the 
progressively more difficult task of perceiving the reality behind them 
clearly necessitate closer cooperation between the various branches of 
the administration in responding to them. This enjoins us to examine 
critically the structure of the set of Finnish security documents that 
were produced in the early years of the 21st century: did they really 
promote the drive for total security or did they make it more difficult 
to achieve? 
Security has to be built up in a comprehensive manner – in the form of 
total security. By analogy with the concept of total defence of the 
territory of Finland,214 which of course is in itself too closely linked to 
the defence administration, it should be a matter of collaboration 
between all the actors involved in generating security. One crucial 
question for Finland at that time was how the threat perceptions that 
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were formulated could be handled administratively without clashes 
over resources or jurisdiction . The umbrella concept of total security 
naturally calls for a comprehensive security strategy, an overall 
Council of State policy that consists of a security document that takes 
all dimensions into account and accommodates all the means available 
in the various branches of the administration for responding to the 
perceived threats. It also calls for the foundation of a body comparable 
to the Security and Defence Committee that could coordinate the work 
of all the various actors engaged in combating the perceived threats, 
either by creating a new institution for this purpose or by releasing an 
existing committee from its ties to a particular branch of the 
administration. The important thing is that there should be an 
understanding of the construction of security as a single entity – total 
security as an interactive symbiosis of innumerable contributory 
factors and dimensions.  
Also connected with the construction and categorization of perceived 
threats to Finland in the early years of the 21st century was the 
prevailing manner of framing threat images, the custom of speaking of 
new, broad-based security or old, traditional security and of new, non-
military threat perceptions or military threat perceptions. These 
framing patterns that allude to the social construction of dichotomies 
in security and perceived threats were markedly to the fore at the 
preparation stage leading to the 2004 government report and in its 
discussion in Parliament, and also in the report of the Security Policy 
Monitoring Group. It was a question of finding a balance between the 
threats described as military and non-military, of seeking some kind of 
political prioritization and of sensing a certain incompatibility 
between these perceived threats. Concepts were used to construct and 
maintain an unnecessary dichotomy, and may be seen to have fostered 
instances of threat perception competition between the branches of the 
administration. Talk of the broad-based nature of security was 
frequently used in the threat perception discourse in a conscious 
attempt to establish a conceptual distinction vis-à-vis the old (military) 
form of security, although in reality military security is simply one 
part of the entity known as broad-based security.   
Questions of budgetary funding are an essential element in Finnish 
threat perception policy. It is the prevailing concept of security 
together with the politically prioritized and legitimated threat per-
ceptions that guide the determination of response measures – and the 
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allocation of budgetary funds for this purpose. The latter, financial 
aspect had in fact become a more challenging and complicated issue 
than ever by 2004. The expanding of the concept of security and the 
securitization of the new threats had meant at the same time that more 
threat perceptions than ever before were being put forward by 
instances other than the defence administration. Since every threat 
perception is drawn up in a particular branch of the administration, it 
is handled administratively as a matter raised by that branch, which 
thereby becomes responsible for its political legitimation and for 
ensuring a sufficiency of financial resources for responding to it. This 
has meant that a pronounced sectorization has been visible in Finnish 
threat perception policy since the beginning of the new millennium, in 
spite of the fact that the perceptions themselves have shown precisely 
the opposite trend, the diffusion of security issues among sectors and 
across the boundaries between branches of the administration. The 
background factors leading to this situation have included the more 
severe competition between threat perceptions over the distribution of 
the limited budgetary funds available for securitization purposes . On 
the other hand, it has also been a question of a power struggle between 
the branches or ministries themselves, with each trying to defend its 
own “threat territory” and lay emphasis on the functions for which it is 
responsible as means for combating threats. 
Questions of the allocation of funding were prominent at the 
preparation stage in the case of the 2004 government report and 
during the discussion of the report in Parliament. What was at issue 
was differences of opinion between branches of the administration and 
between individual politicians regarding the political prioritization of 
the various threat perceptions and the means proposed for 
counteracting the threats – and the consequent distribution of 
government funds. This threat perception competition was particularly 
severe between the Ministry of the Interior and the defence admi-
nistration, i.e. between the internal security and military threat models, 
but it should be noted that the competition was not a controversy over 
the content of the perceived threats as such but was connected with the 
status of the government report as the only security document that 
directly affected the allocation of government money. Above all, an 
inconsistency was noted by the Ministry of the Interior in the fact that, 
given the political emphasis on the broad-based concept of security 
and the growing intensity of the perceived non-military threats, the 
government report confirmed the allocation of resources only in the 
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case of the defence administration. The truth was that the Internal 
Security Programme did not have the same status of authorizing the 
distribution of funding. The Ministry of the Interior had attempted to 
securitize its perceived threats in the context of the report in order to 
increase their political weight and guarantee sufficient long-term 
funding for them, but the indeterminacy that surrounded some of the 
concepts in the report at the preparation stage led to conflicting 
interpretations as to which perceived threats should be discussed in it. 
Although the threat perceptions constructed by the Foreign Ministry 
did not carry with them the same expectations of funding, the ministry 
did attempt during the preparation stage (while underlining the 
political weight carried by the report as a security document) to 
emphasize its international threat images and those that could be 
responded to by means of foreign policy measures. In the case of the 
defence administration, the procedure by which the government 
placed security and defence policy reports before Parliament would 
seem to have been highly significant and necessary, as its politically 
approved policy outlines guaranteed the defence administration the 
funding that it needed (even from one government‟s term of office to 
the next) and legitimated its operational and developmental plans on 
the basis of the perceived threats that had been approved. 
The procedure of setting out Finland‟s security and defence policy in 
the form of a government report to Parliament has undoubtedly been 
instrumental in promoting a struggle over the allocation of funds. This 
(needless) competition between threat perceptions over the allocation 
of funds does not reflect upon the perceptions as such as much as on 
the weakness of the structure of government security documents. 
From the viewpoint of the defence administration, however, a 
procedure of this kind that enables long-term development plans to be 
made can be regarded as justified. But then the military threat models 
were the only ones among those securitized in the report that received 
funding for their control, increasing numbers of non-military threats 
have been securitized in government reports but no funding has been 
allocated for their management. Thus the perceived threats detailed in 
the report are of unequal status, and it is quite natural that other 
branches of the administration should attempt to improve the political 
priority attached to their own threat perceptions relative to the military 
threat models. The government report procedure in its present form 
thus promotes sectorization, and it is clear that the extension of the 
concepts of security and threat and the increased political weight 
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attached to non-military threat perceptions give rise to a need for 
securitization funding to be more equally distributed . This is again a 
question of building up total security, which will require not only joint 
coordination of the distribution of security funding but also the partial 
reversal of the recent sectorization of security and the intensification 
and clarification of cooperation between branches of the adminis-
tration. 
The financial resources to be allocated, or available for allocation, to 
the construction of security also affect the general construction of the 
perceived threats and the threat reality to be described. It is difficult to 
imagine a situation in which a (public) government report were to put 
forward perceived threats to the existence of the Finnish state without 
a response in the form of an allocation of funds (or with only a very 
small such additional allocation). It is possible, of course, for quite 
serious struggles over the combating of threats and their compatibility 
with the available resources to take place at the preparation stage for a 
report (away from the public eye), but in the eventual report that 
outlines Finland‟s security and defence policy they will appear in a 
mutually balanced form. On the other hand, if political guidelines 
regarding the financial framework are laid down at the preparatory 
stage, as was the case with the 2004 government report, the resources 
for responding to the perceived threats will have been defined before 
the threats themselves and may by implication be interpreted as 
having affected the construction of the threat descriptions. In other 
words, if the perceived threats are to be fitted to predetermined 
budgetary allocations, they will have to be constructed in such a way 
as to be affordable. This will mean that the threat reality in the report 
will be built up from the inside outwards, i.e. internal factors 
(financial constraints) will affect the description of the security 
environment and the ways in which the threat perceptions are framed. 
Thus the logic of resource-based construction of the threat reality will 
lead to the construction of the perceived threats on financial grounds. 
It is evident from the above that the theoretical frame of reference for 
the interpretation attempted here requires to be filled out with an 
element that takes account of the allocation of budgetary funds as part 
of the political context. Economic resources affect the construction of 
perceived threats, and they can similarly help us to interpret the ways 
in which the threat perceptions have been framed, the constructive 
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relativity involved in this, the political interests lying behind the 
securitization proposals and the conflicts between threat perceptions. 
The social relativity introduced into the political construction of threat 
images when combined with the research aspect also comes to the fore 
when images have to be rejected, i.e. it affects the art of saying “no”. 
The threat reality is constructed not only by proposing perceived 
threats but also by opting not to propose them. Finland‟s economic 
and material resources do not permit preparations to be made for all 
eventualities. Politically speaking, it is very difficult on a published 
security policy agenda to put forward a perceived threat and then 
indicate that insufficient resources are available to provide protection 
against it. Thus it was decided in the preparation of the 2004 report to 
leave the nuclear threat to Finland outside the set of perceived threats 
to be presented, primarily on resource grounds, although admittedly 
the decision was also influenced by the association of this threat with 
Russia. 
One thing that attracts attention in the administrative preparation of 
the 2004 report in addition to the controversies surrounding some of 
the perceived threats is the lack of political controversy in the case of 
the military threats. The military threat models drawn up by the 
defence administration were accepted for securitization in the report 
with relatively little difficulty, even though it is these that may be 
regarded as being the most indeterminately framed of all. The 
typology of framing set out in the theoretical section (4.3) would in 
fact be open to some adjustment on this point. The fact was that the 
politicians had an implicit belief in the threat models produced by the 
defence administration, regarding the Defence Forces and their high-
ranking officers (who in addition were in the powerful position of 
acting as expert advisors) as reliable constructors of threat models, the 
views put forwards by whom were difficult for the members of the 
working group to contradict, and still more so for the members of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. This may be 
regarded as one rather unusual feature of the preparatory work for the 
report: the defence administration found it relatively easy to securitize 
its threat models without any appreciable political debate or demand 
that their models should be identified to particular sources. This ease 
of acceptance and lack of justification at the preparation stage was 
very much at variance with the discussion of the report in Parliament, 
where numerous members questioned the validity of the models and 
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their current relevance. Similarly, the general public opinion regarding 
the low probabilities attached to these models could be interpreted as 
suggesting that better justifications would have been in order. 
Also connected with the securitization of the military threat models 
was the influence exercised by factual information during the 
preparation stage. The Defence Forces were assumed on the basis of 
the military threat models to be in possession of information which, on 
account of its sensitivity or confidential nature, could not even be 
divulged to all of the Cabinet Committee members. The President of 
Finland, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister had been 
informed by the Defence Forces of the “background information” to 
the military threat models, and those that they were prepared to 
legitimate were difficult for the other actors to contest (if only on the 
grounds of the procedure for preparing the report and the powerful 
position of these people in the initiating of new legislation (influence 
of the institutional context). This manner in which the military threat 
models were securitized bears some similarities to the Finnish concept 
of security, in which, in spite of the emphasis placed on non-military 
threats, the principal dimension on which a threat to the existence of 
the Finnish state is perceived is that of military security. It is felt 
essential to face up to the military threats, for however improbable 
they may be, their consequences would be extremely serious. Where 
securitization of the military threat models is concerned there is also 
the question of their powerful institutionalized position: it would be 
politically extremely difficult to “cut off” the long temporal 
continuum that these threat models represent. It is easier to keep them 
on the security policy agenda “just in case”. At the same time, of 
course, there is no need to frame a highly institutionalized threat 
model that is closely associated with the whole Finnish culture of 
external threats in a manner that will arouse fear. The defence 
administration in its re-framing of the military threat models has 
indeed attempted to bring them up to date, so that the re-framed model 
of a large-scale offensive contained in the 2004 report, in which the 
old threat model was expressed in a new form, may be regarded as a 
conscious effort to ensure its political legitimation. 
Although military threat models occupy a strong position in the 
Finnish understanding of security, their legitimacy has been somewhat 
undermined by the lack of justification given for them in the 2004 
report and their indeterminate framing. It can be noted, however, that 
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demands for the justification of the military threat models have been 
gaining in strength within Finnish society since the early years of the 
21st century. The dominant position of non-military threat 
perceptions, the open atmosphere for threat perception policy 
discussion, the western threat reality and the weakening of the support 
provided by historical experiences in the course of time have 
gradually come to pose a more serious challenge to the political 
consensus regarding the military threat models, making it more 
difficult to maintain these in Finnish society. This trend can be 
expected to continue and gain momentum, provided no major changes 
occur in Finland’s security environment. The veil of secrecy 
surrounding the military threat models and the reluctance to discuss 
them in public have also become problematic for the political elite, 
detracting from the credibility of their security policy argumentation 
on account of the absence of justifications, or at least their 
insufficiency, and at the same time the general public‟s belief in the 
authenticity of the threat models is apt to decline. With the 
strengthening of the political priority assigned to non-military threat 
perceptions and the waning of the dominant position enjoyed by those 
in the military security sector, politicians can easily find themselves 
faced with a choice as to whether it would be more expedient to 
channel some of the budgetary allocation for defence towards the 
management of threats that are more distinctly framed and are closer 
to the everyday experience of the voters. The party platforms 
examined for the purposes of the present research, for example, 
included demands for more developmental policy resources and for 
internal security measures but not for combating military threats. This 
state of affairs challenges the defence administration to justify its 
threat models more openly in future. If the threat models are 
indistinctly framed, it is difficult to convey a true picture of the 
resources required for responding to the threats.  
As it is, the perceived threats put forward in the security and defence 
policy report as a whole are expressed in a guarded form of political 
language. The desire to achieve a consensus in favour of approving 
the threat perceptions, the principle of “offending no one” and the 
indeterminacy of the broad concept of security have led to an 
indistinct and generalized style of framing them, a fear of describing 
the threats in too much detail. There are so many political and 
ministerial interests hidden behind the threat perceptions, so many 
identity policy aspirations and so many attempts to reconcile differing demands for the justification of the military threat models have been 
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interpretations. In this sense the present research may be regarded as 
having brought forward a new understanding and interpretation of the 
manner in which the perceptions were prepared for use in the 
government report and of the factors influencing their construction.  
The report may to a significant degree be regarded as an admin-
istratively constructed document in the compilation of which civil 
servants and expert advisors have played a prominent part. In spite of 
this major administrative contribution, however, the perceived threats 
themselves always represented in the last resort the outcomes of 
political choices, compromises and decisions. Although the structure 
of the preparation process gave the civil servants considerable power, 
influence and opportunities, the securitization of perceived threats was 
a politically regulated and supervised process. Some of the policies 
were decided upon politically in advance and in the early stages of the 
preparatory work, which placed constraints on the civil servants when 
it came to putting forward and weighing up various alternatives – in 
the case of the perceived threats as elsewhere.  This means that a 
critical evaluation should also be made of the rationality and 
applicability of the ponderous administrative preparation process. 
The structure and legal framework of that process allowed certain 
political actors to exercise a considerable amount of personal 
influence on the construction of the threat perceptions. It is clear, for 
instance, that the threat interpretations put forward by the President of 
Finland, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of 
Defence had better chances of contributing to the threat reality as 
presented in the report than did those of other actors, especially since 
these members of the elite were able to influence the construction of 
the threat images not only directly (above all through decisions taken 
in the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy) but also 
indirectly (through the civil servants who represented them in the 
working group). It was the structure created for the preparation of the 
2004 government report that made this indirect channel of influence 
available (and ensured that it was available), since the working group 
was to construct the report under close political supervision from the 
President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence 
Minister. This was one reason why the fingerprints of the Foreign 
Minister were clearly visible in the non-military threat perceptions, 
whereas it was the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces who 
played a major role in the construction, and particularly the framing, 
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of the military threat models. Thus evidence of influence exercised by 
both individual persons or branches of the administration and overall 
normative factors are to be detected in the threat perceptions. Indeed, 
the construction of Finnish threat perceptions in general is to a great 
extent a matter of variations in the relative weights carried by these 
sources of influence in interaction with trends in the security 
environment and with the international threat discourse. 
The public threat reality built into the government reports and other 
Finnish security documents is to be understood as a politically flexible 
expedient that permits the making of political choices. The perceived 
threats can be constructed and adapted in accordance with political 
interests and aspirations. Politics in the sense in which it is 
conceptualized in this work is always present where the process of 
constructing perceived threats is an interactive one. The threat images 
serve as tools for the exercise of security politics, which implies that 
threat perception policy can be used to construct a Finnish security 
and defence policy that has a certain content – the content that one 
would wish for. The crucial issue in threat perception policy is how 
and why perceived threats are constructed politically and certain 
things are securitized. 
The constructivist and political nature of threat perceptions calls for 
constant critical evaluation of both the perceived threats themselves 
and the way in which particular things are securitized. It was in fact 
the case in the early years of the 21st century that increasing numbers 
of the perceived threats put forward by the government administration 
were questioned in public, and this more open, discursive atmosphere 
meant that the structure of the threat reality was more open to 
differences in viewpoint and that actors were under more pressure to 
justify the threat images that they proposed. This open, critical 
discussion within society at large should be seen as a factor capable of 
promoting a consistent understanding of the threat situation. Although 
extensive political discussions of perceived threats are an important 
part of democracy, their excessive politicization could lead to the 
erratic generation of responses to the threats – in view of the 
sometimes short-term nature of political interests. At the same time it 
should be remembered that there is no single, ready-made, permanent 
truth that governs the specification of security and perceived threats.     
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Epilogue: threat perceptions as a means of constructing both security 
and insecurity 
When we construct a description of the threat reality that surrounds us 
we are at the same time constructing insecurity. Insecurity is easier to 
recognize and understand than security, so that threat perceptions can 
be expected to foster a sense of insecurity regardless of what the 
threats might be. The representation of certain things in the form of 
threat perceptions, as framed threats, and the securitization of these in 
Council of State security documents is bound to give rise to insecurity 
even if the threats do not call for any exceptional counter-measures. 
The Finns did indeed feel a sense of insecurity in the early years of the 
new millennium, on account of a deduction achieved through 
interaction between the individual and the collectivity regarding the 
existence of threatening factors, an anxiety to be guarded against both 
individually and collectively. It is possible to respond to threats that 
generate insecurity by taking actions that generate security, with the 
objective of achieving freedom from the threats, or more precisely, 
striving towards a situation in which the threats are felt to be under 
control and reasonable provisions have been for responding to them. It 
is possible to generate this security by constructing threat perceptions 
of the right kind, ones that can be brought under control, although all 
of this is relative, of course: a balancing act between feelings of 
security and insecurity. 
The construction of threat perceptions is thus a two-edged sword, 
creating security on the one hand and insecurity on the other. The 
exposure of a threat is at the same time both desirable and undesirable. 
Politically, however, issues gain greater weight if they are presented 
in the form of threats, and still more so if others can be persuaded to 
believe in the reality and seriousness of those threats . Threat per-
ceptions are not constructed solely on the basis of material factors but 
essentially through the correct process of framing within the social 
reality. Through politics these structures are combined to form a 
political threat reality, as manifested in the threat perceptions 
contained in the government reports on Finnish security and defence 
policy, for example. Jointly approved, political securitized threat 
perceptions entitle the actors who present them to take measures to 
control or combat the threats concerned – on the grounds that a threat 
calls for a response. Security, the opposite of insecurity, can be seen to 
imply the existence of sufficient resources for protecting those things 
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that are regarded as important and controlling the factors that 
constitute threats. A feeling of security can be achieved better when 
sufficient resources are directed to towards controlling the threat in 
each case, although the sufficiency of resources is in itself a relative 
and politically highly disputable matter. It is impossible, for instance, 
to determine in absolute terms at what point Finland‟s defence 
capability becomes credible, or when sufficient measures have been 
taken to bring the threat of terrorism under control. It is extremely 
difficult in the context of threat perceptions to define any 
unambiguous measures of the production of security, i.e. control over 
a specific threat. 
One should take a very critical view of excessive securitization (in 
which almost everything becomes a perceived threat) and thereby of 
the construction of a burgeoning threat culture. By no means all things 
and phenomena should be regarded in a security context as perceived 
threats; on the contrary, there is a need to try and reduce the number 
of things to be securitized and to emphasize the role of normal 
political decision-making procedures without reference to the security 
or insecurity aspect. Securitization should be a carefully considered 
process, and more emphasis than at present should be laid on 
desecuritization. New threats were frequently produced in Finland in 
the early years of the 21st century simply because perceived threats 
were a good way of directing the allocation of resources, maintaining 
or improving the political power of the actor responsible and 
increasing the political and social weight assigned to certain matters. 
One essential, although very difficult, question, however, concerns the 
commensurability of threat perceptions and their political 
prioritization. To what extent does organized crime pose a threat to the 
existence of the Finnish state, or to what extent should resources be 
devoted to military threat models that are regarded as extremely 
improbable? If some of the threat perceptions are intentionally 
“forgotten”, will this generate insecurity or security? Given that we 
are still engaged in increasingly heated discussions on how to define 
the object of securitization, the nature of threat perceptions and the 
means of responding to threats, it may be concluded that threat 
perception policy has been very much to the fore in Finnish society 
during this early part of the 21st century. 
Finland’s threat perception policy in recent times can be seen in the 
light of the present research to have been strongly influenced by an 
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uncontrolled broadening of the concept of security and the resulting 
difficulties experienced in combining the various dimensions of 
security and the resulting disputes between branches of the 
administration with regard to their perceived threats . The threat 
perceptions have been allowed to compete with each other, as it were, 
in the context of a broader-based concept of security in which both 
national and international influences have been brought to bear on 
their construction. This competition between threat perceptions was to 
be seen in the 2004 Government Report on Finnish Security and 
Defence Policy both at the administrative preparation stage and in its 
public political discussion in Parliament. The difficulty of achieving 
commensurability and political prioritization among the threat 
perceptions led to instances of competition between them, a situation 
confirmed by the structure of Finnish security documents during the 
same period. The broadening of the threat perceptions (whether this is 
regarded as a good thing or not) and their increasing complexity are 
features that have become a social reality, and we are obliged to live 
in the midst of that reality. 
If security changes, then the threat perceptions will change; and if the 
threat perceptions change, the means for responding to the threats will 
change, or at least will need to be changed. From a threat perception 
policy perspective, the principal requirement for the future may be 
seen to be the production of means of responding that span the 
boundaries between branches of the administration and are targeted 
at constructing a state of total security . This would imply a broader, 
more integrated understanding of the generation of security than that 
which prevails at present, a single entity constructed by all the actors 
together in response to the various threat perceptions.  
The construction of security and insecurity is a continuous process. 
The threats tell us what we should be afraid of and guide us towards 
guarding against those things. When a threat reality of that kind is 
developed through human interaction an element of threat perception 
policy, or threat perception politics, is always present, since an almost 
infinite number of interpretations of the material and social reality 
may exist for the same threat. We are obliged to live amidst these 
interpretations – securely or insecurely. Finally it should be remem-
bered that we have been dealing here with threat perceptions as a 
political concept, and it is worth noting that where threat perceptions 
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can be turned into politics, politics can be turned into threat 
perceptions. 
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